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The "good faith" settlement is a vehicle by which a joint tortfeasor
can free himself from the obligation to pay his proportionate share of
plaintiff's damages. In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court,I the California Supreme Court applied the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence to multi-party cases. The court held that although the
doctrine of joint and several liability remained in full force,2 the liabil-
ity for the plaintiff's losses should be apportioned among the tortfeasors
on the basis of comparative fault? This apportionment could be made
under the theory of partial indemnity4 whereby a tortfeasor who had
paid more than his allocable share could recover the excess from his
joint tortfeasors. However, the court allowed one important exception;
a tortfeasor who had previously entered into a "good faith" settlement
with the plaintiff would be released from claims by his fellow
tortfeasors for partial indemnity.5 Not every settlement would consti-
tute a release-only a settlement that was in "good faith."
A. Summary of the Article
This article focuses on what type of settlement between one
tortfeasor and the plaintiff should be determined to be in "good faith"
so as to discharge that settling tortfeasor from liability for his propor-
tionate share of the plaintiffs judgment. Its purpose is to examine the
issue within the parameters of current legislation and California
Supreme Court opinions. The article advocates no legislative change
or change in the rules articulated by the supreme court. Rather, it rec-
ommends an approach to the "good faith" issue within these estab-
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. A.B. 1971,
Stanford University; J.D. 1974, University of Southern California.
1. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
2. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
3. Id. at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
4. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
5. Id. at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
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lished guidelines. Part II traces the theories of apportionment of fault
and discusses the effect of a settlement on such apportionment. Part III
serves three purposes. First, it provides an analysis of the important
California cases dealing with the issue of a "good faith" settlement.
Second, it illustrates the chronological progression of the definition of
"good faith." It shows how the present definition resulted from each
court in succession adding its own dicta to prior dicta until recent deci-
sions have reached results which the courts themselves have admitted
are inequitable. Third, it provides the framework for the analysis of
the possible definitions of a "good faith" settlement found in the re-
mainder of the article. Part IV proposes a methodology for defining
"good faith," identifies the policy considerations relevant to an inter-
pretation of a "good faith" settlement, and recommends that these poli-
cies be accommodated rather than ranked. Part V analyzes four
possible definitions of "good faith" in terms of these policies and rec-
ommends a definition of a "good faith" settlement to be utilized by the
courts. The test proposed by this article is that a settlement is in "good
faith" if it falls within the reasonable range of the settlor's liability to
the other parties. The components of the reasonable range test are dis-
cussed in Part V-D.
B. An Illustration of the Effect of a "Good Faith" Settlement
The effect of a finding that a settlement between the plaintiff and
one of several alleged joint tortfeasors6 has been made in "good faith"
can be illustrated by the following example.
Assume that the plaintiff was injured and sued joint tortfeasors A
and B. Under the comparative fault principles of American Motorcycle
Association v. Superior Court,7 the jury would determine the percentage
of fault of each party. Let us suppose that the jury rendered a $ 100,000
judgment against both defendants and found thatA was 80% at fault, B
was 20% at fault and the plaintiff had no fault. The plaintiff could then
recover the entire $100,000 from either co-defendant under the rules of
6. The term "joint tortfeasors" is used today to encompass both tortfeasors acting in
concert, which was its original meaning, and tortfeasors who, though acting independently,
cause an individual injury (also called "concurrent tortfeasors"). Turcon Constr., Inc. v.
Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 282-83, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580, 582 (1983); Fleming,
Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems
Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1464, 1482 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fleming]. The term 'joint tortfeasors" as used in
Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1984) embraces joint, concurrent, and suc-
cessive tortfeasors. Turcon Constr., 139 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
7. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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joint and several liability. 8 Assume that the plaintiff chose to collect
the entire judgment from B. Defendant B could then by way of a sepa-
rate action or a cross-complaint for partial indemnity9 recover from A
the amount equal to A's proportionate share of the loss, or $80,000.
Even if the plaintiff chose to sue only B without naming A as a co-
defendant the result would be the same. B could cross-complain
against A for partial indemnity in the same action'" or seek partial in-
demnity from A in a separate action."I In either event, B would have
the right to recoverA's proportionate share of the judgment from A. B
would end up being out of pocket $20,000 for plaintiffs injuries, andA
would be out of pocket $80,000. Each of the tortfeasors would have
paid an amount equivalent to his percentage of fault.
However, when there is a settlement between the plaintiff and one
joint tortfeasor, that settling tortfeasor may end up paying less than his
proportionate share of the plaintiff's ultimate recovery.' 2 If that settle-
ment is determined to be in "good faith," the other joint tortfeasors
may seek no partial indemnity from the settling joint tortfeasor. 13 The
dollar amount of the settlement is deducted from the amount the plain-
tiff may recover against the other joint tortfeasors, but the remaining
joint tortfeasors will be required to pay the balance of the plaintiff's
judgment without any right to partial indemnity from the settling
tortfeasor.1 In the above example, if the plaintiff settled in "good
faith" with co-defendant A for $10,000 and the jury entered the same
judgment of $100,000 in the trial against nonsettling co-defendant B,
the $10,000 judgment would be subtracted from the amount that plain-
tiff could recover against B, but B would be required to pay the entire
remaining $90,000 to the plaintiff and would have no claims against A.
Therefore, even though B was only 20% at fault, because of A's "good
faith" settlement with the plaintiff, A would pay $10,000 or 10% of
8. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
9. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200. The term "partial indemnity" is
used in American Motorcycle and will be used in this article. Other terms used to describe
the same principle are "equitable indemnity" and "comparative indemnity."
10. Id.
11. E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d 497, 510, 579 P.2d 505, 513,
146 Cal. Rptr. 614, 622 (1978).
12. He could also pay more, but the issue of whether a settlement is in "good faith"
presents itself only when the nonsettling tortfeasors think that the settling tortfeasor is pay-
ing less than his or her fair share.
13. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West
Supp. 1984);American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
14. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 603,
578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
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plaintiff's judgment and B would be forced to pay $90,000 or 90%.15
If the settlement is determined not to be a "good faith" settlement,
then each tortfeasor bears his proportional share of the loss. Assuming
A still wished to settle, which is unlikely, B could recover $70,000 from
A in a suit for partial indemnity so that B would end up paying $20,000
andA would end up paying $80,000 ($10,000 in settlement and an ad-
ditional $70,000 to B).
Therefore, each prejudgment settlement found to be in "good
faith" affects the ultimate expense borne by each tortfeasor. Absent
any settlement, all defendants are liable in direct proportion to their
respective degree of fault. By settling before judgment, one tortfeasor
may discharge his entire liability by contributing less than his propor-
tionate share, leaving the other defendants saddled with the entire
judgment reduced only by the amount of the settlement. The cheaper
the settlement, the smaller the reduction. Thus, the remaining
tortfeasors have a definite and calculable financial interest in the
amount of any settlement.
Because only a settlement that a court finds to be in "good faith"
will alter the comparative liabilities of the tortfeasors, the decision as to
whether the settlement was made in "good faith" is crucial. It is this
finding of "good faith" that triggers the release of the settling tortfeasor
from subsequent liability for partial indemnity. 6
The settlement which releases a "good faith" settlor can take place
in several factual settings. Probably the most common situation occurs
where a named defendant in plaintiff's action settles with the plaintiff. I7
However, there is no requirement that the settling tortfeasor be a
named defendant." Thus, tortfeasor A could pay an amount to the
plaintiff before any action was filed and if plaintiff later sued other
tortfeasors B and C, the "good faith" settlor A would be immune from
any cross-complaints by B or C. Also, if the plaintiff chose to sue only
tortfeasors B and C, and if B or C cross-complained against tortfeasor
15. The result would be the same if the plaintiff had settled with A before trial and had
only named B in the complaint. B would still have no right to seek partial indemnity from
A. See infra text accompanying notes 17-21.
16. A finding of "good faith" is usually followed by a motion for summary judgment to
dismiss the cross-complaint or the action for partial indemnity. Northrop Corp. v. Stinson
Sales Corp., 151 Cal. App. 3d 653, 658, 199 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1983); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 186 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1982).
18. Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 57, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136,
145 (1984). California Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 use the word
"tortfeasor" not "defendant," thus implying a broader scope of applicability. Id.
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A for partial indemnity, A could obtain a release from the claims for
partial indemnity by making a "good faith" settlement with the plain-
tiff prior to trial, even though A was not a defendant in the plaintiff's
action. 19 In another situation, one tortfeasor A could settle in "good
faith" with the plaintiff, and if he thought his settlement reflected more
than his fair share, he could sue or continue to pursue a cross-com-
plaint against a nonsettling tortfeasor B.2° However, as soon as B also
settled in "good faith" with plaintiff, A's right to such partial indemnity
would terminate.2
For ease of analysis, this article often refers to the settling or non-
settling defendant. However, the same principles would apply to any
tortfeasor, regardless of whether he was named as a defendant in plain-
tiff's action.
C. The "Good Faith" Hearing
The issue of "good faith" most often presents itself today in a pre-
trial hearing pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
877.622 which allows a party to seek a court order determining a settle-
ment or proposed settlement to be in "good faith." The hearing is usu-
ally requested by a co-defendant who wishes to settle with the plaintiff,
although the plaintiff sometimes is the moving party. Understandably,
the defendant seeks this determination so that he can be assured that if
he settles, he will be totally free from the litigation by being released
not only from plaintiff's claims but from claims for partial indemnity
by the joint tortfeasors as well. Usually, the defendant makes the find-
ing that his proposed settlement is in "good faith" a condition to his
final execution of the settlement agreement and will not enter into the
settlement absent this finding. Without it, he would still be liable for
partial indemnity so his settlement would have accomplished nothing.
If a nonsettling co-defendant thinks that the settlement is too low,
he will oppose the finding of "good faith" at the hearing. The non-
settling co-defendants do not want the settling defendant released from
liability for partial indemnity for a settlement price that is below the
settling defendant's "fair share" of proportionate liability for plaintiffs
19. Id.
20. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 262 (1978).
21. Owen v. United States, 73 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983); Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 707, 166 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1980).
22. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1984).
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harm, because the co-defendants are liable for the remaining amount
of the plaintiff's damages without reimbursement from the settlor.
II. BACKGROUND
The law regarding the obligation of a joint tortfeasor to pay a
share of any recovery awarded to plaintiff has undergone two dramatic
changes in the last thirty years. One rule that has remained constant is
that a joint tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff is free from any
obligation to contribute further toward the plaintiff's recovery. Since
1957, the only requirement of the settling tortfeasor's freedom has been
that the settlement made with the plaintiff be in "good faith."
This section will discuss briefly how California law developed
from a system of no contribution, to a system of contribution, to the
present system of partial indemnity among joint tortfeasors. The focus
will be on the effect that one tortfeasor's settlement with the plaintiff
has on that tortfeasor's obligation vis-a-vis his joint tortfeasors to pay a
portion of the plaintiffs judgment.
A. The Common Law Rule
Until 1957, California utilized the common law rule that there was
no right by joint tortfeasors to apportion or allocate the plaintiff's dam-
ages among themselves.23 The rule was penal in nature, punishing the
tortfeasors as "wrongdoers" by refusing to grant relief to them in ad-
justing losses among themselves. 24 Accordingly, each tortfeasor against
whom the plaintiff received a judgment was liable for the entire
amount of that judgment. The plaintiff could choose from which
tortfeasor to collect the judgment and once paid, that tortfeasor had no
right to seek contribution from other joint tortfeasors regardless of
whether they were defendants against whom the plaintiff had also re-
ceived a judgment or tortfeasors the plaintiff had chosen not to name in
the complaint.25
23. Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799); Thornton v.
Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 550, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1962); Comment, Contribution and
Indemnity Collide With Comparative Negiigence-The New Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity,
18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 779 (1978).
24. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993 n.5, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498, 503 n.5 (1972); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 291 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as LAW OF TORTS].
25. Prosser has said of this rule that "[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule
which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, uninten-
tionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to. . . the plaintiff's whim
or spite, or his collusion .... " See LAW OF TORTS, supra note 24, § 50, at 307.
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The rules with respect to settlement were equally rigid as far as the
plaintiff was concerned. If the plaintiff settled with one tortfeasor and
released him from liability, that release constituted a release of all other
tortfeasors as well.26
B. The Contribution Statutes
In 1957, the California Legislature sought to remedy the harshness
of the common law rule by passing the contribution statutes.27 These
26. Ellis v. Jewett Rhodes Motor Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 395, 400, 84 P.2d 791, 793 (1938);
Chetwood v. California Nat'l Bank, 113 Cal. 414, 45 P. 704 (1896), appeal dismissed, 171
U.S. 441 (1898); LAW OF TORTS, supra note 24, § 49, at 301-02 n.5. The basis and reasons for
the common law rule are somewhat cloudy. However, it appears to be based on the assump-
tion that where the tortious conduct of two or more persons combifies to cause a single,
indivisible injury to another, the injured party only has one cause of action and is entitled to
only one satisfaction. Therefore, a release of the cause of action against one of the
tortfeasors necessarily releases the others. McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 662-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); Thaxter, Joint Tortfeasors: Legislative Changes in the Rules Regarding Releases
and Contribution, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 180, 182 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Thaxter]. Covenants
not to sue, instead of releases, became the vogue because courts ruled that covenants not to
sue were not releases, and thus did not release the other tortfeasors. Kincheloe v. Retail
Credit Co., 4 Cal. 2d 21, 23-24, 46 P.2d 971, 972 (1935).
27. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980). The legislation had two general
objectives: equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault and encouragement of set-
tlements. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498, 503 (1972); see Thaxter, supra note 26, at 185. The 1957 contribution legislation
was sponsored by the State Bar of California. See Mull & Farley, 1957Legislative Program,
32 CAL. ST. B.J. 13, 17 (1957). In explaining the bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
State Bar declared:
The ancient basis of the rigid rule against contribution in this type of case is the
policy that the law should deny assistance to tortfeasors in adjusting losses among
themselves because they are wrongdoers and the law should not aid wrongdoers.
But this over-emphasizes the supposed penal character of liability in tort; it ignores
the general aim of the law for equal distribution of common burdens and of the
right of recovery of contribution in various situations, e.g., among cosureties. It
ignores also the fact that most tort liability results from inadvertently caused dam-
age and leads to the punishment of one wrongdoer by permitting another wrong-
doer to profit at his expense.
1 Sen. J. Appendix 130 (Reg. Sess. 1957).
The right of contribution applied only to negligent tortfeasors, and the bar to contribu-
tion among intentional wrongdoers under the common law was retained. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 875(d) (West 1980).
Another doctrine, although non-statutory in nature, which had evolved to temper the
common law bar to allocation of liability among tortfeasors was the doctrine of indemnity.
Indemnity, unlike contribution, did not divide responsibility among tortfeasors, but rather
totally shifted that responsibility from one tortfeasor to another. Express or contractual in-
demnity arose as a matter of contract between the parties. Implied or equitable indemnity
was a means by which a passively, impliedly, or secondarily negligent party, who without
active fault on his part had been compelled by reason of some obligation to pay damages
occasioned by the initial negligence of another, could shift the entire liability for the loss to
the person whose negligence was active or primary. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 15
Cal. App. 3d 137, 143, 92 Cal. Rptr. 809, 812-13 (1971). See also Molinari, Tort Indemnity in
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statutes are still part of the Code of Civil Procedure, but their general
applicability after the American Motorcycle decision is doubtful.28
The contribution statutes made two major changes in the common
law rules. The first change was to provide for the equal sharing of a
judgment by jointjudgment debtors. In order for the right of contribu-
tion to have arisen, two factors must have been present: (1) a joint
judgment must have been rendered against two or more defendants in
a tort action29 and (2) one defendant must have paid the entire joint
judgment or more than his pro rata share.30 A pro rata share was an
equal share,31 so if there were two joint judgment debtors, a pro rata
share was one-half; if there were three, a pro rata share was one-third.
A tortfeasor could not be compelled to make contribution beyond his
pro rata or equal share of the judgment.32
Even under the contribution statutes, the plaintiff was still able to
control the distribution of the loss among the tortfeasors. He did this
when he made his choice of which defendants to sue. Because contri-
bution was limited to tortfeasors against whom "a money judgment has
been rendered jointly,"33 no action for contribution could be filed
against a tortfeasor not sued by the plaintiff. Accordingly, no cross-
complaint could be filed by a named defendant against an unnamed
defendant in order to make him a defendant in the action so that the
required joint judgment could be obtained.34
California, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 159 (1968). The contribution statutes did not affect the
existing common law rights of express and implied indemnity. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 875() (West 1980).
28. The method of sharing plaintiff's loss among joint tortfeasors according to compara-
tive fault established under the supreme court's partial indemnity doctrine superseded the
method of sharing established by the contribution statutes. "In effect, the court read [the
contribution statutes] out of the statute book .... Fleming, supra note 6, at 1487. The
only one of the contribution statutes still applied today is Code of Civil Procedure section
877 dealing with "good faith" settlements. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
29. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(a) (West 1980); E.B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court, 56
Cal. App. 3d 650, 653, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541, 543 (1976); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Consani, 223
Cal. App. 2d 342, 344, 35 Cal. Rptr. 750, 751 (1963).
30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(c) (West 1980). Under the principle of joint and sev-
eral liability, the plaintiff could satisfy the judgment against whichever defendant he or she
chose. General Electric Co. v. State ex rel. Department of Public Works, 32 Cal. App. 3d
918, 926, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543, 548 (1973).
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876(a) (West 1980).
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875(c), 876(a) (West 1980). When one defendant had
been held liable because of the acts of another defendant, e.g., an employer's liability for the
tort of his employee, the two were obligated to contribute only one single pro rata share for
which there was a right of indemnity between them. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876(b) (West
1980).
33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(a) (West 1980).
34. Genera/Electric Co., 32 Cal. App. 3d at 925-26, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 547-48; Thornton v.
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A second major change made by the 1957 contribution legislation
was in the area of settlements. It was in this context that the concept of
a "good faith" settlement was first introduced into the law. The appli-
cable statute is Code of Civil Procedure section 87711 which is still im-
portant today for two reasons. First, it provides the historical context
of the "good faith" requirement. Second, although it applies specifi-
cally to contribution, the court in American Motorcycle applied its ra-
tionale to partial indemnity, and the cases grappling with the concept
of a "good faith" settlement in the partial indemnity area specifically
refer to section 877 and treat it as applicable in that context as well.
3 6
Section 877 establishes as a threshold determination whether or
not a settlement is in "good faith."'3 7 If "good faith" is found, several
things occur: (1) the settling tortfeasor is discharged from any obliga-
tion to make contribution to other tortfeasors (i.e., a judgment debtor
who pays more than his pro rata share of the plaintiffs judgment can-
not claim contribution from the settling tortfeasor);31 (2) the nonsettling
Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 551-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398-99 (1962); Fleming, supra note 6,
at 1488. "The result is a circular series of contingencies that cannot be satisfied. The de-
fendant has no right of contribution unless he obtains a joint judgment, he cannot obtain a
joint judgment unless he states a cause of action [by cross-complaint], and he cannot state a
cause of action unless he has a right of contribution." Goldenberg & Nicholas, Comparative
Liability Among Joint Tortfeasors: The Aftermath of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 8 U. WEST L.A.
L. REv. 23, 45 (1976).
35. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980) provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one
or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort-
(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its
terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount
stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
36. E.g., Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 57-58, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 136, 144-45 (1984); Northrop Corp. v. Stinson Sales Corp., 151 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657,
199 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1984); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 326, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 80 (1983); Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 887, 176
Cal. Rptr. 254,258 (1981); Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 805, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 42 (1981).
37. Code of Civil Procedure § 877 does not use the term "settlement." However, it per-
tains to settlements because it refers to "a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment" which could be given only by a plaintiff,
and "the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or. . .the amount
of the consideration paid for it," which would be an amount given by a defendant in ex-
change therefor. Accordingly, § 877 refers to a plaintiff's settlement with one of several joint
tortfeasors. Cases interpreting § 877 have applied it in this context. See supra note 36.
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West 1980). An intriguing problem is created by
the interplay between §§ 877 and 875. Section 875(a) provides that the right of contribution
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tortfeasors are not released from liability by the settlement with one
tortfeasor (as was true under the common law); 39 and (3) the plaintiff's
judgment against any nonsettling tortfeasor is reduced by the dollar
amount of the settlement.4°
C Comparative Fault and Partial Indemnity
California tort law has changed radically since the passage of the
contribution statutes. With the California Supreme Court cases of Li v.
exists only where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defend-
ants in a tort action. If there is a settlement prior to trial between the plaintiff and one co-
defendant, as discussed in § 877, there would not be a judgment rendered against the settling
co-defendant as required by § 875. Therefore, even assuming the settlement was not made
in "good faith" as required by § 877, there would never be a judgment against the settling
co-defendant as required by § 875. Accordingly, without a joint judgment, no right to con-
tribution exists. Thus, § 877's provision for a discharge for a settling defendant is unneces-
sary. Likewise, the requirement of "good faith" of the settlement in order to achieve such
discharge seems to be without meaning. Fleming answered this question without asking it
when he stated "due to California's joint-judgment rule, a settlor still cannot be sued for
contribution even if the settlement is set aside." Fleming, supra note 6, at 1497 n. 134.
The court in River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 1000,
103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 508 (1972) discussed the effect of a release not found to be in "good
faith" pursuant to § 877. The court noted that if the bad faith settlement resulted from
collusion between the plaintiff and the settlor, the nonsettling tortfeasor may seek to have
the settlement set aside. Id. Conceivably, he might seek the offending settlor's joinder to the
lawsuit as a party defendant, thus preserving his own contribution claim against the possibil-
ity of a judgment. Id. The issue in River Garden Farms was the effect of a bad faith settle-
ment where only the plaintiff breached the duty of good faith. Id., 103 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
The court stated that in that situation, the tortfeasor who himself compromised in good faith
should receive exactly what the statute tenders him-a discharge from his liability for pro
rata contribution. Id., 103 Cal. Rptr. at 509. Thus, the nonsettling tortfeasor is damaged by
the loss of a co-defendant who would have shared pro rata payment of the judgment. Id.
The amount of the loss would be calculated by the pro rata share which the settlor would
have paid had he been a party to the judgment. .d. Thus, the nonsettling tortfeasor has a
civil claim for damages against the plaintiff who exercised bad faith. Id. He may set off his
claim against the latter's tort recovery and receive credit against any judgment awarded in
the tort suit. Id. In economic terms, he receives pro rata rather than pro tanto credit against
the judgment. Id. The charge of the bad faith settlement is regarded as "new matter consti-
tuting a defense" to be raised by answer to the plaintiffs complaint. Id. at 1002, 103 Cal.
Rptr. at 510.
This problem is unique to § 877 and is not found in § 877.6. Unlike § 877, § 877.6 deals
with the partial indemnity theory established in American Motorcycle. Under this theory,
one defendant named in the lawsuit by the plaintiff may seek apportionment of the loss
against a joint tortfeasor either named or not named in the lawsuit by plaintiff either by way
of cross-complaint or after a judgment is entered. Under the doctrine of partial indemnity
addressed by § 877.6, there is no requirement that a judgment first be obtained against the
tortfeasors named by plaintiff in the complaint.
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980).
40. Id.
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Yellow Cab Co.41 and American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court,41 California adopted a system of comparative negligence
whereby damages are apportioned among the plaintiff and all joint
tortfeasors according to their degree of fault. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
the court replaced the all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negli-
gence with a system of comparative negligence. Under the former con-
tributory negligence system, if the defendant was found negligent, but
the plaintiff was found even a slight bit contributorily negligent, the
plaintiff would recover nothing. After Li, the plaintiffs contributory
negligence would not completely bar his recovery but would serve to
reduce his damages in proportion to the degree of his fault.43
In 1978, the case of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court extended Li's rule of comparative negligence to multi-tortfeasor
situations. It established a system of partial indemnity whereby all
tortfeasors responsible for plaintiff's injury would be obligated to pay
in accordance with their percentage of fault.' A defendant who pays
all or part of a plaintiffs judgment may, under the principle of partial
indemnity established in American Motorcycle, obtain reimbursement
from other tortfeasors in proportion to the fault attributable to each.
Furthermore, this right may be asserted against any joint tortfeasor,
whether named by the plaintiff in the original action or not, either by
cross-complaint 4 or independent action.46
1. The effect of a settlement in the context of partial indemnity
While the allocation of damages among tortfeasors was changed
radically byAmerican Motorcycle, the effect of a settlement on the obli-
gations of a settling tortfeasor was not changed at all. The court re-
tained the same rules that existed in the context of contribution. First,
a tortfeasor who entered into a "good faith" settlement with the plain-
tiff would be discharged from any claim for partial indemnity that
might be pressed by another tortfeasor.41 Second, the plaintiffs recov-
41. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
42. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
43. 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
44. 20 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
45. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 917-18, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
46. E.L. White v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d at 510, 579 P.2d at 513, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 622. Compare this to the situation under the contribution statutes where there is no
right to contribution against a party not sued by the plaintiff.
The doctrine of partial indemnity did not contain "two unwelcome limitations [found in
the contribution statutes]: (I) the requirement of a joint judgment and (2) the 'pro rata'
allocation of shares." Fleming, supra note 6, at 1487.
47. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
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ery from nonsettling tortfeasors would be diminished only by the
amount that the plaintiff actually recovered in a "good faith" settle-
ment, rather than by an amount measured by the settling tortfeasor's
proportionate responsibility for the injury.4"
Therefore, while establishing a system whereby all tortfeasors
would be ultimately charged according to their degree of comparative
fault, the court allowed a tortfeasor to be free from this allocation once
he entered into a settlement with the plaintiff that was found to be in
"good faith." Accordingly, the definition of a "good faith" settlement is
as crucial under today's partial indemnity doctrine as it was under the
principles of contribution. Because of the importance of the American
Motorcycle decision in the evolution of the definition of the "good
faith" settlement requirement, the case will be discussed in Part III.
49
2. Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6
In 1980, the California Legislature enacted Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 877.650 which codified the portion of the opinion of Ameri-
can Motorcycle establishing that a settlement in "good faith"
discharges the settling tortfeasor from liability to other tortfeasors, and
established procedural rules for an early determination of whether a
settlement is in "good faith." Section 877.6 is the most recent statute
dealing with the concept of a "good faith" settlement, and it will be
discussed in Part 111.51
48. Id., 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
49. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
50. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1984) provides:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a
settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged
tortfeasors, upon giving notice thereof in the manner provided in Sections 1010
and 1011 at least 20 days before the hearing. Upon a showing of good cause, the
court may shorten the time for giving the required notice to permit the determina-
tion of the issue to be made before the commencement of the trial of the action, or
before the verdict or judgment if settlement is made after the trial has commenced.
(b) The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court
on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any counter-affida-
vits flied in response thereto, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evi-
dence at the hearing.
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indem-
nity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof
on that issue.
51. See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION OF "GOOD FAITH"
This section will examine how a "good faith" settlement has been
and is being defined by the California courts. The statutes and the ma-
jor California cases dealing with "good faith" will be analyzed. They
will be discussed for the most part in chronological order so the evolu-
tion of the present definition of "good faith" may be seen. Two federal
cases applying California law which have refused to follow California
court of appeal decisions on the "good faith" issue will also be ex-
amined. Although the Ninth Circuit opinions are not binding on the
California courts,52 they provide an alternate interpretation of a "good
faith" settlement.
The California Supreme Court has never decided the issue of what
constitutes a "good faith" settlement. California appellate courts have
considered the issue of a "good faith" settlement in different contexts in
approximately eighteen cases." In five decisions the court formulated
a definition of a "good faith" settlement even though the "good faith"
of a particular settlement was not in issue.54 In seven cases the appel-
late court squarely faced a determination of whether the settlement
before it was made in "good faith."55 Several of the cases defining
52. City of Oakland v. Buteau, 180 Cal. 83, 89-90, 179 P. 170, 173 (1919).
53. See list of cases in this note and infra notes 54-55. The following cases have in-
volved the concept of a "good faith" settlement in contexts other than defining the term:
Northrop Corp. v. Stinson Sales Corp., 151 Cal. App. 3d 653, 199 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1984) (hold-
ing that the proper procedure for a settlor to obtain a dismissal from a cross-complaint for
indemnity is to obtain a ruling pursuant to CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 that the settle-
ment was in "good faith" followed by a motion for summary judgment); Lyly & Sons Truck-
ing Co. v. State, 147 Cal. App. 3d 353, 195 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1983) (discussing the allocation
among the nonsettling tortfeasors of a "good faith" settlor's proportional share of the judg-
ment in excess of the amount of his settlement); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192
Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983) (discussing who are "joint tortfeasors" within the meaning of CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6); Turcon Const., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d
282, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1983) (discussing the definition of "joint tortfeasors"); Golden Bear
Forest Products, Inc. v. Misale, 138 Cal. App. 3d 573, 188 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1982) (holding a
party whose settlement was paid by an insurance company obtained a release pursuant to
§ 877); Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 707, 166 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1980) (holding that where joint tortfeasors each settled with the plaintiff in "good faith,"
each was released from claims for partial indemnity by the other).
54. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981); Fisher
v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980); Stambaugh v. Superior
Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976); Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975); River Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26
Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
55. Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1984); Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 146 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 194 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1983) (hearing granted Nov. 10, 1983, LA 31826); Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983); Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143
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"good faith" arose in the contribution context before the decision in
American Motorcycle,56 several cases were decided between the time of
American Motorcycle and the passage of Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 877.6,11 and several cases discussed the issue in the context of sec-
tion 877.6.58
A trend can be seen in the California appellate decisions begin-
ning with River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court 9 and ending with
Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates.6° Originally, the
courts viewed the "good faith" requirement as a means to accommo-
date two competing policies found in the law-the policy of encourage-
ment of settlements and the policy of equitable apportionment of loss.
Both policies were considered in formulating a definition of a "good
faith" settlement. The early cases advocated a test whereby a settle-
ment would be in "good faith" if its monetary value was within the
reasonable range of the plaintiff's potential recovery. 61 Through an ev-
olutionary process the courts have moved to an approach where the
monetary value of the settlement is unimportant and a settlement will
be found to be in "good faith" as long as the joint tortfeasors cannot
establish collusion or tortious intent on the part of the plaintiff and the
settling defendant.62 This current definition of "good faith" results
from the courts giving priority to the policy of encouragement of settle-
ment and ignoring the policy of equitable apportionment of loss.
Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323,
191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942,
186 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1982); Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176
Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
56. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976);
Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975); River
Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
57. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981); Fisher
v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
58. Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1984); Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 146 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 194 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1983) (hearing granted Nov. 10, 1983, LA 31826); Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983); Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143
Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323,
191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942,
186 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1982); Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176
Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
59. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
60. 146 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 194 Cal. Rptr. 729, hearing granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A.
31842).
61. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (1972); Lareau v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 796, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837, 845 (1975).
62. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983);
Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
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Under the present definition, a settlement which constituted nothing
more than a waiver of costs in exchange for a dismissal was found to be
in "good faith," shielding the settlor from claims for partial indem-
nity.63 It is interesting that the cases decided before the California
Supreme Court established the system of comparative negligence were
more concerned with the policy of equitable apportionment of fault
than the cases decided thereafter.64
Step by step, the appellate courts have moved away from a mean-
ingful interpretation of the "good faith" concept. The cases built one
upon the next, often incorporating dicta from previous cases that made
sense in the context of the prior case but was inapplicable to the case at
hand. Each case in turn established its own dicta to be followed by
subsequent cases to the point that the courts now feel bound by a rule
that they acknowledge provides inequitable results. The following dis-
cussion illustrates this pattern.
A. The 'Reasonable Range" Test of River Garden Farms, Inc. v.
Superior Court
The first case to consider the meaning of a "good faith" settlement
did so in the context of the contribution laws. That case, River Garden
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court,6" decided in 1972, is still discussed in the
major cases involving "good faith" settlements and is thought of as the
leading case in the area.66 The River Garden Farms court promulgated
the first, and most workable, definition of "good faith." Its test for
"good faith" will form the framework for the recommendation made in
Part V of this article.
River Garden Farms did not involve the usual objection that the
settlement entered into was too low and, therefore, should not be deter-
mined to be in "good faith." The charge of lack of "good faith" was
aimed at the plaintiff alone, and was based upon the plaintiff's alloca-
tion of certain settlement proceeds among various claims so as to in-
crease the potential liability of the nonsettling defendant, River Garden
Farms.67 The suit involved claims by two minors resulting from a fire
63. Cardia, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 888, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (1981).
64. Compare River Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (1972) with Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1983).
65. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
66. Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 327, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78, 81 (1983).
River Garden Farms was also cited by the California Supreme Court in American Motorcy-
cle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
67. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 991-92, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
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in which their parents were killed and they were severely injured. The
minors' attorneys settled the children's claims for both their own per-
sonal injury and the wrongful death of their parents against all of the
defendants except River Garden Farms. The attorneys allocated the
major share of the settlements to the less valuable wrongful death
claims and a minor share to the potentially large personal injury
claims.68 Defendant River Garden Farms claimed this worked an in-
justice because it was thereby isolated as the sole target for a potentially
large personal injury judgment, and, under Code of Civil Procedure
section 877, it would bear this judgment alone, without contribution. It
would receive credit only for the minor share of the settlements allo-
cated to the personal injury claims.6 9
Although not deciding the issue of the "good faith" of the alloca-
tion of the settlement proceeds because that was a question of fact to be
decided by the trial court,7" the court in River Garden Farms exhaus-
tively discussed the concept of "good faith" settlements. The court dis-
agreed with the plaintifi's contention that the obligation of "good faith"
was limited to the settling parties, because if this were so, no statutory
demand for a release given in "good faith" would have been necessary.
Thus, the duty of "good faith" runs to the nonsettling tortfeasors, and
the requirement of section 877 that a settlement be in "good faith" es-
tablishes a standard of equitable conduct embracing other defendants
68. The settlements of the three other tortfeasors totalled $1,290,000. The attorneys allo-
cated the settlement proceeds between the wrongful death claims and the personal injury
claims so that $800,000 was applied to the wrongful death claims and $490,000 to the per-
sonal injury claims. The personal injury claims had a potential for a very large verdict
because the children had suffered severe and permanent physical handicaps. Id. at 991, 103
Cal. Rptr. at 502. On the other hand, the wrongful death claims were far less valuable
because one or more of the parents may have been guilty of contributory negligence. Id.
69. Id. at 992, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 502. Because this case arose before the partial indem-
nity doctrine was established by American Motorcycle, there was not much River Garden
Farms could do to contest this situation. It moved to dismiss the action, asserting that the
settlements were not made in "good faith" within the meaning of § 877. It argued the com-
mon law rule providing that "a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all" applied and,
therefore, it had been released by virtue of the releases the plaintiffs had given to the three
settling defendants. Id. at 999, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The trial court, without holding an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of "good faith," denied River Garden Farms's motion to
dismiss. Id. at 1000, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 508. On an application for a writ, the court of appeal
did not decide whether the allocation violated the duty of "good faith" but held that River
Garden Farms was entitled to assert the invalidity of the releases for lack of "good faith" by
way of answer or new matter in the lawsuit by the plaintiffs that could be offset against any
judgment, or by an action for declaratory relief. Id. at 1001-03, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10.
Because of the "joint judgment" rule, River Garden Farms did not have the option of suing
the settling parties for contribution. See Thaxter, supra note 26, at 1497.
70. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
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as well as the immediate parties to the settlement.7'
The court specifically refused to limit the interpretation of "good
faith" to lack of collusion,72 and held the "good faith" requirement has
a far broader meaning than merely prohibiting collusive behavior.73
The court stated in language that has been cited repeatedly in case after
case construing "good faith":
Although many kinds of collusive injury are possible, the
most obvious and frequent is that created by an unreasonably
cheap settlement. Appliedpro tanto to the ultimate judgment,
such a settlement contributes little toward equitable-even
though unequal-sharing. . . Prevention of collusion is but a
means to the end of preventing unreasonably low settlements
which prejudice a non-particopating tort/easor. The price of a
settlement is the prime badge of its good or badfaith.
Lack of good faith encompasses many kinds of behavior ...
When profit is involved, the ingenuity of man spawns limit-
less varieties of unfairness. . . . The Legislature has here in-
corporated by reference the general equitable principle of
contribution law which frowns on unfair settlements, includ-
ing those which are so poorly related to the value of the case as
to impose a potentially disproportionate cost on the defendant
ultimately selectedfor suit.
74
In defining a "good faith" settlement, the River Garden Farms
court attempted to strike a compromise between two competing poli-
cies: (1) equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault and
(2) encouragement of settlements." It was careful not to overlook the
71. Id. at 995, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 504. "The good faith clause. . . establishes a duty
relationship among the plaintiff, the settling defendant and the nonsettling defendant." Id.
at 999, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 507. "In concluding a bad faith settlement with one of several
tortfeasors, the [plaintiff] breaches a statutory duty of good faith he owes the others." Id. at
1001, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 509. Therefore, even though a plaintiff could still attack his antago-
nists one by one under the contribution statutes in California, he would at least be com-
pelled to abide by the moral standards signified by the demand for a good faith release. Id.
at 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
72. The Uniform Law Commissioners had accompanied § 4 of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act, a provision that was probably the model for § 877, with a
statement declaring that the "good faith" clause "'gives the court occasion to determine
whether the transaction was collusive, and if so, there is no discharge."' Id. at 995, 103 Cal.
Rptr. at 505.
73. Id. at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06.
74. Id. at 996-97, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
75. These were the goals of the 1957 tort contribution legislation. Id. at 993, 103 Cal.
Rptr. at 503.
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statutory objective of encouraging settlements and assuring them a
measure of finality,76 but, unlike the more recent cases dealing with
"good faith," the court did not look solely to that goal to provide the
answer. "[I]f the policy of encouraging settlements is permitted to
overwhelm equitable financial sharing, the possibilities of unfair tactics
are multiplied. 77
The test espoused by the River Garden Farms court to determine
"good faith" is one of reasonable range: "Applied to strike a balance
between dual statutory objectives [of encouraging settlements and equi-
table financial sharing], the good faith clause should not invalidate a
settlement within a reasonable range of the settlor's fair share."7" The
"good faith" clause does not demand equitable sharing as fixed by a
jury verdict which has not taken place. If this were the case, the parties
could not accomplish settlement with a fair assurance of finality be-
cause it is impossible to determine what the jury will decide.79 Rather,
a court should make only a rough assessment of value.80 The mechan-
ics of making this assessment are discussed in Part V-D-3 of this
article.81
In summary, the River Garden Farms court expressly rejected the
absence of collusion as the sole criterion of "good faith.",,2 It balanced
competing policies and recommended an examination of the amount of
the settlement to determine if it falls within the reasonable range of the
settlor's fair share of the ultimate verdict to be received by the plain-
tiff. 3 If the price of the settlement falls within the reasonable range,
then the settlement is in "good faith" and carries the ramifications of
section 877. If the price is too low and is not within the reasonable
range of the settlor's fair share of the plaintiff's predicted recovery, then
the settlement is not in "good faith."8 4
76. Id.
77. Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
80. Id.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 320-36.
82. Id. at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06.
83. Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
84. Adopting this test and citing language from River Garden Farms with approval was
the next case dealing with "good faith," Lareau v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783,
796, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837, 845 (1975). Like River Garden Farms, Lareau involved the question
of a "good faith" allocation of settlement proceeds between different claims.
Since the issues in Lareau arose after a trial on the merits, the court stated that the
proper procedure for the nonsettling defendant to test the "good faith" of the settlement
allocation would be a separate action against the plaintiffs and the settling parties. 44 Cal.
App. 3d at 798-99, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
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B. The Beginning of the Demise of the Reasonable Range Test:
Stambaugh v. Superior Court
The reasonable range definition of "good faith" established by
River Garden Farms was undermined by the 1976 case of Stambaugh v.
Superior Court." Stambaugh did not specifically disapprove of River
Garden Farms's reasonable range test, but used language that would be
relied upon by other cases to do so.
The proceedings in Stambaugh took place after Li v. Yellow Cab
Co ,86 but before American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court.8 7
In Stambaugh, a nonsettling tortfeasor was attempting to bring a
tortfeasor who had settled with the plaintiff back into the case to deter-
mine his percentage of fault under the principles of Li.88 The court
rejected this argument, but the nonsettlor raised for the first time at the
appellate level the argument that the settling defendant was properly
brought into the action in order that the "good faith" of his settlement
with the plaintiff could be determined. No lack of "good faith" had
been expressly alleged. It is in this context that the appellate court dis-
cussed the issue of "good faith."'89 It admitted that this issue was not
properly before it because it had not been raised below. However, by
way of dicta the court expressed its opinion on the "good faith" issue.
Instead of considering the competing interests of equitable appor-
tionment and settlement of disputes as was done in River Garden
Farms, the court in Stambaugh, without discussion, thrust the policy of
encouragement of settlement of litigation into the forefront. It cited a
list of cases for the proposition that the law favors settlements.90 The
85. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976).
86. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Li abolished California's
contributory negligence defense and replaced it with a comparative negligence rule.
87. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
88. Stambaugh involved a wrongful death action resulting from a motor vehicle acci-
dent. The heirs of the decedent settled a wrongful death claim with alleged tortfeasor Stam-
baugh prior to suit for $25,000, the full amount of his insurance coverage, and gave him a
release. The heirs later commenced an action against other alleged joint tortfeasors, includ-
ing Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), for the same wrongful death action. There-
after, PG&E cross-complained against Stambaugh under the rationale of Li, for the purpose
of determining the proportion of fault attributable to Stambaugh. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 234,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
89. The settling defendant, Stambaugh, moved for summary judgment on the cross-
complaint, and the motion was denied by the trial court. The appellate court issued a writ of
mandate, holding that the cross-complaint violated Code of Civil Procedure § 877 because a
settling tortfeasor is discharged from further obligation by way of contribution or otherwise.
62 Cal. App. 3d at 235, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
90. Id., 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846. As shown in Part IV, these cited cases do indeed stand for
that proposition, but none dealt with a conflict between the goals of settlement and equitable
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court's emphasis on this policy is understandable because a nonsettling
tortfeasor was attempting to force the settling defendant against whom
no lack of "good faith" had been alleged to participate in the trial. If
such a procedure were allowed, it would certainly discourage a party
from settling. In this context then, Stambaugh's oft-cited language re-
garding encouragement of settlement is applicable.9
The Stambaugh court refused to define the bounds of "good
faith."92 It did not focus on what constituted "good faith," but rather
on what did not. It said that "good faith" would not be determined by
the proportion the settlement bears to the damages of the plaintiff.
93
Again, this made sense in the context of this case because the nonsettlor
was arguing the settlor had to take part in a trial in order that his exact
percentage of fault could be determined so the "good faith" of the set-
tlement could thereby be judged. The court properly refused to follow
this approach.94
However, in so doing, the court added by way of dicta that if the
settlement is not a result of collusion or bad faith it is, therefore, in
"good faith." The court also opined that instances of such collusion or
bad faith are rare. While not specifically rejecting the River Garden
Farms test, Stambaugh's broad language that "good faith" is not to be
determined by the proportion the settlement bears to the plaintiffs
damages and its strong language that the law favors settlements were
utilized by future courts to undermine the River Garden Farms
approach.95
apportionment. See infra text following note 199. Ironically, the last case cited in the list
was River Garden Farms.
91. The Stambaugh court stated: "Few things would be better calculated to frustrate this
policy [of encouraging settlements], and to discourage settlement of disputed tort claims,
than knowledge that such a settlement lacked finality and would but lead to further litiga-
tion with one's joint tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability." 62 Cal. App. 3d at 236, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 846. This language was cited in American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 578
P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99. See infra text accompanying note 100.
92. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
93. Id.
94. The court stated:
We have heretofore pointed out the policy of the law favoring settlement of
litigation. Except in rare cases of collusion or badfaith, such as were proclaimed in
River Garden Farms. . .and Lareau. . . .a joint tortfeasor should be permitted
to negotiate settlement of an adverse claim according to his own best interests,
whether for his financial advantage, or for the purchase of peace and quiet, or
otherwise. His good faith will not be determined by the proportion his settlement
bears to the damages of the claimant. For the damages are often speculative, and
the probability of legal liability therefore is often uncertain or remote.
Id., 132 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (emphasis added).
95. See, e.g., Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 806, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38,
42 (1981); Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 707, 710, 166 Cal.
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It is this shift from the balancing of interests, found in River Gar-
den Farms, to the elevation of the policy favoring settlements, first
found in Stambaugh, that caused the dilution of the "good faith"
requirement.
C. American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court and the
Concept of "Good Faith"
The next step in the interpretation of a "good faith" settlement
came two years later in the landmark case of American Motorcycle As-
sociation v. Superior Court.96 American Motorcycle established a cause
of action for partial indemnity by which joint tortfeasors could appor-
tion damages among themselves in direct proportion to their respective
fault,97 and applied the "good faith" settlement provisions of Code of
Civil Procedure section 877 to the partial indemnity theory.9"
Rptr. 687, 689 (1980); Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 445, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47,
54 (1980). See infra notes 106, 110 and accompanying text.
96. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). The plaintiff in American
Motorcycle was a teenage boy who had been injured in a cross-country motorcycle race. He
chose to sue only the sponsoring organizations. Under the then current state of the law,
those defendants would be able to seek contribution only among themselves after the judg-
ment. One of the defendants, the sponsor of the race, sought leave of court to file a cross-
complaint against the boy's parents asserting two causes of action. The first cause of action
alleged the parents negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor
child, and sought indemnity from the parents if the organization was found liable. The
second cause of action asked for a declaration of "allocable negligence" of the parents so
that damages awarded against the organization, if any, could be reduced by the percentage
of damage attributable to the parents' negligence. The trial court denied the motion on the
ground that Code of Civil Procedure § 875 allowed contribution only among tortfeasors
held jointly liable. Since the plaintiff had not named the parents as co-defendants, the de-
fendant had no cause of action against them for contribution. The court of appeal reversed.
Id. at 585-86, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86.
The California Supreme Court ordered a hearing on its own motion. It directed the
trial court to vacate its order denying the sponsoring organization leave to file its proposed
cross-complaint against the parents. Id. at 608, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
97. Id. at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
98. Id. at 603-04, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99. Other important provi-
sions of the court's decision were: (1) the "joint and several liability" doctrine, whereby each
tortfeasor whose negligence contributes to an injury remains liable for all compensable dam-
ages attributable to that injury, remained in force, id. at 582, 578 P.2d at 901, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 184; (2) the partial indemnity doctrine is a different concept than contribution and is not
precluded by the contribution statutes which provide that contribution be allocated among
tortfeasors "pro rata" (according to the number of defendants) and not in accordance with
their individual shares of fault, id. at 583-84, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185; (3) par-
tial indemnity may be asserted by a cross-complaint against a tortfeasor who has not been
made a party defendant by the plaintiff, id. at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185; and
(4) the plaintiff's share of fault must be ascertained by weighing his negligence against the
combined total of all causative negligence, not only that of the named defendants, id. at 589
n.2, 578 P.2d at 906 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189 n.2.
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In analyzing the effect of a settlement by one joint tortfeasor on
the right of other tortfeasors to obtain partial indemnity from him, the
California Supreme Court specifically considered the application of
Code of Civil Procedure section 877 dealing with "good faith" settle-
ments under the contribution statutes.99 The court stated, quoting with
approval River Garden Farms and language from Stambaugh:
Although section 877 reflects a strong public policy in
favor of settlement, this statutory policy does not in any way
conflict with the recognition of a common law partial indem-
nity doctrine but rather can, and should, be preserved as an
integral part of the partial indemnity doctrine that we adopt
today. Thus, while we recognize that section 877, by its terms,
releases a settling tortfeasor only from liability for contribu-
tion and not partial indemnity, we conclude that from a real-
istic perspective the legislative policy underlying the provision
dictates that a tortfeasor who has entered into a "good faith"
settlement (see River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court [ci-
tation omitted]) with the plaintiff must also be discharged
from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may
be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor. As the Court of Appeal
noted recently in Stambaugh v. Superior Court [citation omit-
ted]: "Few things would be better calculated to frustrate [sec-
tion 877's] policy, and to discourage settlement of disputed
tort claims, than knowledge that such a settlement lacked fi-
nality and would lead to further litigation with one's joint
tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability." This observation is
as applicable in a partial indemnity framework as in the con-
tribution context. Moreover, to preserve the incentive to settle
which section 877 provides to injured plaintiffs, we conclude
that a plaintiff's recovery from nonsettling tortfeasors should
be diminished only by the amount that the plaintiff has actu-
ally recovered in a good faith settlement, rather than by an
amount measured by the settling tortfeasor's proportionate re-
sponsibility for the injury ..... 10o
In summary, while holding that the partial indemnity doctrine was
separate and apart from the contribution statutes, the court used sec-
tion 877 which applied only to contribution as part of the partial in-
demnity theory. The court did not state that section 877 specifically
99. Id. at 603-04, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
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applied to partial indemnity, but rather adopted a rule for partial in-
demnity that is identical to the section 877 rule for contribution, i.e.,
that a settlement in "good faith" both (1) precludes any claim to partial
indemnity against the settling tortfeasor and (2) diminishes the plain-
tif's recovery from the nonsettling tortfeasors by the amount of the
"good faith" settlement rather than by an amount measured by the set-
tling tortfeasor's proportionate responsibility for the injury. The appel-
late cases after American Motorcycle are a bit confused on this point
and apply section 877 itself (rather than the court's rule which simply
mirrors the language of section 877) when discussing the concept of
good faith settlements under the partial indemnity rule of American
Motorcycle.1° 1
It is important to note at this point that the supreme court inAmer-
ican Motorcycle did not define "good faith." Nor did it approve the
Stambaugh court's definition of "good faith." In fact, when mention-
ing "good faith," it cited River Garden Farms. All that American Mo-
torcycle did with respect to the issue was to establish that a tortfeasor
who settles in "good faith" with the plaintiff will be released from fur-
ther liability by way of claims for partial indemnity. The requirement
remained that the settlement be in "good faith" before this release
occurs.
Also, even though citing with approval Stambaugh's language re-
garding encouragement of settlements, the California Supreme Court
did not express any opinion as to the priority of the goal of settlement
vis-a-vis the goals of comparative negligence. In fact, its expressed
method to accomplish the policy of encouragement of settlements was
to rule that a plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling tortfeasors is di-
minished only by the amount that the plaintiff has actually recovered in
a "good faith" settlement, rather than by an amount measured by the
settling tortfeasor's proportionate responsibility for the injury-" °2 not
to hold that virtually every settlement should be found to be in "good
faith."
101. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
102. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199. For example, if a settling
tortfeasor who settled for $10,000 was found at plaintiffs trial against other tortfeasors to
have been 40% responsible for plaintiffs damages of $100,000, under a dollar amount or pro
tanto reduction the other tortfeasors would be liable to plaintiff for $90,000. Under a pro-
portionate or pro rata reduction the other tortfeasors would be liable to plaintiff for $60,000.
(This is a different meaning of pro rata than was used in the contribution statutes where a
pro rata share meant an equal share.) The plaintiff would collect a total of only $70,000
under the pro rata approach, $10,000 in settlement and $60,000 from the other tortfeasors.
The plaintiff's bar has been the principle advocate of pro tanto rather than pro rata
reduction because under the pro tanto rule an under-value settlement in "good faith" does
19841
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17
D. The Tortious Conduct Test: Fisher v. Superior Court and
Dompeling v. Superior Court
The cases of Fisher v. Superior Court'"3 and Dompeling v. Superior
Court 101 abandoned the River Garden Farms analysis of "good faith"
and instead instituted a tortious conduct test. The Dompeling case is
most frequently cited as authority for the tortious conduct test and has
been repeatedly incorporated by subsequent appellate decisions, 05
sometimes leading to ludicrous results.
1. Fisher v. Superior Court
Fisher was the first case to discuss a "good faith" settlement after
American Motorcycle was decided. It did not involve a determination
of whether or not a settlement had been made in "good faith" but
rather concerned the issue of when the determination of "good faith"
should be made. In explaining its reasons for reaching its decision that
the trial on the issue of "good faith" should occur before the trial on
the merits, the court expressed its opinion on the proper interpretation
of "good faith" by way of dicta. 06 It said a settlement is in "good
not prejudice the plaintiff. Fleming, supra note 6, at 1495. The plaintiff still collects a total
amount equal to the amount of his judgment under this rule.
For a further discussion of the pro rata reduction proposal, see infra note 293.
103. 103 Cal. App. 3d 433, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
104. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981).
105. E.g., Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 58, 200 Cal. Rptr.
at 145; Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 289, 191 Cal.
Rptr. at 679; Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 378; Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr.
at 260.
106. The dicta of Fisher should be examined in light of the facts and lower court's order
in that case. The underlying action arose out of a traffic accident in which a Ford-manufac-
tured vehicle operated by Schultz struck and injured the plaintiff, Fisher. Fisher sued
Schultz and Ford and settled all his claims against Schultz for $100,000, the entire amount of
the available insurance policy limits. Ford cross-complained against Schultz for partial in-
demnity. Id. at 437-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
Schultz, in her answer to Ford's cross-complaint, raised as an affirmative defense that
she had made a "good faith" settlement with Fisher, which, if true, would discharge her
from liability to Ford. However, the trial court ruled that the trial on the cross-complaints
and the issue of "good faith" would be heldfollowing the trial on plaintiff's complaint. The
trial court also indicated that it might have the same jury that tried the main action try the
cross-complaints, and might make the jury's special findings in the main trial on the propor-
tion of fault binding on the determination of the cross-complaints if the settlement was not
later found to be in "good faith." Id. at 438, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 50. Thus, defendant Schultz
and her insurance carrier were placed in the position of having to undergo a lengthy and
costly trial on the merits even though they had previously settled because the trial court
refused to hold the hearing on the "good faith" of the settlement first.
The Fisher court focused on the language of Stambaugh quoted by the supreme court in
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faith" "absent evidence of collusion or grossly inappropriate. . . ap-
portionment of the settlement proceeds to injure the nonsettling alleged
tortfeasors."' °7 Thus, Fisher speaks to an element of intent to injure
that was not seen in the prior cases.
2. Dompeling v. Superior Court
As with the previous cases that discussed "good faith," Dompeling
did not directly deal with the issue of whether a settlement was made in
"good faith." Dompeling was a discovery case, and the court's discus-
sion of "good faith" arose in its analysis of the scope of discovery.
The plaintiff in Dompeling was involved in an automobile accident
and sued two defendants, Dompeling and Chatom, who each cross-
complained against the other for partial indemnity. Prior to trial, the
plaintiff entered into a settlement with Dompeling for $100,000, which
was the limit of his insurance policy, plus a possible $10,000 more from
Dompeling personally on a sliding scale depending on the plaintiffs
recovery from Chatom. The trial court ruled that the issue of whether
the settlement was entered into in "good faith" would be decided in a
separate trial preceding the trial of the personal injury action.'
Pursuant to the action on the cross-complaint for partial indemnity
and Dompeling's defense of a "good faith" settlement, Chatom took
the deposition of Dompeling and inquired exhaustively into his per-
sonal and business assets. Dompeling refused to answer on the
grounds that such information was not discoverable and was irrelevant
to the issue of the "good faith" of the settlement. The trial court or-
dered Dompeling to answer the deposition questions, but the appellate
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering discov-
American Motorcycle, and seized upon Stambaugh's assertion that the encouragement of
settlements is a strong public policy and that a defendant's knowledge that a settlement
lacked finality would frustrate the policy of encouraging settlements. Id. at 440, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 52. Thus, Fisher articulated the strong policy in favor of settlements as the correct
rationale for its holding that it is not proper to make a settling defendant pay for and defend
a long trial on the merits before it can be determined whether the settlement was in "good
faith." Id. at 442, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 53. There can be no quarrel with this analysis. The
Fisher court, however, did not stop its inquiry at this point. By way of dicta the court
offered a restrictive definition of the "good faith" requirement.
107. Id. at 445, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
108. The trial court denied Dompeling's motions for approval of the settlement agree-
ment as a settlement in "good faith" and for entry of the judgment in Dompeling's favor on
Chatom's cross-complaint for indemnity. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
Presumably, § 877.6 had not taken effect at the time of the trial court's ruling because pursu-
ant thereto, Dompeling was entitled to a hearing on the issue of "good faith" upon the filing
of his motion, rather than at a separate trial.
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ery of Dompeling's finances.'" 9
In order to determine the scope of discovery on the issue of "good
faith," the appellate court sought to define the concept. It discussed
and relied on previous cases, notably Stambaugh.' 10 It acknowledged
the strong policy in favor of settlement, and having done this, estab-
lished a rule giving effect solely to this policy. It made no attempt to
accommodate the policy of equitable apportionment of loss. The court
stated:
Bad faith is not established by a showing that a settling
defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair
share of the value of plaintiff's case. A settlement always
removes the settling defendant from the action; this necessar-
ily results in a possibility that the remaining defendants will
suffer judgment greater in amount than if there had been no
settlement.
Where plaintiff settles with fewer than all defendants, the
defendants are clearly adverse parties. A settling defendant
does not owe a legal duty to adverse parties, the nonsettling
defendants, to pay the plaintiff more so that the adverse par-
ties may pay the plaintiff less. Plaintiff and defendants are
also adverse parties; the plaintiff does not owe a legal duty to
the nonsettling defendants to seek more from a settling de-
fendant so that the nonsettling defendant may pay less.
The settling parties owe the nonsettling defendants a le-
gal duty to refrain from tortious or other wrongful conduct; ab-
sent conduct violative of such duty, the settling parties may
act to further their respective interests without regard to the
effect of their settlement upon other defendants.'
An example given by the court of conduct violative of such duty would
be an agreement between the settling defendant and the plaintiff that in
return for settling for a disproportionate amount, the defendant would
aid the plaintiff's case by committing perjury." 12
The court felt it was compelled to further the policy of encourage-
ment of settlements. Because a rule allowing nonsettling defendants to
109. Id. at 803, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
110. Id. at 806, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 42. The court cited with approval and emphasis the
following language of Stambaugh: "Except in rare cases of collusion or bad faith,. . . a
joint torf/easor should be permitted to negotiate settlement of an adverse claim according to its
own best interests .. " Id., 173 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43 (emphasis added by Dompeling court).
111. Id. at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 810 n.7, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45 n.7.
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depose settling defendants regarding their finances would discourage
defendants from settling, the court chose to deal with this discovery
problem by defining."good faith" in such a way as to "substantially
narrow the scope of the pretrial hearing upon the issue of good faith
settlement,'." 3 so that financial status would not be an issue except in
the most extreme case.' 1 4 Thus, the Dompeling court in dicta relied on
the Stambaugh and Fisher dicta, and thereby further restricted the con-
cept of "good faith."
. The Effect of Code of Civil Procedure Section 877.6
The next event in the evolution of the "good faith" concept was
the passage by the California Legislature in 1980 of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 877.61' dealing with "good faith" settlements in the
context of the partial comparative indemnity doctrine established by
the American Motorcycle case. In section 877.6 the legislature specifi-
cally codified the portion of the American Motorcycle dicta regarding
the effects of a "good faith" settlement between the plaintiff and a joint
tortfeasor.1 6 Section 877.6(c) provides that a "good faith" settlement
shall bar the other joint tortfeasors from "any further claims against the
settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or
comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or compara-
tive fault."' 7  Compare the language in American Motorcycle: "[We
conclude that from a realistic perspective, the legislative policy under-
lying the provision [section 877] dictates that a tortfeasor who has en-
tered into a 'good faith' settlement [citation omitted] with the plaintiff
must also be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative in-
113. Id. at 810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
114. While specifically disavowing the River Garden Farms case without acknowledging
that it had done so, the court in Dompeling actually engaged in a River Garden Farms type of
reasonable range analysis and concluded that the settlement was not unreasonable. See in-
fra note 275 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 308-09. The court could
have based its decision on this ground, i.e., that the settlement was within the reasonable
range of potential exposure and, therefore, was in "good faith," or it could have decided that
discovery into the financial matters of the defendant is not relevant to a reasonable range
test of "good faith."
115. See supra note 50 for text of § 877.6. Actually, Dompeling was decided after its
passage but the events in the trial court occurred before, so the case did not discuss this
statute.
116. Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 283, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 580, 582 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 326-27, 191 Cal. Rptr.
78, 81 (1983). See also CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL DIGEST A.B. 3425 at 1
(hearing date April 30, 1980) (analysis of A.B. 3425 CAL. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, REPORT A.B. 3425 at 2 (analysis of A.B. 3425 as amended May 7, 1980)).
117. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1984).
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demnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor." 8 The lan-
guage of section 877.6 "for partial or comparative indemnity" is
derived directly from theAmerican Motorcycle case. The term "equita-
ble comparative contribution" is not found in American Motorcycle or
subsequent cases applying its doctrine. However, it appears that the
legislature used these terms in an attempt to cover all the bases, and
that its intent was to make section 877.6 apply to joint tortfeasor cases
under American Motorcycle's theory of partial or comparative indem-
nity, or any theory by whatever name based on comparative negligence
or comparative fault. 19
Section 877.6 did not define the term "good faith." Furthermore,
nothing in the legislative history of the section indicates that the legisla-
ture gave any consideration to this aspect of the statute.
The remaining subsections of section 877.6 deal with the hearing
on the issue of a "good faith" settlement. In this respect, section 877.6
codified the holding of Fisher v. Superior Court.120 Before this section,
there was no statute establishing when, during a lawsuit, the issue of
"good faith" was to be determined. The statute provides that the hear-
ing shall be held on at least twenty days' notice.' 2' Section 877.6 fur-
118. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
119. In fact, § 877.6(c) was specifically added by amendment to the text of the bill as
originally introduced. The assembly amendments adopted on May 7, 1980, added, among
other things, subsection (c), which used the term "equitable comparative contribution."
These amendments did not refer to partial or comparative indemnity. "A determination by
the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from
any further claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution
based on comparative negligence or comparative fault." Text of A.B. 3425 as amended in
the assembly May 7, 1980; 8 CAL. J. OF THE ASSEMBLY 1979-80, at 14435 (amendments to
A.B. No. 3425). The bill was later amended in the senate on July 1, 1980, to change subsec-
tion (c) to include the phrase "or partial or comparative indemnity," which specifically
tracked the language of the American Motorcycle case. The senate amendment stated:
"(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any
other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable
comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negli-
gence or comparative fault." A.B. 3425 (as amended in the senate July 1, 1980) (emphasis in
original).
120. 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980). See also CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, BILL DIGEST A.B. 3425 at 3 (hearing date April 30, 1980) (analysis of A.B.
3425); CAL. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON A.B. 3425 at 2-4 (analysis of
A.B. 3425 as amended May 10, 1980).
121. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1984). Fisher stated that the issue of
"good faith" should be decided at the earliest possible time. Section 877.6 adopted this
approach and provides for this hearing. Interestingly, the original version of the bill as
introduced provided for the hearing to be conducted by the court at the time another noticed
hearing or conference was conducted relative to the particular case or the time the trial was
commenced. However, in its May 7, 1980 amendments, the assembly amended the bill to
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ther provides that the hearing shall be held upon affidavits and
counter-affidavits, or in the court's discretion, evidence received at the
hearing,"' and that the burden of proof on the issue of "good faith" is
on the party who asserts the lack of "good faith."'
' 23
F The Results of the Tortious Conduct Test
Several cases decided after Dompeling illustrate the inequitable re-
sults that can occur when the tortious conduct test of "good faith" is
applied. Up to and including the Dompeling case, all cases defining
"good faith" had done so in dicta. The subsequent cases beginning
with Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court 124 were the first to face
squarely the issue of whether a settlement had been made in "good
faith." Yet, instead of analyzing the problem critically, the courts sim-
ply looked to the language of the previous cases. They did not examine
the prior cases in light of the issues present before those courts, or ac-
knowledge that the language they were citing was dicta. The courts
reached results they admitted were unfair, yet they felt compelled to do
so by prior precedent.
1. Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court
Cardio exemplifies the problem that resulted from the courts' pro-
cedure of successively incorporating language from one case to the
next, with each case narrowing further the test of "good faith." In
Cardio, the plaintiffs were the widow and seven children of a man who
died during open heart surgery. The plaintiffs sued the hospital, sev-
eral doctors, and Cardio, the distributor and manufacturer of the heart-
lung pump machine that was a factor in the patient's death. The hospi-
tal filed a cross-complaint for partial indemnity against Cardio.
Before trial, the plaintiff dismissed Cardio with prejudice. Cardio
provide for the hearing to be held any time upon the giving of at least twenty days notice (or
a shorter time, if necessary) to permit the determination to be made prior to trial.
122. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(b) (West Supp. 1984). The original bill provided that
any party to the action should have the right to object and present any "actual evidence" to
prove that the settlement was not made in "good faith." The present language was added by
the assembly amendments of May 7, 1980.
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(d) (West Supp. 1984) (incorporating the decision of
Fisher, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 447, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 56). This language was contained in the
original version of the bill as introduced on March 20, 1980, and was not changed by any
subsequent amendments. The Fisher court also held that "the burden of proving that there
has been a settlement is on the settlor who asserts that settlement as a bar to all claims for
contribution or comparative (equitable) indemnity by any other tortfeasor." 103 Cal. App.
3d at 447, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (emphasis added).
124. 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
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made no payment toward the plaintiff's recovery, and the only consid-
eration plaintiff received for the dismissal was a waiver of costs by
Cardio. The hospital pursued its cross-complaint against Cardio for
partial indemnity. Cardio defended on the ground that it had entered
into a "good faith" settlement, and the trial court ordered a separate
trial on this issue which was held before the trial of the main action on
the cross-complaints. At the trial, the plaintiff's counsel testified that he
had dismissed Cardio from the case as a tactical move. While he felt
that there was a substantial case against Cardio, he had a straightfor-
ward, uncomplicated case against the hospital for the negligent act or
omission of its employees in operating the machine. Since the hospital
had sufficient assets and sufficient insurance to pay the judgment, he
had no desire to complicate a simple medical malpractice case where
there was clear liability by bringing in a complicated products liability
cause of action. He thought that it was in the best interest of his clients
to simplify the case.
125
The trial court analyzed the issue of whether the settlement had
been made in "good faith" by using a River Garden Farms reasonable
range analysis and rejecting the tortious conduct test of Dompeling.
While there was no collusion between plaintiffs and Cardio in connec-
tion with the dismissal, the trial court thought it would be unreasonable
and unfair to permit the dismissal to operate as a bar to the claim of the
hospital for partial indemnity. This dismissal for a waiver of costs
could not have been reasonably proportionate to Cardio's potential lia-
bility to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the trial court ruled that Cardio did
not receive the dismissal in "good faith" to the extent that "good faith"
is required before a dismissal can be used as a bar to an action for
partial indemnity. 1
26
The court of appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the trial
court to vacate its order and to enter a new order sustaining Cardio's
defense to the cross-complaint on the basis that Cardio had entered
into a "good faith" settlement. The appellate court quoted Dompeling
to the effect that a settling defendant owes no duty to a nonsettling co-
defendant except to refrain from tortious or other wrongful conduct,
and that absent such conduct, a settling party may act to further its own
interest without regard to the effect of the settlement upon co-defend-
ants. 27 Since Cardio had acted consistently with that principle, the
125. Id. at 884-85, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 256-57.
126. Id. at 887, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
127. Id. at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (citing Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App.
3d 798, 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 44-45 (1981)).
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settlement was made in "good faith."' 28
The appellate court acknowledged that the trial court had recog-
nized the serious complications in the present law and had reasoned
that to immunize Cardio would frustrate the entire purpose of the com-
parative fault cases.' 29 Further, the court of appeal acknowledged that
its own decision created a miscarriage of justice:
The result is unsatisfactory. The rule permits a plaintiff
to insulate a defendant. . . from being liable to a codefend-
ant . . . for comparative indemnity by dismissing [one de-
fendant] in consideration of a waiver of costs where the
dismissal is motivated by plaintiffs' tactical considerations
having little relationship to [that defendant's] potential liabil-
ity. . . . The result is fundamentally unfair, and cannot be
what the Legislature intended.
30
The Cardio court thought that its hands were tied by the terms of
section 877. However, if it had followed the River Garden Farms test
for "good faith" under section 877, it clearly could have found that the
Cardio settlement was not within the reasonable range of defendant's
liability and would not have been in "good faith." Instead of applying
that precedent, however, the court in Cardio called upon the legislature
to act to amend section 877 in light of the American Motorcycle
decision. 
3 1
What the Cardio court overlooked was that the legislature had ac-
ted in response to the American Motorcycle case by enacting Code of
Civil Procedure section 877.6(c) in 1980.32 This section incorporated
the same "good faith" rule in the partial indemnity context of American
Motorcycle as was found in section 877. The Cardio court failed to
recognize that because the legislature did not define the term "good
128. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260. The court concluded that "without
further legislative clarification, the term 'good faith' must be given a meaning within the
usual sense of the term," and that under this test, the Cardio settlement had been in "good
faith." Id. The court gave no authority for the proposition that "good faith" must be given
a meaning within the usual sense of the term, and offered no opinion as to what the "usual
sense of the term" was.
129. Id. at 888, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
130. Id. at 890-91, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
131. The court stated: "The Legislature is equipped with the facilities and the forum to
hear from all interested parties and to pass appropriate amendments to Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 877; the Legislature should move with dispatch to prevent the occurrence of
such an unfortunate result as in this case." 122 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
132. This section was applicable to the Cardio case but the court failed to mention it. For
a discussion of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6(c) and its legislative history, see supra
notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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faith," it is up to the courts to interpret the "good faith" requirement in
a manner to prevent the inequity that the Cardio court acknowledged
its decision had created.
The practical effect of the Cardio decision can be illustrated using
the underlying facts of that case. If the plaintiff had decided earlier
that it did not want to get involved in a complicated products liability
case and had only proceeded against the hospital and not against
Cardio, then, by way of cross-complaint, the hospital could have ob-
tained partial indemnity from Cardio. Of course, it is a rare case in-
deed where a plaintiff will choose not to name a potential defendant in
the complaint. Even so, if the plaintiff had simply dismissed Cardio as
a defendant, the hospital still could have obtained partial indemnity.
However, under the Cardio decision, as soon as some meager consider-
ation accompanied the dismissal, that tactical dismissal by the plaintiff
became a "settlement." Because it was not done with the intent to in-
jure the hospital, but rather to help the plaintiff, it was found to be in
"good faith," thus cutting off the hospital's rights to partial indemnity.
By that transaction, then, the plaintiff effectively, although not mali-
ciously, terminated the hospital's rights to seek partial indemnity from
Cardio. There can be no doubt that such a result violates the policy of
comparative fault among tortfeasors enunciated by the American Mo-
torcycle decision.
After the Cardio decision, a number of cases reached the appellate
courts involving the specific issue of the "good faith" of a settlement.
Each of these cases cited the language of Cardio and Dompeling and
reaffirmed the rule that only if a settlement was tortious toward nonset-
ting tortfeasors, would the settlement be determined not to have been
made in "good faith." The more important of these cases are discussed
below.
2. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Superior Court
The settlement reached in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Su-
perior Court 133 illustrates the statement in River Garden Farms that
"when profit is involved, the ingenuity of man spawns limitless vari-
eties of unfairness."' 34 In Burlington, the plaintiff was injured when a
railroad car door fell on him. He sued the railroad, Burlington North-
ern, and the manufacturer of the car, Paccar. In a settlement with Bur-
lington, the plaintiff agreed to proceed to trial against Paccar only. In
133. 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982).
134. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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exchange, Burlington guaranteed the plaintiff would recover at least
$2,000,000 at trial from Paccar. If the judgment was less than
$2,000,000, Burlington would pay the difference. If the judgment went
over $2,000,000, Burlington would pay nothing. Thus, by gambling
that the plaintiff would be able to recover at least $2,000,000 from Pac-
car and agreeing to cover any difference, the railroad had a good
chance of evading any financial responsibility.1
35
Burlington moved for an order pursuant to Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 877.6 that the settlement was in "good faith," thereby at-
tempting to cut off Paccar's rights to seek partial indemnity. The trial
court denied the motion, but the court of appeal issued a writ directing
the trial court to enter an order that the settlement was in "good faith."
Citing Fisher and Stambaugh, the court articulated its view of the
competing interests involved. "While inequity may result, it has been
thought that the policy of encouraging settlement, and of removing at
least the settlingpartyfrom the case, would suffer serious impairment if
it were subordinated to a policy requiring equitable apportionment."1
36
Thus, the court in Burlington did two things. First, it redefined the
settlement goal as settlement between the plaintiff and the settling
party, rather than overall settlement of the litigation. Second, unlike
the court in River Garden Farms which balanced the competing policies
of encouragement of settlement of litigation and equitable apportion-
ment of loss, the Burlington court subordinated the policy of equitable
apportionment to this redefined policy of encouragement of settlement.
As is evident, once the court establishes the primary policy as the en-
couragement of settlement between the plaintiff and the settling party,
then virtually no settlement agreement will be found to be lacking
"good faith," because an agreement must be upheld to support this
policy.
Additionally, the court of appeal adopted the Dompeling court's
view that the requirement of "good faith" is a means to insure that the
settling parties do not tortiously injure the nonsettling parties. 37 Be-
135. Burlington also reserved the right to veto any settlement between plaintiff and Pac-
car for less than $2,000,000, thus maintaining the right to prevent any settlement that would
require it to contribute anything. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 944, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
136. Id. at 945, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The court cited Dompeling's language that the
settling defendant does not have a duty to pay the plaintiff more so that the adverse parties
may pay the plaintiff less. Id. (citing Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at
44-45; Cardio, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260). The court then concluded
that the settling parties are bound only to refrain from tortious or other wrongful conduct
against the nonsettling parties. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW [
cause the trial court found no tortious conduct directed toward the non-
settling party,138 the appellate court held this was equivalent to the
finding of "good faith" required by the statute.
As in Cardio, the appellate court acknowledged that the fairness of
such a result was "highly debatable" but concluded that the courts have
regularly upheld settlements found free of tortious effect on the nonset-
tling party, irrespective of their overall fairness.' 39 In this respect, the
court was indeed correct.
3. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates
The appellate court decision in Tech-Bill, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde
& Associates 140 is another illustration of an unfair and incongruous
result that can be reached when a court adopts language from previous
cases without trying to accommodate the various competing policy con-
siderations. The California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in
the Tech-Bilt case, so the appellate decision has no force or effect and
cannot be cited as authority. 4 1 However, the case will be discussed
here briefly to illustrate the extreme result that was compelled by the
wording of prior decisions.
In Tech-Bilt, the settlement in question consisted of the plaintiffs
dismissal with prejudice of a subcontractor against whom it could not
proceed because the statute of limitations had run in exchange for a
waiver of costs amounting to approximately $55. 142 Another defend-
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Cardo and Fisher).
140. 146 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 194 Cal. Rptr. 729, hearing granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A.
31826).
141. CAL. CT. R. 28(a) provides in part: "Within 30 days after a decision of a Court of
Appeal becomes final as to that court, the Supreme Court, on its own motion, or on petition
as provided in subdivision (b), may order the cause transferred to itself for hearing and
decision .. " This rule has been interpreted as rendering the lower court's opinion, deci-
sion and judgment a nullity. See Ponce v. Marr, 47 Cal. 2d 159, 161, 301 P.2d 837, 839
(1958). See also CAL. CT. R. 976(d) which provides: "No opinion superseded by the grant-
ing of a hearing... shall be published," and CAL. CT. R. 977(a), which provides: "An
opinion that is not ordered published shall not be cited or relied upon by a court or a party
142. In Tech-Bilt, plaintiffs, owners of a residential property, brought an action against
the developer, Tech-Bilt Construction Corp., the soils engineers, Woodward-Clyde & As-
socs., and others on various theories to recover for structural defects in their residence.
Later, realizing that their action against Woodward-Clyde was barred by the applicable stat-
ute of limitations (Code of Civil Procedure § 337.5), plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the suit
against Woodward-Clyde with prejudice in exchange for a waiver of costs. Presumably,
Woodward-Clyde would have prevailed against plaintiffs in a motion for summary judg-
ment based on the statute of limitations and they would have been able to recover their costs
of suit, namely their filing fee in the amount of $55. Thereafter, Tech-Bilt filed an amended
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ant, a contractor, had a cause of action against this subcontractor for
partial indemnity that was not barred by the statute of limitations
under the recent supreme court case of Valley Circle Estates v. VTN.
Consolidated, Inc. 143 Nevertheless, the Tech-Bilt court found the re-
lease by the plaintiff of the subcontractor to be a "good faith" settle-
ment simply because no tortious conduct was involved, thereby
eliminating the contractor's ability to obtain partial indemnity from his
subcontractor.44
A decision such as Tech-Bilt illustrates how the present tortious
conduct test for "good faith" gives the plaintiff inordinate control over
the defendant's right of partial indemnity. If the plaintiff had realized
his claim against the subcontractor was barred and had not sued him,
the contractor would have been able to seek partial indemnity from the
subcontractor. 14  However, because the plaintiff chose to sue the sub-
contractor, and then later agreed to dismiss that defendant for a waiver
of costs upon discovery that his action was barred by the statute of
limitations, the contractor's right to partial indemnity was terminated.
True, the plaintiff did not act with bad faith as that term is commonly
used. The plaintiffs actions seemed to be quite rational. Yet, this can-
cross-complaint for partial indemnity and declaratory relief against Woodward-Clyde.
Woodward-Clyde defended by seeking a confiimation that its agreement with plaintiffs was
a "good faith" settlement, thus entitling it to summary judgment on the cross-complaints.
After a hearing, the trial court found the settlement to be in "good faith" and entered sum-
mary judgment dismissing Tech-Bilt's cross-complaint against Woodward-Clyde. Tech-Bilt
appealed.
143. 33 Cal. 3d 604, 189 Cal. Rptr. 871, 659 P.2d 1160 (1983). In Valley Circle Estates, the
California Supreme Court held that even though a plaintiff's cause of action against a sub-
contractor is barred by the statute of limitations, a cross-complaint against the subcontractor
for partial indemnity by the general contractor is not barred as long as the main action was
brought in a timely fashion by the plaintiff against the general contractor. The supreme
court stated:
To impose on general contractors the liability of their subcontractors would
not only be unfair, but could effectively deter the activities of the construction in-
dustry. On the other hand, to require that subcontractors remain liable for their
work for the period of time during which general contractors must remain liable,
should not only promote responsibility in the construction industry generally, but
provide an additional incentive on the part of subcontractors to be certain of their
work.
id. at 614, 659 P.2d at 1167, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
144. The opinion of the appellate court quoted verbatim the language from American
Motorcycle and Dompeling set forth earlier in this article. See supra notes 100, 111 and
accompanying text. The court then cited the definition of "good faith" found in Webster's
Dictionary, and also relied on the Cardio case which held that a settlement in which the
plaintiffs released a defendant in consideration for nothing more than a waiver of costs was
a "good faith" settlement.
145. This is true assuming the plaintiff did not "settle" with the subcontractor before suit
by accepting money not to sue him.
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not be the result intended by the supreme court in its American Motor-
cycle decision, its Valley Circle Estates decision or the result intended
by the legislature in drafting section 877.6. Presumably, in granting the
hearing in the Tech-Bill case, the California Supreme Court found that
this case has gone too far in emasculating the "good faith" require-
ment. Whether the court's granting of the hearing was motivated
predominantly by the fact that Tech-Bilt provides an escape for sub-
contractors from their liability to general contractors under the Valley
Circle Estates case or whether the court intends to reevaluate the test
for "good faith" remains to be seen.
It is the thesis of this article that the "good faith" requirement
must indeed be redefined in a way to foster the competing policies of
equitable sharing among tortfeasors and the encouragement of settle-
ments. Part V-D of this article provides a recommendation to achieve
this purpose.
146
4. Other cases applying the tortious conduct test
Two cases, Kohn v. Superior Court147 and Wysong & Miles Co. v.
Western Industrial Movers,' 4 are somewhat out of step with other ap-
pellate decisions in their analysis of whether a settlement was in "good
faith." While specifically advocating the tortious conduct test,149 each
court did not merely say the settlements were in "good faith" because
there was no tortious conduct. Instead, these courts actually performed
a reasonable range type of analysis to uphold the trial court's finding of
"good faith" settlements. 5 ° Kohn and Wysong will be discussed later
to illustrate the mechanics of a reasonable range analysis.'
5'
A recent California case on the issue, FordMotor Co. v. Schultz," 2
146. See infra text accompanying notes 301-83.
147. 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983).
148. 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983).
149. The Kohn court cited "the most recent decisions in the area"-Golden Bear Forest
Prods., Inc. v. Misale, 138 Cal. App. 3d 573, 188 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1982); Burlington N. R.R.
Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982); Cardio Systems, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981); and Dompeling v. Supe-
rior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981)-for the proposition that only
rarely will a settlement be disapproved. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
150. Also performing a reasonable range analysis, although citing Dompeling and Wy.
song, was the court in the recent case of Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal.
App. 3d 45, 58, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136, 145 (1984). See infra notes 354-56 and accompanying
text.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 346-53.
152. 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983). This case involved the same lawsuit
in which writ proceedings resulted in the second district's opinion in Fisher v. Superior
Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
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reaffirmed the tortious conduct definition of "good faith" by following
the trend of giving priority to the goal of encouragement of settlements
and subordinating the policy of equitable apportionment of loss. It up-
held a finding of a "good faith" settlement merely because no tortious
conduct was present on the part of the settling parties." 3
G. The Ninth Circuit Cases
The Ninth Circuit has decided two cases 154 involving "good faith"
settlements in California under its diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
and has refused to follow the tortious conduct test of the California
decisions. Unlike the California cases in which a settlement has never
been found not to have been made in "good faith," both Ninth Circuit
cases found lack of a "good faith" settlement. The Ninth Circuit test of
"good faith" is different than that enunciated in any California deci-
sion-to be in "good faith," a dismissal of a party by the plaintiff must
represent a settlement which is a "good faith" determination of relative
liabilities and must not reflect merely a tactical maneuver by the
plaintiff.'
55
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 156 plaintiff
sued Ford Motor Company and a dealership for personal injuries. Im-
mediately prior to trial, the plaintiff's attorney dismissed Ford because
he thought he had a better chance of recovery if Ford's expert witnesses
did not testify and because he believed he had little chance to recover
from Ford. Ford paid no money to the plaintiff. The plaintiff pre-
vailed in his suit against the dealer, and the dealer's insurer, Commer-
cial Union Insurance Company, instituted a diversity action against
Ford for partial indemnity under the principles of American Motorcy-
cle. Ford defended on the ground that section 877 of the Code of Civil
Procedure discharged it from liability for equitable indemnification be-
cause the dismissal by the plaintiff was in "good faith."
The district court found that the settlement was in "good faith."
153. "[T]he rationale to be applied in any instance where the good faith character of a
settlement is challenged is one which will find the existence of that element, absent any
adequate showing of collusion 'aimed at injuring the interests of an absent tortfeasor."'
Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 950, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (quoting River
Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505).
154. Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
155. Owen, 713 F.2d at 1464; Commercial Union, 640 F.2d at 213. This test is evaluated
in Part V-C. See infra text accompanying notes 294-99.
156. 640 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). This case was decided after
Stambaugh and American Motorcycle but before Dompeling.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed, adopting a rule that it believed the Califor-
nia Supreme Court would adopt if confronted with a similar situa-
tion.'57 Unlike the California cases which looked only to the goal of
encouragement of settlement, the Ninth Circuit used the River Garden
Farms analysis of identifying two competing policies involved in the
relationship between section 877 and the doctrine of partial indemnity:
the policy in favor of settlement and the equitable rule developed by
the California Supreme Court allocating liability among tortfeasors in
proportion to fault. The court concluded that it was bound by these
two goals of California law-equity and settlement-and that neither
statutory goal should be applied to defeat the other. 58
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the decision to dismiss Ford was
a tactical maneuver by the plaintiffs attorneys to remove a deep pocket
defendant because of the experts it could produce and the skilled trial
attorneys it could retain. Thus, the decision did not reflect the coopera-
tive decision-making between parties that is the earmark of a settle-
ment, and did not reflect a consideration of relative liability.' 5 9 The
court spoke of two intertwined tests in its decision that the settlement
had not been made in "good faith." It is difficult to determine whether
the court based its opinion on the fact that the dismissal was a tactical
maneuver and, therefore, no settlement had occurred, or whether the
dismissal was not in "good faith" because the plaintiff did not receive
an amount related to the liability of the settling party. In all likelihood,
it was a combination of the two.
A more recent Ninth Circuit case is Owen v. United States. 60
There, the settling party argued that the Commercial Union "good
faith" test had been superseded by subsequent opinions of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal, particularly Dompeling v. Superior Court which
157. 640 F.2d at 214. The court stated: "When we confront a situation not yet met by the
California Supreme Court, we must seek the rule we believe that court would adhere to were
it confronted with a similar situation." (citing Takahashi v. Lomis Armored Car Serv., 625
F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1980)).
158. 640 F.2d at 213 (quoting River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr.
at 506).
159. 640 F.2d at 213. The court noted that the case involved a $3,250,000 damage recov-
ery by the plaintiff and, therefore, even a slight probability of liability on Ford's part would
have warranted substantial contribution.
The court stated that the "good faith" of the dismissal alone was not sufficient. That
did not satisfy § 877 because it did not establish the existence of settlement or the "good
faith" required toward interested individuals not participating in the dismissal. The dismis-
sal must represent a settlement which is a "good faith" determination of relative liabilities.
Only in this situation are both policies behind § 877-equity and settlement-furthered, Id.
160. 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983). Owen was decided in August of 1983, falling chrono-
logically between the California cases of Wysong and Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz.
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imposed the tortious or other wrongful conduct test for lack of "good
faith". 6' However, the Ninth Circuit refused to follow Dompeling. It
acknowledged that its interpretation of section 877 in Commercial
Union would only be binding in the absence of any subsequent indica-
tion from the California courts that its interpretation was incorrect. It
stated that although these recent California decisions cast a new light
on the question, 62 the issue of "good faith" settlements "presents one
of those rare instances where convincing evidence exists that the high-
est court of the state will not follow the result reached by some of the
state's inferior appellate courts."'163 The court concluded that the Com-
mercial Union approach, based on effectuating both of the goals of eq-
uity and promotion of settlement as set forth in River Garden Farms,
rightly predicted what the California Supreme Court will hold.
1 64
Owen is interesting, however, because, even though the court expressly
disavowed the Dompeling tortious conduct test for lack of "good faith"
and instead embraced a proportionate test, an examination of the
court's opinion reveals that it did just the opposite.1
65
161. Id. at 1464.
162. Id Owen acknowledged that the Dompeling test has been followed in Cardio, Bur-
lington, and Wysong. The court stated: "In the absence of a pronouncement by the highest
court of a state, the federal courts must follow the decision of the intermediate appellate
courts of the state unless there is 'convincing evidence that the highest court of the state
would decide differently."' Id. (quoting Andrade v. City of Phoenix, 692 F.2d 557, 559 (9th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam)).
163. 713 F.2d at 1465.
164. Id. at 1466.
165. In Owen, an employee was killed in a crash of his employer's airplane. The heirs
brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act in federal court against the United States,
and brought a second wrongful death action against the employer in state court. The Gov-
ernment impleaded the employer in federal court for partial indemnity, alleging pilot error
as a partial cause of the accident. The heirs then settled with the Government for over
$1,000,000. This payment represented over 95% of the eventual total recovery by the heirs.
Subsequently, the heirs and the employer settled the state case for $55,000, contingent upon
the district court's certification that the agreement was a "good faith" settlement. If the
employer's settlement with the heirs was in "good faith," then the Government's indemnity
action against the employer would be terminated by § 877(b).
Having stated that the criteria for "good faith" should be in an evaluation of relative
liabilities between the parties, the court's application of this test to the facts of the case seems
dubious at best. The court made a point on several occasions of noting that both sides, by
their own admission, agreed that the employer had minimal exposure to plaintiffs. Id. at
1467. After making this point, it seems logical that the court would then go on to conclude
that the settlement was made in "good faith" because it was an evaluation of relative liabili-
ties. The court even noted that had the employer and the heirs concluded this settlement
before the Government settled the case, the court would have had no occasion to question
the "good faith" of the award. Id. at 1466 n.7. However, instead of reaching this conclu-
sion, the court seemed to apply a tortious conduct type of analysis.
The court was disturbed because the Government had made a prompt, substantially full
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
H. Summary of the Law Regarding "Good Faith" Settlements
This section has traced the development of the definition of a
"good faith" settlement both under California law and under two fed-
eral cases interpreting the California law. The early California deci-
sions attempted to accommodate the competing values of equitable
apportionment of loss among joint tortfeasors and encouragement of
settlement, and, in so doing, defined a "good faith" settlement as one
being within the reasonable range of the settlor's fair share of liability.
value settlement with the plaintiffs based on its belief that liability would eventually be
apportioned pursuant to its cross-complaint for indemnity against the employer. If the
plaintiff/employer settlement was found to be in "good faith," then the Government would
lose its ability to gain indemnity. Future deep pocket tortfeasors would thereby be discour-
aged from making early and full value settlements because of the fear that another tortfeasor
would "manipulate the statute" to achieve immunity from an indemnity action. Therefore,
the court held the settlement was not made in "good faith" and that the Government could
have its day in court on the indemnity claim. Id. at 1467-68.
Obviously, the amount of the settlement was not the stumbling block for the Owen
court. The Government had already paid the heirs their money, and even if the employer
had settled with the plaintiffs for more than $55,000 (which the court admitted would have
been an improvident settlement since they had minimal exposure), the only result would
have been that the plaintiff would be compensated for full value by the Government and
would be compensated even more by any settlement it could obtain from the employer.
This still would not have helped the Government, because once the employer's settlement
was found to be in "good faith," the Government would be barred from claiming indemnity
against the employer.
Therefore, the court was not concerned that the employer had not paid the plaintiff
enough, (i.e., the settlement did not reflect the "relative liabilities" of the parties) but rather
that a settlement had been made at all. Under this rationale, no settlement between the
employer and the plaintiff could be in "good faith" after the Government had settled with
the plaintiff for full value, because, under § 877, once the employer's settlement is found to
be in "good faith," the Government is barred from claiming indemnity against the em-
ployer.
What was present in the Owen case, then, was an improvident settlement by the Gov-
ernment. Instead of settling for "full value" (i.e., virtually the entire amount claimed by
plaintiffs) it should have settled for what it thought was a reflection of its proportionate
liability. Assuming it did wish to settle for full value and then later apportion the damages
among the tortfeasors through a cross-complaint for partial indemnity, the Government
could have included a provision in its settlement agreement that is commonly included in
full value settlements, namely a release and dismissal by the plaintiff of all potential joint
tortfeasors. In this way, a joint tortfeasor cannot later "settle" with the plaintiff in order to
obtain a discharge from partial indemnity claims under § 877 and § 877.6. This is precisely
what occurred in American Bankers Insurance Co. v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 97 Cal.
App. 3d 732, 159 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1979). The insurance carrier settled the tort action for the
full amount of plaintifls claim and had obtained the plaintiffs dismissal with prejudice as to
all defendants. It was then able to pursue claims against the other defendants for partial
indemnity. Whether or not the plaintiff will agree to dismiss all defendants is simply one
more factor to consider in evaluating a settlement. 5 CEB Civ. LITIGATION REP. 194, 195
(1983).
Thus, even though the Owen court said that the settlement was not in "good faith"
because it was not "proportional," the court seemed to be disqualifying a proportional settle-
ment in order to allow the Government to pursue its claim for partial indemnity.
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The more recent cases have moved away from this definition, and now
the courts will find any settlement to be in "good faith," regardless of
the payment received by the plaintiff, as long as the nonsettling defend-
ant cannot prove tortious conduct on behalf of the settlors. The courts
have reached this result by attempting to foster the policy of encourage-
ment of settlement while ignoring the policy of equitable apportion-
ment of loss. It is ironic that the cases decided before American
Motorcycle in the contribution context defined the concept of "good
faith" in a way which sought to achieve a degree of equitable appor-
tionment of loss, whereas the Dompeling case and its progeny decided
after American Motorcycle completely ignored this policy. The Ninth
Circuit has refused to follow the recent California decisions and has
adopted a test requiring the settlement to bear a relationship to the
liability of the settling party.
This section has also analyzed and discussed the facts of each case
and the actual approach used by each court where it differed from the
stated approach. This was done to illustrate that the rules formulated
by the decisions were often dicta, were often established to cure a par-
ticular problem present in the case, and were often not applicable to
subsequent cases citing them. Part V of this article will analyze four
alternative definitions of "good faith", suggested by the cases just
discussed.
1 66
IV. A METHODOLOGY FOR FORMULATING A DEFINITION OF
"GOOD FAITH"
The remainder of this article is concerned with developing an in-
terpretation of the "good faith" requirement to be utilized by the
courts. This section proposes a methodology for formulating a defini-
tion of "good faith." Part V analyzes four possible definitions and
makes a recommendation.
A useful method for defining "good faith" can be found in princi-
ples of statutory construction. Even though the concept of a "good
faith" settlement has been established by case law as well as statutes, 167
two maxims of statutory construction, with slight modification to per-
166. See infra text accompanying notes 263-383.
167. It is present in Code of Civil Procedure § 877, which, although a part of the contri-
bution statutes, is still being applied. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The "good
faith" provision was incorporated by the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle
as part of the doctrine of partial indemnity. Finally, Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6 put in
statutory form a portion of the holding of American Motorcycle regarding "good faith"
settlements.
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tain to a judicial rule as well, provide logical guidelines for the inter-
pretation of the "good faith" provision. First, the intent of the
legislature or court should be ascertained so that the purpose of the
provision in question can be effectuated. Second, a statute or rule
should be construed with reference to the entire scheme of law of which
it is a part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain
effectiveness.'
68
Therefore, as an aid to formulating an appropriate definition of a
"good faith" settlement, this section will identify and examine the poli-
cies underlying both the "good faith" requirement itself and the entire
legal scheme of which it is a part. It will also be shown that these
policies conflict with each other in the "good faith" settlement context.
Accordingly, in order to give effect to the legislative intent and the rele-
vant policy considerations, the "good faith" requirement should be
viewed as an accommodating factor between competing goals, and
should be defined in a way to let it carry out this purpose.
A. The Relevant Policy Considerations
Three major policies and two lesser policies that should be consid-
ered in formulating a definition of "good faith" have been identified by
the courts and can be discerned from legislative history. The major
policies are: (1) maximizing the plaintiff's recovery, (2) encouragement
of settlement, and (3) equitable distribution of loss according to pro-
portion of fault.169 Other relevant policies, although of lesser impor-
tance, are: (1) practical considerations regarding the "good faith"
settlement hearing, and (2) privacy of financial information.
1. The policy of maximizing recovery for the plaintiff
One of the policies underlying the California Supreme Court deci-
sions dealing with comparative fault is the maximization of recovery to
the injured party for the amount of his injury to the extent the fault of
others has contributed to it.' 7 ° This policy is evident in the court's
168. Peopleexrel. Younger v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30,40, 544 P.2d 1322, 1331, 127
Cal. Rptr. 122, 128 (1976); Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11
Cal. 3d 801, 813-14, 523 P.2d 617, 624-25, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577, 584-85 (1974).
169. These are the three policies underlying the comparative fault cases decided by the
California Supreme Court as identified in the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 496, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1978).
170. Id. Several appellate decisions have identified the maximization of plaintiff's recov-
ery as the foremost and highest ranking policy underlying the supreme court decisions. Id.;




decision in Li to eliminate the total bar to recovery if a plaintiff is con-
tributorily negligent. 1 ' It is also the basis for the court's refusal in
American Motorcycle to abandon the concept of joint and several lia-
bility in favor of making each defendant liable to the plaintiff for only
his proportional share of the award. The rule of joint and several lia-
bility permits an injured person to obtain full recovery for his injuries
even when one or more of the responsible parties do not have the finan-
cial resources to cover their liability.'72 The court held that if one of
the tortfeasors cannot pay the full amount of his judgment, fairness
dictates that the "wronged party should not be deprived of his right to
redress."' 73 Justice Clark acknowledged this policy in his dissent in
American Motorcycle by stating that one of the rationales present in the
majority's opinion was an "asserted public policy for fully compensat-
ing accident victims."'
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2. The policy of encouragement of settlements
Perhaps the principal and most often discussed policy relevant to
the issue of a "good faith" settlement is the policy of encouragement of
settlements. This policy has been identified by all of the cases discuss-
ing "good faith" settlements. As stated by the court in Stambaugh:
"'The law wisely favors settlements. . . .'" [citations omit-
ted]. "[I]t is the policy of the law to discourage litigation and
to favor compromises of doubtful rights and controversies,
made either in or out of court." [citations omitted]. Settle-
ment agreements "'are highly favored as productive of peace
and goodwill in the community, and reducing the expense
and persistency of litigation.'" [citations omitted]. Indeed, it
has been said that a major goal of section 877 is the "encour-
agement of settlements." [citations omitted].' 7 5
That settlement of litigation is a major goal in California law cannot be
disputed.'76 It is indeed the policy behind Code of Civil Procedure
sections 877 and 877.6 and the early cases dealing with "good faith"
171. 13 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875 (1975).
172. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
173. Id. (quoting Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948)).
174. 20 Cal. 3d at 612, 578 P.2d at 921, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Clark, J., dissenting).
175. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 235-36, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (citations omitted).
176. California courts have stressed repeatedly that settlements and compromises are fa-
vored by the law. See Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multole Parties, and Settlements,
65 CALIF. L. REv. 1264, 1268 (1977); See also Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 150
P.2d 876, 878 (1944); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 86, 91 Cal. Rptr.
301, 304 (1970).
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
settlements. It is also one of the policies recognized inAmerican Motor-
cycle. Because reliance on this policy alone has resulted in the current
interpretation of "good faith" applied by the California courts, it is im-
portant to analyze this policy in detail to. determine both its origin and
its effect in a multiparty situation.
a. encouragement of settlements by giving them finality
The way the statutes and the California Supreme Court sought to
encourage settlements was to give them finality by allowing a defend-
ant, once he settled, to be free from the litigation entirely, including
claims by his joint tortfeasors. It was recognized that a defendant
would have no incentive to settle with the plaintiff if he could still be
forced to litigate the case in the context of claims for contribution or
partial indemnity. 77 The legislative history of Code of Civil Procedure
sections 877 and 877.6 illustrates that the policy of encouragement of
settlements embodied in those statutes reflected mainly this concern for
providing finality. Similarly, American Motorcycle and the early ap-
pellate cases discussing encouragement of settlements were addressing
this same concern. In Part IV-C it will be shown that the California
appellate courts have misconstrued this policy as a directive for them to
encourage settlements by finding virtually all settlements to be in
"good faith," and in so doing they have ignored the role of "good
faith" requirement as a limitation on those settlements that should be
encouraged. 178
A discussion of the policy of encouragement of settlements must
begin with Code of Civil Procedure section 877 because it is the main
authority cited for this policy. The legislative history of this statute
reveals the concern for settlement finality, i.e., that settlements not be
discouraged because of continued liability to joint tortfeasors. Section
877 achieved this purpose by releasing a "good faith" settlor from
claims for contribution. 179 The River Garden Farms court speculated
177. A potential defendant's desire for settlement is blunted when he cannot close his file
on the case. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503; UNIF.
CONTRIB. AMONrG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4(b), Commissioners' Comment, 12 U.L.A. 99-100
(1975); Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 486, 488-89 (1966); Thaxter,
supra note 26, at 187-88. If the settlor were still liable for partial indemnity, then the settling
tortfeasor would be deprived of the benefit of his bargain with the plaintiff. "He would
suffer all the expense and inconvenience of a multiparty trial and could still possibly be held
liable for more than he settled for through the back door of a cross-complaint for compara-
tive indemnity against him. Obviously that would destroy every incentive for settlement
... " Fisher, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 443, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 237-62.
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West 1980).
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that section 877 was modeled after section 4 of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act.'8 ° The Commissioners' notes to that sec-
tion state that an earlier draft, which did not discharge the settling
tortfeasor from contribution to any other tortfeasors, discouraged set-
tlement. Therefore, in order to encourage settlements, the new subsec-
tion, almost identical to section 877, provided that a release in "good
faith" of one tortfeasor discharged that tortfeasor from all liability for
contribution.' 81 Thus we find the language of River Garden Farms that
the statutory objective is "encouraging settlements and insuring a
measure of finality."1
82
Unfortunately, finality was not necessarily achievable under the
180. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 504. The court acknowledged that no
legislative history specifically identifies it as such.
181. The commissioners noted:
No defendant wants to settle when he remains open to contribution in an uncertain
amount, to be determined on the basis of a judgment against another in a suit to
which he will not be a party. Some reports go so far as to say that the 1939 Act has
made independent settlements impossible ...
It seems more important not to discourage settlements than to make an at-
tempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimination by plaintiffs, or collusion
in the suit. Accordingly the subsection provides that the release in good faith dis-
charges the tortfeasor outright from all liability for contribution.
UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4(b), Commissioners' Comment, 12 U.L.A.
99-100 (1975).
Some of the commentators disagree with this interpretation of legislative intent in Cali-
fornia. For example, Fleming stated that the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act provided that a settling tortfeasor remained liable for contribution in the
amount by which his share exceeded the dollar value of the settlement. California did not
adopt this version and only three states did, a common explanation being that it discouraged
settlements by providing little incentive for either the settling defendant or the plaintiff to
settle. The second version of the Act (which is almost identical to § 877) abandoned this
approach and provided that a "good faith" settlement released the settling tortfeasor from
contribution and further provided that plaintiffs recovery would be decreased only by the
amount actually paid or the consideration for the settlement, whichever is larger. This ver-
sion was adopted by a great many states, including California. However, "it is far from
clear whether it was this feature [the encouragement of settlements] rather than an increas-
ing disenchantment with the common law rule of no contribution which was the primary
motive [for states to adopt this version]." Fleming, supra note 6, at 1495.
Another commentator has noted that the 1955 version of the Uniform Act (after which
§ 877 was copied) was not necessary in California because Californa also adopted the provi-
sion that the right to contribution does not attach unless a joint money judgment has been
rendered. Thus, the rule of the 1939 Uniform Act that a release does not also release the
settling tortfeasor from liability from contribution would Wave no application in California
because no joint judgment can ever be obtained against a party who has settled. Thus, in
California, it was not necessary to adopt § 877 to encourage settlements as was the case with
other states which did not have the joint judgment rule. Thus, while the purpose of § 877,
which was modeled after § 4 of the 1955 Uniform Act, may have been to encourage settle-
ments, this provision was unnecessary in California, and only served to detract from the
contribution act as a whole. Thaxter, supra note 26, at 188.
182. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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contribution statutes.'8 3 For example, Stambaugh 184 addressed the sit-
uation of a nonsettling tortfeasor who was trying to bring a settlor back
into the case for purposes of deciding his "good faith." The strong ar-
ticulation of the policy of encouragement of settlement underlying sec-
tion 877 made by the court in Stambaugh can be explained by the
concern to provide a settling defendant with a total release from all
aspects of the litigation. The court defined "good faith" in such a way
as to provide this measure of finality.'1
5
Even after the contribution statutes were replaced by the theory of
partial indemnity for apportioning loss, the courts in expressing the
policy of encouragement of settlements were actually concerned with
finality of settlement. InAmerican Motorcycle, the California Supreme
Court reaffirmed that section 877 reflected a strong public policy in
favor of settlement. 8 6 The court sought to further this same purpose in
the partial indemnity context by providing an incentive for both plain-
tiffs and defendants to settle. It encouraged tortfeasors to settle by rul-
ing that a settlor who settles in "good faith" is free from partial
indemnity claims. Plaintiffs were given an incentive to settle by the
rule that the amount of the plaintiffs judgment is reduced pro tanto
183. Code of Civil Procedure § 877 only provided for the discharge of a settling tortfeasor
from further liability if the settlement was in "good faith." Yet under the joint judgment
rule no contribution was possible from someone who had settled, regardless of whether the
settlement was in "good faith." Therefore, the early cases grappled with the problem of
what would be the nonsettling tortfeasor's remedy for a settlement that was not in "good
faith," but which, by operation of the contribution joint judgment rule, cut off his right to
contribution from the settling tortfeasor. In Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal.
App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975), the court suggested that a nonsettling defendant's
remedy would lie in the form of a recovery from both the plaintiff and the settling defendant
in an independent action asserting "bad faith." Thus, after the trial on the merits against the
nonsettling tortfeasors had been concluded, a settling tortfeasor could be forced to litigate
the entire case in the guise of a bad faith claim, because the nonsettlor's damages would
include an amount that the settlor would be required to pay had the joint judgment been
entered. This, of course, would discourage settlements.
An analogous finality problem was illustrated by Justice Clark in his dissent in Ameri-
can Motorcycle. He stated that because the possibility exists of establishing "bad faith," a
nonsettling tortfeasor must continue to maintain his cross-complaint for partial indemnity
against a settling tortfeasor. Aware that a settlement would not ordinarily prevent his par-
ticipating in the litigation on the issue of damages and relative fault, and that he might be
liable for further damages, a defendant contemplating settlement will rarely do so alone. 20
Cal. 3d at 610 n.2, 578 P.2d at 920 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203 n.2 (Clark, J., dissenting).
184. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 85-95.
186. 20 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198. See supra text accom-
panying note 100.
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and not by the percentage of the settlor's fault. 7
Similarily, in Fisher Y. Superior Court,188 the appellate court was
reacting to a trial court decision that completely frustrated the policy of
finality of settlement by ordering that the issue of "good faith" would
not be tried-until after the full trial on the merits of the plaintiffs liabil-
ity claim. The trial court further ruled that the jury findings in that
trial might be binding in the subsequent trial on the nonsettling defend-
ant's cross-complaint for partial indemnity and on the issue of "good
faith." Thus, the trial court was forcing a settling defendant to fully
participate in and defend against the plaintiffs case in order to protect
herself against a possible adverse ruling on the "good faith" issue.8 9
In dealing with this problem the appellate court emphasized the policy
of encouragement of settlements and ruled that the issue of the "good
faith" of a settlement must be determined first. 190 Unfortunately, in so
doing, it also significantly narrowed the definition of "good faith" to
one of tortious conduct. 191 Therefore, in Fisher, the appellate court's
strongly stated articulation of the policy of encouraging settlements was
in actuality a concern that defendants were not being provided with the
incentive to settle-namely, the assurance that a settlement would be
final and would free the settlor entirely from future involvement in the
action. 1
92
Also concerned with the finality problem was section 877.6.
Passed in 1980, it had the same purpose as section 877, namely to en-
courage settlements by providing that a settlor would be free from fu-
ture claims by his joint tortfeasors. 93 The legislative history supports
this conclusion. The bill's proponents stated: "A procedural uncer-
tainty under existing law had caused the loss of settlements in a sub-
stantial number of trial court cases. . . . [D]efendants contemplating
settlement with the plaintiff are reluctant to risk vulnerability to a later
jury trial in which a concurrent tortfeasor may claim that the settlement
lacks 'good faith.'"194 Unlike section 877, section 877.6 provided a
cure for the finality problem by allowing a pretrial hearing to deter-
187. 20 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198. See supra note 102
and accompanying text.
188. 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
189. Id. at 437-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
190. Id. at 442-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
191. Id. at 445, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
192. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
193. The clear policy of § 877.6(c) is to encourage settlement by providing finality to liti-
gation for the settling tortfeasor. Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App.
3d 230, 232, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580, 582 (1983).
194. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BILL DIGEST A.B. 3425, at 2 (hearing
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mine the issue of the "good faith" of a settlement. 195 Under this proce-
dure the defendant is not discouraged from entering into a settlement
with the plaintiff because of the fear he may be required later to litigate
the issue of his liability if the issue of "good faith" is decided against
him. Thus, section 877.6 permits a defendant who wants to settle to
know in advance whether his settlement is in "good faith" and whether
he will, therefore, be free from partial indemnity claims.
In conclusion, the statutes, American Motorcycle, and even the
early appellate decisions sought to encourage settlements by providing
the settling defendant with total freedom from the litigation. This is
the origin of the stated policy of encouragement of settlement that is
emphasized and relied upon in the "good faith" cases. However, this is
a far cry from the position being taken by some California appellate
courts that the statutes and American Motorcycle sought to encourage
settlements by mandating that virtually all settlements be found to be
in "good faith."' 9 6
b. the policy of total versus partial settlement
In the context of "good faith" settlements, possible definitions of
"good faith" differ as to whether they foster total settlement of litiga-
tion, partial settlement, both, or no settlement at all. Therefore, recog-
nizing that the courts have identified a general policy of encouragement
of settlements, 9 7 a crucial question arises as to whether that policy
speaks to total settlement of a case, partial settlement, or both. The
term "total settlement" means a settlement between all parties, or one
that will lead to a settlement between all parties, so as to end the litiga-
tion entirely. The term "partial settlement" means a settlement be-
tween the plaintiff and one joint tortfeasor only, with the plaintiff
proceeding to trial against the remaining tortfeasors.
(1) total settlement of litigation
The reason the law encourages settlements is that settlements save
time, effort, and expense for the parties and the community. g1  The
benefit from a settlement accrues when the case is removed from the
judicial system, and this occurs only when all claims relating to the loss
date April 30, 1980) (analysis of A.B. 3425). See also CAL. SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS,
THIRD READING ANALYSIS OF A.B. 3425, at 2.
195. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1984).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 237-40, 249-52.
197. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
198. See Thaxter, supra note 26, at 186; Fleming, supra note 6, at 1495.
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are settled. As stated in Stambaugh, settlement agreements are
"'highly favored as productive of peace and goodwill in the commu-
nity and [because they] reduc[e] the expense and persistency of litiga-
tion.' "199 In fact, the cases cited by the Stambaugh court for the
proposition that the law favors settlements are all instances (with the
notable exception of River Garden Farms) where the effect of the settle-
ment in question was to end the litigation entirely.
In identifying the three policies underlying the California
Supreme Court comparative fault cases, the court of appeal in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co. articulated the settlement
goal as "encouragement of settlement of the injured party's claim.'' 2°°
Although it is not absolutely clear from this language or from the
court's opinions, the predominant policy goal seems to be the settle-
ment of a case in its entirety.
(2) partial settlement of litigation
Whether partial settlement of litigation is a worthwhile goal is
open to question. 2 1' For example, the Sears court concluded that the
reduction of transaction costs from the simplification of litigation that
results from having one less joint tortfeasor in a case because of a set-
tlement is at most a subordinate policy consideration. 0 2 It does not
justify support of partial settlements to the same extent that the law
favors complete settlement of a case.20 3
On the other hand, the commissioners suggested in their comments
to section 4 of the Uniform Act that the goal of partial settlement is
desirable.2°4  Furthermore, sections 877 and 877.6 and the court in
199. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
200. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
201. Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 489.
202. 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 497, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264-65. The court based this conclu-
sion on the fact that in the appellate court decision of American Motorcycle (which was
authored by the same judge in the same division of the court of appeal who wrote the Sears
opinion) the goal of reduction of transactional cost by simplification of litigation was one of
the principal policy underpinnings. The supreme court, by vacating that opinion, treated
that policy consideration as subordinate. Id. at 496, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
203. Similarly, Fleming stated, the saving of "transaction costs" in the form of legal and
court expenses resulting from having one fewer joint tortfeasors involved in litigation be-
cause of a settlement is too marginal and speculative a goal to justify support for partial
settlements to the same extent that the law favors complete settlements. Fleming, supra note
6, at 1495.
204. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. A commentator has noted:
The only clear advantage offered by the 1955 [Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors] Act is the promotion of final, but partial, settlements. . . . The 1955
Act allows the plaintiff to obtain the entire unsatisifed portion of his claim from the
nonsettlor, and insures finality of settlement for the settlor by denying contribution.
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American Motorcycle seem to encourage partial settlement by provid-
ing finality of the settlement to the settling defendant and by providing
an incentive for the plaintiff to settle by reducing his ultimate judgment
only by the pro tanto amount of any prior settlement rather than by the
percentage of the settling defendant's fault.2"5 In the "good faith" set-
tlement context, at least one case, Burlington, has expressly articulated
the policy in favor of partial settlements, although it did not analyze
the issue specifically. In the Burlington case, the court described the
goal of settlement as the encouragement of settlement between theplain-
tiff and the settling defendant.2 °6
However, whether partial settlement is an intentional goal or is but
a means to achieve the end of total settlement of the litigation is un-
clear. For example, section 877.6 has as a stated purpose the easing of
court congestion by providing an incentive to settle the entire
As a consequence, partial settlements are attractive; in fact, the major reason given
for the change from the 1939 Act was that the 1955 approach promoted settlements
more effectively. . . . It is arguable that, as the nonsettlor can be held for all the
damages without gaining a right to contribution, all of the tortfeasors will be eager
to settle, and entirety of settlement will be promoted. . . . [A]ny conclusion that
the act promotes entirety of settlement is at best speculative.
Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 492.
205. Section 877.6 does not itself contain a provision for a pro tanto reduction.
206. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 945, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
Another appellate court expressed the opinion that plaintiffs should be encouraged to
settle even if it is with fewer than all the tortfeasors. Lyly & Sons Trucking Co. v. State, 147
Cal. App. 3d 353, 358, 195 Cal. Rptr. 116, 119 (1983). In that case, the court decided how to
allocate among remaining joint tortfeasors the percentage of responsibility attributable to
joint tortfeasors who have previously entered into "good faith" settlements with the plaintiff
and are, therefore, free from paying amounts in excess of their settlement. The court of
appeal held that the solvent (nonsettling) tortfeasors must share in direct proportion to their
respective degree of fault the liability of the judgment-proof (settling) tortfeasors, and this
computation must be made as though the judgment-proof tortfeasors had not been involved
in the accident. Thus, an insolvent defendant's shortfall should be shared proportionately
by the solvent defendants as though the insolvent or absent person had originally not partic-
ipated. Id. As part of its argument, a nonsettling tortfeasor (the state) contended that the
allocation of insolvent or settling defendants' shortfalls must include plaintiffs who are at
fault. The court expressly rejected this and held that the suggestion was at odds with the
explicit rationale of American Motorcycle that in order to encourage settlements, the rule
must be that one who enters into a "good faith" settlement must also be discharged from any
claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor.
The court emphasized that it is not only the defendant in the main action, but also the
plaintiff, who has an interest in finality of settlements. The state's suggestion that the plain-
tiffs fault be taken into account would eliminate any incentive an injured plaintiff would
have to settle with fewer than all of the tortfeasors. In expressing this policy, the Lyly court
stated: "We understand American Motorcycle to have ended the discussion definitively."
147 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 119. Of course, American Motorcycle did not deal
with the issue of whether partial settlements, as such, should be encouraged.
"GOOD FAITH" SETTLEMENT
litigation.2 °7
It has been argued that much of the agitation for encouraging par-
tial settlements has come from the plaintiffs' bar to whom settlement is
an economical way of life, often yielding high rewards. 20 8 The benefits
to a plaintiff from a partial settlement come not in the form of ending
the litigation, but rather in the form of getting some money to the
plaintiff more quickly. As such, a partial settlement may help achieve
the goal of maximizing the plaintiff's recovery.
The interesting and crucial consideration is whether a settlement
with fewer than all defendants will encourage or discourage settlement
with the remaining tortfeasors. This is central to an analysis of whether
a given interpretation of a "good faith" settlement actually fosters the
policy of settlement of the entire case. This determination varies with
the different alternative definitions of "good faith" and will be consid-
ered in the analysis of those alternatives.2 9
3. The policy of equitable distribution of loss according to
proportion of fault
The third major goal that is significant in dealing with the issue of
a "good faith" settlement is the public policy of equitable apportion-
ment of loss among the parties in relation to their degree of fault.2 10 In
this respect, the goals of apportionment of loss according to fault and
equity and fairness are intertwined. Thus, the courts talk about appor-
tionment of loss according to fault as "equitable" apportionment, be-
cause it is primarily from a sense of equity and fairness that the courts
have moved to the present comparative negligence system.211
The importance of the policy of equitable apportionment of loss is
clear. It is this policy which caused the supreme court in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co. to abrogate the prior California rule of contributory negli-
gence which barred any recovery by a negligent plaintiff, regardless of
207. The fact that settlements were discouraged under the procedural system before Code
of Civil Procedure § 877.6 "contributed widely to metropolitan court congestion." CAL.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON A.B. 3425, at 3 (analysis of A.B. 3425 as
amended May 7, 1980). The Senate Judiciary Committee cited the Fisher case for. the prop-
osition that the legislation was needed to stop "the needless proliferation of a great number
of more complex trials." Id
208. See Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, supra note 177, at 489; UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, Commissioners' Comment; Fleming, supra note 6, at 1495;A4merican
Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
209. See infra notes 266-67, 360-61 and accompanying text.
210. Sears, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
21 . Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736-37, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978).
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L.4W REVIEW
his percentage of fault, and in its place adopt a pure system of compar-
ative negligence which apportions liability in direct proportion to fault
in all cases. In so doing, the court also rejected the system whereby the
plaintiff may recover up to the point at which the plaintiffs negligence
is equal to that of the defendant in favor of the pure form because of
this policy that liability for damage should be borne in direct propor-
tion to the amount of negligence of each of the parties.2"2 The court
based its decision in Li on logic, practical experience and fundamental
justice.21 In fact, the major precept guiding the court in L! seemed to
be that of fairness or justice.214
Also stressing the policy of fairness was Daly v. General Motors
Corp.215 in which the court applied comparative fault principles to ap-
portion responsibility between a strictly liable defendant and a negli-
gent plaintiff in a products liability action. The court stated that
"[f]ixed semantic consistency. . . is less important than the attainment
of a just and equitable result," '216 and that the Li principle could best be
described as "equitable apportionment of loss" rather than compara-
tive fault or negligence.
217
Of course, the policy of apportioning liability according to fault as
mandated by considerations of fairness and equity was the theme un-
derlying the California Supreme Court's decision inAmerican Motorcy-
cle Association v. Superior Court. In American Motorcycle, the court
identified the common goal of the doctrines of contribution and indem-
nity as "the equitable distribution of loss among multiple
tortfeasors."218 The court stated that the existing California common
law equitable indemnity doctrine, while ameliorating inequity and in-
justice in some cases, suffered from the same basic "all-or-nothing" de-
ficiency as the discarded contributory negligence doctrine, and fell far
short of fulfilling Li's goal of" 'a system under which liability for dam-
212. 13 Cal. 3d at 829-30, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
213. Id. at 812-13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
214. Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and Ampl/ftcatlon
of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 775, 777 n.8
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Zavos].
215. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
216. Id. at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
217. Id. at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87. The court also said that
Li stood for the principle that "loss should be assessed equitably in proportion to fault." Id.
at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Also, the Daly court spoke in terms of "logic,
justice and fundamental fairness" and indicated that "[t]he law consistently seeks to elevate
justice and equity above the exact contours of a mathematical equation." Id. at 742, 575
P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390. See generally Zavos, supra note 215, at 777 n.8.
218. 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
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age will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct propor-
tion to their respective fault.' "219 In concluding that the force of Li's
rationale applied equally to the allocation of responsibility between
two or more negligent tortfeasors, thus requiring a modification of the
state's traditional all-or-nothing common law equitable indemnity doc-
trine, the court further expressed its concern with equity and fairness as
mandating apportionment of loss. "Again, we concur with Dean Pros-
ser's observation in a related context that '[t]here is obvious lack of
sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for
which two defendants were ... unintentionally responsible, to be
shouldered onto one alone. . while the latter goes scot-free.' "220 Ac-
cordingly, the American Motorcycle court held that a joint tortfeasor
may obtain partial indemnity from his joint tortfeasors on a compara-
tive fault basis."2'
Even before comparative negligence was adopted in California,
equitable apportionment of loss among tortfeasors was an important
goal. The belief that it was inequitable to place the entire burden of
liability on one wrongdoer when another was also responsible for the
harm prompted erosion of the common law doctrine denying contribu-
tion and led to the enactment of the contribution statutes.22 In the
early cases dealing with the "good faith" issue under the contribution
statutes, courts were concerned with effectuating the policy of equitable
distribution of loss among tortfeasors, even though that equitable dis-
tribution was limited to an equal division among judgment
tortfeasors.223 Thus, the strong public policy of allocating loss among
the parties in an equitable fashion formed the basis for the California
Supreme Court decisions in the area of comparative negligence, and
was also present in the context of the old rules of contribution and
indemnity.
4. Lesser policy considerations
a. practical considerations regarding the "goodfaith" hearing
A lesser policy consideration, yet nevertheless one which must be
219. Id. (quoting Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 864 (1975)). Under the common law equitable indemnity doctrine, the total loss
was shifted from one tortfeasor to another. For a discussion of this doctrine, see supra note
27.
220. 20 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
222. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993 n.5, 996-97, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503 n.5,
505-06. See supra notes 27, 74 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., id. at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
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discussed with respect to defining the concept of a "good faith" settle-
ment, is the practical effect of the definition chosen on the "good faith"
hearing itself. California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 pro-
vides for a pretrial hearing on the issue of "good faith" to be conducted
upon twenty days written notice.224 The hearing is similar to ones con-
ducted in other law and motion matters, and the judge may in his dis-
cretion decide the issue based on affidavits and declarations.225 Thus,
any definition of "good faith" must be one that will allow the issue to
be determined at a pretrial hearing.226 This concern for practical con-
siderations was expressed by the court in Dompeling and caused the
court to provide a very limited definition of "good faith" in order to
narrow the scope of the hearing and, correspondingly, the scope of dis-
covery.227  It will be argued that the Dompeling court narrowed the
definition of "good faith" too much. However, the court's concern with
practical considerations is a valid one.
b. the protection of defendant's financial affairs
The Dompeling court was also concerned that if a settling defend-
ant had to undergo discovery into his financial affairs for purposes of
determining the "good faith" of a settlement, settlements would be dis-
couraged.228 The protection of defendants from discovery regarding
their financial assets in order not to discourage a settlement was a cru-
cial policy consideration present in Dompeling, and resulted in the
court espousing a definition of "good faith" which made the discovery
of the defendant's financial information not relevant to the subject mat-
ter of the action.229
224. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1984). See supra note 50 for text of
§ 877.6.
225. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(b) (West Supp. 1984). There is no right to a jury trial
in a "good faith" hearing pursuant to § 877.6. Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153
Cal. App. 3d 45, 56-57, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144 (1984).
226. A trial court's decision to delay the determination of the issue of the "good faith" of
a settlement until a bifurcated trial instead of deciding it at a pretrial hearing was rejected by
an appellate court in a writ proceeding. The appellate court determined that the moving
party was entitled to a prompt hearing on the merits of its motion pursuant to § 877.6. This
proceeding, which is unreported, was part of the pretrial stages of Wysong, and was men-
tioned by the court in deciding an appeal in the same case. Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western
Indust. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 283, 291, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671, 675, 681 (1983).
227. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
228. Id. at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
229. Id. at 810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
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B. Conflict Among the Policy Considerations
In summary, let us assume that three major policies should be con-
sidered in establishing the definition of a "good faith" settlement: max-
imization of recovery to the injured party, encouragement of settlement
of the injured party's claim, and equitable apportionment of liability
among tortfeasors.23' Also present are considerations regarding the
feasibility of having the issue of "good faith" determined at a pretrial
hearing and the protection of the settling defendant's financial infor-
mation. A definition of a "good faith" settlement must be fashioned in
such a way as to further these policies. However, inherent in any defi-
nition of a "good faith" settlement is a clash between these policy
considerations.
Foremost is the conflict between the goals of equitable apportion-
ment of loss among joint tortfeasors and encouragement of settle-
ments.231 Consider first the effect of a finding of "good faith" on the
policy of equitable apportionment of loss. A settling tortfeasor is dis-
charged from claims for partial indemnity by his joint tortfeasors if his
settlement with the plaintiff is in "good faith." He will need to contrib-
ute no more than the amount of that settlement to either the plaintiff or
to any other tortfeasor. The nonsettlors remain liable for plaintiff's en-
tire damages and receive nothing more than a credit for the amount of
the settlement to be offset against any eventual judgment against them.
The judgment is not reduced by the settlor's percentage of fault. The
lower the settlement figure, the lower the credit, and the greater the
potential liability of the nonsettlors. Therefore, a finding that a settle-
ment is in "good faith" will alter the proportional liability of the joint
tortfeasors, and almost always results in apportionment unrelated to
percentage of fault; i.e., "inequitable" apportionment. Such dispropor-
tionality results whether the remaining defendant goes to trial or set-
tles. As an illustration, reconsider the example found in the beginning
of this article. Assume that the plaintiff seeks damages for personal
injury in the amount of $100,000 against defendant ,4 who is 80% at
fault and defendant B who is 20% at fault. IfA settles with the plaintiff
for $10,000 in a "good faith" settlement, and if B proceeds to trial and
loses, B will have to pay the plaintiff $90,000 or 90% of the verdict even
230. Sears, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 264. See supra text accompanying
notes 169-223.
231. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506. As stated in
Dompeling, "There is an obvious tension between California's well recognized public policy
to promote the settlement of claims and a policy permitting such settlements to be attacked
as unfair." 117 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
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though he was only 20% at fault. This is, of course, a disproportionate
allocation. But disproportionality may also result if B wishes to settle.
Once A and the plaintiff have settled, the risks to B have changed. He
now faces a $90,000 liability instead of the $20,000 one attributable to
his percentage of fault. Also, by settling cheaply with defendant A, the
plaintiff now needs to hold out for a higher settlement from defendant
B in order to be compensated. Thus, defendant B will probably be
forced to settle for a higher amount than he would have if the settle-
ment between the plaintiff and defendant A had not been found to be
in "good faith." This amount will be in excess of that mandated by his
small percentage of fault, and will also result in inequitable allocation
of loss.
The farther the settlement amount between the plaintiff and set-
tling defendant A is from the amount A would have to pay after a
judgment establishing his proportionate share of liability, the more B
will have to pay and the less equitable will be the distribution of loss
among the tortfeasors. Conversely, the higher the settlement and the
more it reflects A actual proportion of responsibility, the more equita-
ble the distribution of loss. Accordingly, in order to foster the policy of
equitable distribution of loss according to fault, a definition of a "good
faith" settlement should be formulated so as to find in "good faith"
only those settlements which approximate in amount the settlor's pro-
portional share of the loss.
However, such a definition of "good faith" will frustrate the goal
of encouragement of settlements, at least in so far as the initial settle-
ment between the plaintiff and one tortfeasor is concerned. That goal
is best accomplished by defining "good faith" in such a manner as to
uphold the greatest number of settlements between a willing plaintiff
and a willing settling defendant. A defendant's desire for settlement is
increased in relation to how low he perceives the settlement figure to be
compared with the amount for which he would be responsible if he did
not settle. Even though attorney's fees and costs of trial are significant,
a defendant is not likely to settle for an amount that is no less than he
would be liable for after a judgment.232 From the plaintiffs standpoint,
because he can obtain a judgment and full satisfaction of his claim
above the settlement figure from a remaining defendant, he will not be
discouraged from settling for a lower amount with one joint




tortfeasor.233 In fact, if the plaintiff needs funds to finance his litiga-
tion, such a settlement may provide the necessary relief without preju-
dicing his ability to collect the remaining amounts later from the
nonsettling defendants. Initial settlements are thus encouraged by de-
fining "good faith" in such a way as to uphold consensual settlements
between plaintiffs and defendants regardless of the relationship of the
amount of the settlement to the settling defendant's potential liability.
Therefore, the closer the definition of "good faith" moves toward
requiring the settlement to reflect the proportionality of the settlor's
fault, the greater will be the fostering of the policy of equitable appor-
tionment of loss, but the policy of encouragement of settlements will be
frustrated to a greater extent.234 Conversely, the farther the definition
of "good faith" moves from requiring proportionality, the greater will
be the fostering of the policy of encouraging initial settlements, but the
policy of equitable apportionment of loss will be frustrated. Therein
lies the crucial conflict between the goals of encouragement of settle-
ments and equitable apportionment of loss-a conflict that must be
dealt with in formulating any definition of a "good faith" settlement.
Another conflict to be considered is that between the goal of effi-
ciency of the "good faith" hearing and the goal of equitable apportion-
ment of loss among joint tortfeasors. The more the definition of a
"good faith" settlement approximates a requirement of pure propor-
tionality, the more the "good faith" hearing must concern itself with
exact determinations of liability, damages and apportionment of fault,
and the more complicated it will become.
The effect of the definition of a "good faith" settlement on the goal
of maximizing the plaintiff's recovery is not clear. It varies with the
circumstances. Returning to the example where the plaintiff had suf-
fered injuries of $100,000 from defendant A who was 80% at fault and
defendant B who was 20% at fault, if the plaintiff settled with A in
"good faith" before trial for $10,000 and prevailed at the trial against
B, then B would pay the plaintiff $90,000. Similarly, if the settlement
with A was in the amount of $50,000, then B would pay $50,000. The
plaintiff would have been fully satisfied in either event. Therefore, as-
233. This is evidenced by the conduct of the plaintiffs in all of the cases discussed. For
example, in Cardio the plaintiff released one defendant because it would be easier to pro-
ceed against the other. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 257. In Ford Motor Co. v.
Schultz, the plaintiff settled with Schultz for a low amount because he could recover the full
judgment against Ford. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 945-46, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
234. This is true at least in the initial settlement. For a discussion of the effect of a possi-
ble definition of "good faith" on the overall settlement of the litigation, see infra notes 266-
67, 361-62 and accompanying text.
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suming the plaintiff prevails at the trial against a remaining solvent
defendant, the amount of the plaintiff's settlement with the first defend-
ant, or indeed whether there had been any settlement at all, does not
affect the amount of the plaintiffs eventual recovery. However, pre-
sumably the plaintiff would prefer to obtain the greatest amount of
money in advance of the trial. Also, if because of the risks associated
with trial, the plaintiff did not prevail against B in the trial after settling
with A, then, of course, the plaintiffs recovery would be maximized by
whatever definition of "good faith" would have encouraged A to settle
for the most money, because that settlement figure would be the only
amount that the plaintiff obtained. What definition of "good faith"
would have compelled A to settle for more money cannot be deter-
mined. If a settlement must approximate proportional liability in order
to be deemed in "good faith," would A have settled for more than
$10,000 or not have settled at all? If the definition of "good faith" is
such that a $10,000 settlement would be found to be in "good faith," is
this all that A would have paid plaintiff or would A have been willing
to pay more because he faced liability for 80% of the judgment? Such
considerations would differ from case to case and from party to party.
Accordingly, the goal of maximizing the recovery of the plaintiff will be
considered a neutral goal that does not conflict with other goals so far
as a definition of "good faith" is concerned. This is consistent with the
cases discussing "good faith" settlements because none of them con-
sider this policy in determining whether a settlement has been found to
be in "good faith." However, in analyzing a recommended definition of
a "good faith" settlement, this article will discuss the effect of the cur-
rent and proposed definitions on this goal.235
In conclusion, there are two major, competing goals which must be
considered in formulating a definition of a "good faith" settlement.
These competing goals of equitable apportionment of loss and encour-
agement of settlement are discussed by all of the "good faith" cases and
will be examined below with respect to each possible interpretation of
"good faith." Another conflict, although not as significant, is between
the goals of equitable apportionment of loss and efficiency of the "good
faith" hearing. This conflict is also considered below.




C Dealing with the Competing Policy Considerations To Rank
Them or to Balance Them
Once the conflict between the goals of equitable apportionment of
loss and encouragement of settlements is recognized, the interrelation-
ship of these two goals becomes crucial to the definition of "good
faith." Some courts and commentators have ranked the goals. As will
be demonstrated, as soon as a ranking occurs, the definition of "good
faith" varies dramatically according to the ranking, with the result that
the policy ranked as secondary is given no effect at all.u36 Other cases
have attempted to accommodate the goals. This is the more sensible
approach.
1. Ranking of goals
The California Supreme Court has expressed no opinion on the
relative importance of the goals of encouragement of settlement and
equitable distribution of loss. In American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court, the court did incorporate the principle of Code of Civil
Procedure section 877 into the partial indemnity theory and held that a
"good faith" settlement would release the settling tortfeasor from
claims for partial indemnity.2 37 The court did quote the language of
Stambaugh regarding the importance of encouragement of settlements,
but it did not put the goal of settlement ahead of the system of compar-
ative fault it was establishing. The requirement of the "good faith" of
the settlement remained, but the court did not define this term.
The decisions of the California appellate courts beginning with
Stambaugh have not followed this approach. They have thrust the pol-
icy of encouragement of settlements to the forefront and relegated the
goal of equitable apportionment of loss to a secondary position. The
case of Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. International Harvester Co. estab-
lished an actual "hierarchy" of interests and ranked the goals in the
following order: (1) maximization of recovery to the injured party for
the amount of his injuries to the extent the fault of others has contrib-
uted to it, (2) encouragement of settlement of the injured party's claim,
and (3) the equitable apportionment of liability among the
tortfeasors u38
The hierarchy established in Sears made sense in that case. Sears
236. See infra text accompanying notes 247-48.
237. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
238. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 264. See also American Bankers Ins. Co. v.
Avco-Lycoming Div., 97 Cal. App. 3d 732, 736, 159 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (1979); International
Harvester Co. v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 652, 660, 157 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328-29 (1979).
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involved a settling defendant's right to seek partial indemnity from a
nonsettling defendant. It did not deal with the issue of a "good faith"
settlement at all. The court established the hierarchy in reaching its
decision to allow a settling tortfeasor to seek partial indemnity after he
had settled. The decision was consistent with all the policies ranked in
the hierarchy and the court could have reached the same decision re-
gardless of the order in which the policies were ranked.
2 39
Such is not the case with defining a "good faith" settlement be-
cause in that context the policies conflict with each other. The meaning
of "good faith" changes according to whichever policy is given priority.
Nevertheless, all but the early California cases dealing with "good
faith" settlements have specifically adopted the Sears hierarchy and
have considered encouragement of settlements as the foremost goal.24
On the other hand, other cases and commentators assert that the
opposite order should be given to the conflicting goals of equitable ap-
portionment and encouragement of settlements. For example, in advo-
cating a change from the system of joint and several liability, one
commentator stated that "the principle of liability in proportion to fault
should control over the mere policy of encouraging settlements when-
ever the two necessarily conflict."24' Similarly, the court in River Gar-
den Farms identified the policies underlying the contribution statutes
including section 877 asfirst, equitable sharing of costs among the par-
ties at fault, and second, encouragement of settlements.
242
The Ninth Circuit adopted this same order of priority. The two
Ninth Circuit cases, Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor
Co.243 and Owen v. United States,2' speak in terms of furthering both
policies. However, as is most evident in the Owen case, the court
239. Permitting assertion by the settling defendant of his right of partial indemnity did
not infringe upon the maximization of recovery to the injured person. He had already re-
ceived his money. It actually encouraged settlement because if a claim for indemnity were
barred after settlement, a named defendant would be inhibited from settling to rid himself of
the expense of litigation if he felt that he had a valid right of indemnity against a solvent
joint tortfeasor. The allowance of this right by the settling defendant also effectuated the
policy of equitable apportionment of loss among the tortfeasors. Sears, 82 Cal. App. 3d at
496, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
240. E.g., Fisher, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 446-47, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56; Cardio, 122 Cal.
App. 3d at 888, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 259; Burlington, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at
378, Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 950, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
241. Comment, Comparative Fault and Settlement in Joint Tortfeasor Cases., A Pea for
Princiole Over Policy, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 833, 834 (1979).
242. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
243. 640 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.) cert denied, 455 U.S. 858 (1981).
244. 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983).
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seemed to be concerned mostly with equity and fairness.24 5 The dis-
senting judge in the Tech-Bilt case stated, "[t]he Ninth Circuit... in-
terprets the correct order of the policies served by section 877 as being
'equity and the settlement of cases prior to trial' [citation omitted]
[I]t seems unlikely that a system of justice would regard the set-
tling of cases as more important than an equitable result. 246
As has been shown, opinions differ on the proper ranking of the
competing policies of encouragement of settlements and equitable ap-
portionment of loss. This only serves to reinforce the theory that in the
context of a "good faith" settlement where these two important policies
conflict, a ranking of the policies is not the proper approach. Ranking
is too simple an analysis and does not lead to a reasonable solution.
Once one policy is given precedence over the other in formulating a
definition, the other policy is frustrated. This is evident by the decided
cases. For example, the California appellate decisions after River Gar-
den Farms and Lareau have articulated the encouragement of settle-
ments as the primary policy consideration.24 7 Once this is done,
virtually any settlement must be found to be in "good faith," because
such a finding encourages at least that particular settlement. This has
led to the inequitable results found in Cardo and Tech-Bilt where a
plaintiff's unilateral decision to dismiss a party in exchange only for a
waiver of costs was held in each case to be a "good faith" settlement.
On the other extreme, one finds the federal cases that place equitable
considerations first. Thus, the Owen court found a settlement not to be
in "good faith" where its only fault seemed to be that it reached an
inequitable result vis-a-vis the Government which had made an im-
provident settlement for too much money.248
Furthermore, a ranking of the goals in defining "good faith" will
result in a definition which always yields the same results. It is interest-
ing to note that the California appellate courts that rank the policy of
encouragement of settlements first have always found the settlements in
question to be in "good faith." In the two, and only, federal cases
which stress equitable apportionment, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has found both the settlements under consideration not to be in
"good faith."
245. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
246. 146 Cal. App. 3d at 1163-64, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Lewis, J., dissenting), hearing
granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A. 31826).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 85-95, 103-14, 124-53.
248. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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2. The "good faith" requirement as an accommodating factor
between competing policies
In defining a "good faith" settlement, the competing policies of
equitable apportionment of loss and encouragement of settlements
should not be ranked because ranking has the effect of frustrating the
policy not ranked first. Rather, a definition should be used which effec-
tuates both policies because both are important considerations in the
law. The requirement that a settlement be in "good faith" should be
viewed as a means to accommodate these competing goals.
The role of the "good faith" requirement as an accommodating
factor complies with the principle of statutory construction mentioned
earlier that a statute should be construed with reference to the entire
scheme of law of which it is a part so that the whole may be harmo-
nized and retain effectiveness. 249 An examination of the entire contri-
bution and comparative fault schemes reveals two policy considerations
relevant in the "good faith" settlement context-encouragement of set-
tlements and equitable apportionment of loss. The California appel-
late courts that have ranked the policies and have given prominence to
the policy of encouragement of settlements in their tortious conduct test
for "good faith" have misconstrued this role of the "good faith" clause
and have misinterpreted the policies sought to be achieved by the
"good faith" requirement. It is true that sections 877 and 877.6 had the
purpose of encouraging settlements, and that a similar purpose was ex-
pressed in American Motorcycle.25 0 However, that purpose was sought
to be achieved by providing a mechanism for the settlor to be released
from claims by joint tortfeasors in order to give that settlement final-
ity.25" ' The further condition that the settlement be in "good faith" is a
separate requirement, limiting those settlements that are to be en-
couraged by providing a release. These statutes and the discussion in
American Motorcycle do not mandate that the "good faith" require-
ment itself be interpreted solely to encourage settlements to the com-
plete frustration of other policies. If this were the case, the "good
faith" factor would have no meaning. The equally relevant policy con-
sideration of equitable apportionment of loss that is actually the domi-
nant theme behind the contribution statutes, of which section 877 is a
part, and the American Motorcycle partial indemnity doctrine, to which
section 877.6 refers,252 must not be ignored. Thus, the "good faith"
249. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 175-96.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 177-96.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 210-23.
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clause should be viewed as a means to accommodate competing but
equally important policies.
The role of the "good faith" requirement as an accommodating
factor rather than as a means simply to encourage settlements is also
supported by the legislative history of the "good faith" clause of Code
of Civil Procedure section 877. As first introduced, the California
bill253 did not include the "good faith" provision, which was later in-
serted into section 877 by a committee amendment.254 As amended,
section 877 was almost identical to a 1955 revision of the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 55 Although there is no documenta-
tion to establish section 4 of the draft prepared by the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws as the immediate progenitor of the legislative com-
mittee amendment which added the "good faith requirement" to sec-
tion 877, the court in River Garden Farms concluded that the
parallelism of language between section 877 and section 4 established
an inference that the California Legislature sought to accomplish the
same goal as the Uniform Law Commissioners." 6 That goal was "that
the plaintiff should not be permitted to release one tortfeasor from his
fair share of liability and mulct another instead, from motives of sym-
pathy or spite, or because it might be easier to collect from one than
from the other." '257 The court in River Garden Farms concluded that
even though in California under the contribution statutes a plaintiff
could still attack his antagonists one by one, he would at least be com-
pelled to abide by the moral standards signified by the demand for a
"good faith" release.258 Therefore, the demand for a release in "good
faith" found in section 877 sought to establish a standard of equitable
conduct embracing other defendants as well as the immediate parties to
the settlement.259 Thus, while the purpose of section 877 was to en-
courage settlements, the purpose of the "good faith" requirement of
section 877 was to impose equitable conditions on those settlements
which would be encouraged.
260
This is what seems to have been also mandated by the California
253. S. 1510, Reg. Sess. (1957).
254. 3 Assembly J. 4716 (1957 Reg. Sess.).
255. UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
256. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 995-96, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05.
257. Id. at 995-96, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (quoting UNIF. CONTIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS
AcT § 4 comment, 12 U.L.A. 99 (1975)).
258. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
259. Id. at 995, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
260. California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6 adopted the "good faith" requirement of
§ 877. There is no legislative history on this aspect of the statute except a general statement
that it adopted present law, namely § 877.
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Supreme Court in the American Motorcycle decision. In developing its
rule of partial indemnity, the court was clearly promulgating the policy
of equitable apportionment of loss among joint tortfeasors. However,
the court also acknowledged the importance of the policy of encourag-
ing settlements, and being aware that the ability of one defendant to
seek partial indemnity from another could defeat the incentive to settle,
it held that a tortfeasor who has entered into a settlement should be
released from liability for partial indemnity if that settlement was in
"good faith."26' The court did not hold that every settlement operates
as a discharge from partial indemnity, but only a "good faith" settle-
ment. The court found that the two policies were not mutually exclu-
sive, but could be accommodated through the definition of the term
"good faith."
A similar sentiment was expressed in River Garden Farms several
years earlier in the context of a "good faith" settlement under the con-
tribution statutes. That court stated:
[I]f the policy of encouraging settlements is permitted to
overwhelm equitable financial sharing, the possibilities of un-
fair tactics are multiplied. Neither statutory goal should be
applied to defeat the other. If the statute is to work well, the
demand for good faith settlement should find its role as an
accommodating factor between undesirable extremes.
[The good faith requirement should be] [a]pplied to
strike a balance between the dual statutory objectives .... 262
V. AN EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE DEFINITIONS OF "GOOD FAITH"
This section will examine four possible interpretations of what
constitutes a settlement made in "good faith" for purposes of releasing
the settling tortfeasor from claims for partial indemnity: (1) the tor-
tious conduct test, (2) the strict proportionality test, (3) the tactical ma-
neuver test, and (4) the reasonable range of proportionality test. These
four alternatives have been suggested by various appellate decisions.
Each alternative will be examined to see if it can serve to accommodate
the competing policies identified in Part IV. The examination of the
alternatives will be made within the confines of the rules set forth by
the relevant code sections and the American Motorcycle decision re-
garding the effect of a settlement found to be in "good faith."
It will be shown that the last alternative, the reasonable range of
261. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
262. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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proportionality test, provides the best accommodation of the competing
values relevant to the "good faith" determination. Therefore, this arti-
cle recommends that the courts adopt the following definition of a
"good faith" settlement: A settlement is in "good faith" when it falls
within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's liability to the
other parties in the litigation. This proposed reasonable range test will
eliminate the inequitable results of the present tortious conduct test of
"good faith" without discouraging the settlement of litigation. It will
be demonstrated that the tortious conduct test completely ignores the
policy of equitable apportionment of loss in favor of the policy of en-
couragement of settlement. Furthermore, while putting a premium on
encouraging settlement, it is not even clear that the tortious conduct
test fosters settlement of the entire case.
A. The Tortious Conduct Test
The current approach being applied by the California courts of
appeal is the tortious conduct test. Under this test, any settlement will
be found to be in "good faith" regardless of its monetary value as long
as it is made without an intent to injure the interests of nonsettling
tortfeasors 63 The amount of the settlement is irrelevant, and it need
bear no proportional relationship whatsoever to the settlor's anticipated
liability.
1. Policy considerations and the tortious conduct test
a. the policy of encouragement of settlements
The California cases utilizing the tortious conduct test do so for
the stated purpose that it fosters the important policy of encouragement
of settlement.264 This test for "good faith" will result in virtually all
settlements made between plaintiffs and defendants being found to be
in "good faith" because most settlements are made because the parties
feel they benefit, not because they intend to injure the nonsettling de-
fendant. The Burlington court went so far as to articulate the goal of
settlement relevant to the determination of "good faith" as the goal of
encouraging settlement between the plaintiff and the settling defend-
ant.265 If this is the interpretation of the goal, the tortious conduct test
certainly does achieve it.
263. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 949, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 475. See
supra notes 111, 107, 127-28, 138, 153 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 90-91, 106, 110-14, 136-37 and accompanying text.
265. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 945, 187 Cal. Rptr, at 378.
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The type of settlement encouraged by this test is an early, cheap
settlement with one tortfeasor. In a situation where both defendants
are solvent and able to pay (as was present in the Cardio case) the
plaintiff will be able to obtain a full recovery regardless of with whom
he settles first. The plaintiff may be willing to settle for a low sum with
one defendant to finance his litigation. Thus, the defendants will race
to effectuate an early and cheap settlement with the plaintiff because,
under the tortious conduct test, the cheap settlement will be found to be
in "good faith." The first settlor will be released from claims for partial
indemnity, leaving the remaining defendant to pick up the lion's share
of the loss.
While the tortious conduct test does encourage settlements be-
tween the plaintiff and one defendant, it is interesting to hypothesize
about its effect on the overall settlement of the litigation. An argument
can be made that the policy of the total settlement of litigation will be
promoted by the tortious conduct test which allows a cheap, nonpro-
portional settlement to be in "good faith." Once the first defendant has
settled cheaply, the second defendant is put at a severe tactical disad-
vantage because his exposure has changed dramatically. Instead of
risking his proportionate share of an adverse judgment, a nonsettling
tortfeasor risks the entire burden of the judgment, offset only by the
amount of the settlement. He may well feel compelled to settle the
case, even for an amount well in excess of his proportional share of
fault, in order to avoid the risk of bearing virtually the entire judgment
alone?
6 6
266. For an illustration of this concept, see the discussion of the reasonable range test,
infra text accompanying notes 361-62.
The psychology of settlement was discussed by Justice Clark in his dissent in American
Motorcycle where he criticized the majority's rule that "'plaintiffs recovery from nonset-
tling tortfeasors should be diminished only by the amount that the plaintiff has actually
recovered in a "good faith" settlement, rather than by an amount measured by the settling
tortfeasor's proportionate responsibility for the injury.'" 20 Cal. 3d at 609, 518 P.2d at 919,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 202 (quoting the majority opinion at 20 Cal. 3d 604, 578 P.2d at 916, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 199). He set up the following hypothetical:
Assume that there is a situation where the plaintiff is 30% at fault, one defendant is 60%
at fault and another defendant is 10% at fault, and that both defendants are solvent.
[T]he plaintiff is brdinarily eager to settle quickly to avoid the long delay incident
to trial. Further, he will be willing to settle with either defendant because under
the majority's suggested rules, he may then pursue the remaining defendant for the
balance of the recoverable loss (70 percent) irrespective [of] whether the remaining
defendant was 10 percent at fault or 60 percent at fault. The defendants' settle-
ment postures will differ substantially. Realizing the plaintiff is eager for quick
recovery and is capable of pursuing the codefendant, the defendant 60 percent lia-
ble for the loss will be prompted to offer a sum substantially below his share of
fault, probably paying 20 to 40 percent of the loss. The defendant only 10 percent
at fault will be opposed to such settlement, wishing to limit his liability. To com-
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Conversely, it can be argued that the policy of total settlement will
not be furthered by the tortious conduct test. Because the plaintiffs
settlement with the first defendant was low, the plaintiff will have to
demand more from the second defendant in order to be compensated
for his injuries. However, the second defendant may be willing to settle
for an amount reflecting no more than his proportional share. He may
rather take a chance at trial than pay the higher amount that is in ex-
cess of his fair share. Thus, a stalemate may result and the case against
the second defendant may go to trial.267
Thus, while a test of a "good faith" settlement that requires only
pete with his codefendant in settlement offers he will be required to offer substan-
tially in excess of his 10 percent share of the loss, again frustrating the Li principle
that the extent of liability should be governed by the extent of fault. Should he fail
to settle, the 10 percent at fault defendant runs the risk that his codefendant will
settle early for perhaps half of his own liability, while the lesser negligent person
must eventually pay the remainder, not only frustrating the Li principle but turn-
ing it upside down. In any event, it is extremely unlikely he can settle for his 10
percent share.
20 Cal. 3d at 610, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (Clark, J., dissenting).
267. An interesting examination of the policy of encouraging settlements was dealt with
in Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 707, 166 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1980). There, the court was confronted with two joint tortfeasors each of whom settled in
"good faith" with the plaintiff in the underlying action before judgment. The issue as to the
"good faith" of either settlement was not raised by either party. The question presented to
the court was whether Code of Civil Procedure § 877(b) protected each tortfeasor from
claims for partial indemnity by the other tortfeasor. The court held that because both
tortfeasors had settled in "good faith," both were released from claims by the other.
In reaching this decision, the court looked to the policy behind § 877 which it identified
as the encouragement of settlements. Id. at 711, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 689 (citing Stambaugh, 62
Cal. App. 3d at 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846). The court in Mill Valley concluded that the
policy favoring settlement of litigation would not be enhanced by limiting the release in
§ 877(b) to cases where the other party had not settled. The court stated: "Such a limitation
would put a premium on settling quickly but its encouraging effect would begin dissipating
after the first defendant had settled and would continue dissipating until the last defendant
who would receive no encouragement toward settlement from the statute." 108 Cal. App. 3d
at 711, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
An argument can be made that this is precisely the situation present under the court's
current analysis of the "good faith" requirement. By holding that a proportionately low
settlement will be in "good faith" as long as there is no corrupt motive, a premium is put on
quick settlement. However, the effect of encouraging settlement begins dissipating after the
first defendant settles for a low amount, and continues dissipating until the last defendant is
left facing a huge liability reduced only by the disproportionately small settlements of pre-
ceding settlors. Thus, while this interpretation encourages early, cheap settlements, it does
not provide much encouragement to the defendant that is left as the target of the plaintiffs
suit.
In In re Waverly Accident of Feb. 22-24, 1978, 502 F. Supp. 1, 5 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), the
court stated that settlement arrangements that would "encourage tortfeasors to race to a
plaintiff to enter an agreement. . . would not advance the broader policy of encouraging
plaintiffs to settle their entire claims with all tortfeasors, to reduce litigation, and to ease the
burden on the courts."
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lack of tortious conduct will encourage early and cheap settlements by
defendants who wish to pay less than their pro rata share, it is debata-
ble whether such a rule will promote the policy of the overall settle-
ment of litigation.
b. the policy of equitable apportionment of loss
It is without question that the tortious conduct test of "good faith"
in no way promotes the policy of equitable apportionment of loss
among joint tortfeasors.268 This policy is completely ignored under this
test. The amount of the settlement is not important; all that is impor-
tant are the motives of the settling parties.
Whether the second defendant chooses to go to trial or settle, the
tortious conduct test which releases the first settlor from partial indem-
nity claims for a cheap, albeit nontortious, settlement will lead to ineq-
uitable apportionment of loss. Thus, where defendantA is 80% at fault
and settles with the plaintiff for $1,000 prior to trial, defendant B is 20%
at fault but is unable to settle with the plaintiff prior to trial, and the
jury returns a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $100,000, de-
fendantB must bear $99,000 of that judgment and defendantA gets off
with only paying the $1,000 in settlement. 269 Alternatively, defendant
B, faced with the possibility of a $99,000 unapportionable judgment
that is completely disproportionate to his degree of fault, might well
settle for a figure that is higher than his proportionate share.270 That
either result violates the policy of equitable apportionment of loss ac-
cording to fault cannot be disputed and has been conceded by the
courts utilizing the tortious conduct test. As stated by the court in
Cardio, "[t]he trial court obviously recognized the serious complica-
tions in the present law [and] . . .reasoned that to immunize [the set-
tling defendant] would frustrate the entire purpose of the comparative
fault cases ....- 2 Justice Clark has said of such a result that it not
only violates Li but turns it upside down.272
Quite apart from considerations of apportionment of loss accord-
ing to fault, the principles of basic equity and fairness embodied in that
policy cut against the tortious conduct test. Certain unfairness results
268. The test does promote the general policy of equity and fairness to the extent that if
collusion with the intent to injure the nonsettling defendants is found, the settlement will not
be in "good faith."
269. See supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
270. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
271. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 888, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 259.




from allowing the plaintiff to so significantly affect the liability of the
parties. Arguments against the use of coercion by a plaintiff to force a
defendant to settle have been made in other contexts. For example,
Fleming observed that "a plaintiff should not have the unrestricted
power unilaterally to decide how the loss should be allocated among
several tortfeasors and thus to prevent, if he so wishes, any distribution
among them. [The distribution of the loss among tortfeasors should] be
made by the law, not the plaintiff .. . ."I" Speaking of the "good
faith" settlement provision in the contribution statutes, the court in
River Garden Farms stated:
The. . . legislation empowers a plaintiff, armed with a strong
and lucrative claim, to settle with his antagonists one by one,
preserving for the jury the opponent with the most money and
the least sympathy. . . . In a multi-party case the threat of
an unshared judgment against the last remaining defendant-
diminished only by meager settlements with his eager fel-
lows-permits a plaintiff to create acute financial pressure
bordering on extortion.
27 4
The California Supreme Court has proclaimed that the theory of par-
tial indemnity established by the American Motorcycle decision was
adopted because "the plaintiff enjoys no right to single out only one or
a few of the tortfeasors to bear all of the loss."27S
The same policy considerations of equity and fairness apply with
respect to a "good faith" settlement. A definition of "good faith"
should not be drawn in such a fashion as to give the plaintiff the unilat-
eral right to select which defendant will pay virtually all of the loss.
This is precisely what plaintiffs were allowed to do in the appellate
decisions such as Cardio, Ford, Burlington, and Tech-Bilt. This ineq-
uity will be perpetuated if the tortious conduct rule continues to be
applied. A rule that sacrifices justice should not prevail.276
273. Fleming, supra note 6, at 1489 (arguing against the joint judgment rule for contribu-
tion). Another commentator has argued that it was unfair, before the contribution statutes
were passed, to allow a plaintiff to use a rule denying contribution as a bludgeon to force a
tortfeasor to settle for more than his pro rata share of the damages. Settlement in Joint Tort
Cases, supra note 177, at 490.
274. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (footnote omitted).
275. People ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 747, 608 P.2d 673,
675, 163 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1980).
276. Goldenberg & Nicholas, supra note 34, at 31 (citing Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1,
10, 114 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1962) ("Law and justice are not necessarily synonymous. The
function of law is to attain and maintain justice.")).
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c. the policy of maximizing plaintiff's recovery
The policy of maximizing the plaintiffs recovery and the effect of
a definition of "good faith" on the furtherance of this policy were pre-
viously discussed.1 7 Because various definitions of "good faith" can
achieve the same recovery for the plaintiff, with only the allocation
among tortfeasors being different, this is a neutral goal.
The tortious conduct test may help a plaintiff to the extent he
needs some quick money to finance the lawsuit against the remaining
defendants. Also, to the extent that a plaintiff may be able to force a
remaining defendant into a larger settlement after a cheap settlement
with the first defendant, 7 8 the tortious conduct test may appeal to
plaintiffs. However, whether or not the total settlement will be larger
than if each defendant settled for an amount approximating his propor-
tional share is unclear. In fact, it has been argued that the potential for
raising enough settlement money to compensate plaintiffs is not served
by letting one defendant off cheaply, but rather by keeping all parties
participating in a realistic settlement. 9
d practical considerations regarding the "goodfaith" hearing and the
protection of the defendant's financial information
The tortious conduct test provides for an efficient and uncompli-
cated "good faith" hearing. Because the only issue with respect to
whether a settlement is made in "good faith" is whether the parties
acted in a tortious manner toward the nonsettling defendants, the non-
settling tortfeasors who wish to dispute the finding of "good faith" will
not have much evidence to present at the hearing. This was the precise
purpose of the Dompeling decision; namely, to limit the scope of "good
faith" sufficiently so that the only issue involved would be a very nar-
row one-an examination into tortious conduct.280 Similarly, Dompel-
ing's concern with the protection of defendant's financial information
is accoihplished under this test because financial status is irrelevant to
whether the conduct was tortious.28'
277. See supra text preceding note 235.
278. See supra text accompanying note 266.
279. Tech-Bilt, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 1163, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Lewis, J., dissenting),
hearing granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A. 31826).
This reasoning was set forth by Judge Lewis for the proposition that plaintiffs' recovery
was not maximized by a finding that plaintiffs' dismissal of the party against whom the
statute of limitations had run (but against whom another tortfeasor had a right to claim
partial indemnity) constituted a "good faith" settlement.
280. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
281. One additional policy is worth noting with respect to the tortious conduct test. Sev-
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2. The tortious conduct test should be abandoned
Several levels of analysis reveal that the tortious conduct test is
unsupportable and should be abandoned. First, this test is based on the
false premise that the goal of encouragement of settlements is primary
and that other policy considerations should be subordinated to that
goal in defining a "good faith" settlement. While encouragement of
settlements is an important policy and cannot be ignored, in the context
of the definition of a "good faith" settlement under the present law this
policy does not deserve the dominance it has been given. Code of Civil
Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 and the American Motorcycle deci-
sion do indeed express the important policy that settlements should be
encouraged, but the way they seek to encourage settlements for defend-
ants is to provide finality by discharging the tortfeasor who settles in
"good faith" from liability to his joint tortfeasors.282 Plaintiffs are en-
couraged to settle by reducing plaintiffs' judgment against remaining
tortfeasors pro tanto and not pro rata. 83 Even the early cases articulat-
ing the strong policy in favor of settlements did so because the proce-
dural rules then in effect deprived the settlement, even if made in
eral courts utilizing this test have commented by way 6f dicta that the settlements involved
were in "good faith" because they were for the full amount of the tortfeasor's insurance
policy limits. See Stambaugh, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 238-39, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 848; Fisher, 103
Cal. App. 3d at 445, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 55. The trial court in Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz held
that as a matter of law a settlement for the full amount of the settling defendant's insurance
policy limits is a "good faith" settlement, but the court of appeal reversed this portion of the
decision. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 949 & n.4, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75 & n.4.
A rule that would mandate that the payment of insurance policy limits constitutes a
"good faith" settlement regardless of the amount of the insurance would have, in addition to
the other effects of the tortious conduct test already discussed, the additional effect of re-
warding a defendant who carried inadequate liability insurance. For example, assume that
the plaintiff decided to pursue two tortfeasors, each with the same financial ability to pay a
judgment over and above the amount of his insurance. Assume defendant A had insurance
coverage of $20,000 and defendant B had insurance coverage of $200,000. A result that
would allow plaintiff to take the $20,000 policy from defendant A to finance his lawsuit,
collect the rest of the judgment from defendant B, and have the settlement with A found to
be in "good faith" merely because it represented the full amount of A's insurance coverage
thereby preventing B from claiming partial indemnity against A, would be unfair and would
reward A for being under-insured.
It should also be noted that even if a settlement for full policy limits is not found to be a
"good faith" settlement, the insurer might have to tender the full amount of the policy limits
in any event if that would be necessary to protect the insured from a potentially higher
verdict in excess of the policy limits. See Comment, supra note 241, at 841; Murphy v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976); Johansen v. Cali-
fornia State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 476 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 186-87.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 102, 186-87.
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"good faith," of finality in that the settling defendant would not be able
to free himself from litigation. 84 By virtue of these procedural rules,
settlements were discouraged. However, under present procedures, the
finality of a settlement can be ascertained in advance.2 85 Without refer-
ence to these considerations, the recent cases involving "good faith"
settlements have simply quoted language from prior cases stating that
settlements should be encouraged, and have utilized the tortious con-
duct test which carries this policy to an extreme.
This approach ignores the role of the "good faith" clause as a
means to accommodate competing policy considerations. The statutes
and American Motorcycle do not mandate that all settlements must be
encouraged, only "good faith" settlements. Thus, the "good faith" re-
quirement is a limiting factor on those settlements that are favored.
The broader policy objectives of the statutory schemes and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court decisions must be kept in mind. Section 877 was
but one part of an entire statutory scheme to provide for equal contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors. Similarly, the court inAmerican Motor-
cycle provided for a discharge from partial indemnity for a "good
faith" settlor as one aspect of its broader scheme of establishing a sys-
tem of equitable apportionment of loss among joint tortfeasors. The
California appellate courts' tortious conduct test of a "good faith" set-
tlement has allowed the exception to swallow the rule. It is an unsup-
portable leap in logic to say that because certain portions of the rules
are meant to encourage settlements, the "good faith" requirement itself
should be defined in such a way as to completely frustrate the broader
policy of equitable apportionment of loss.
On a second level of analysis, it is not even clear that the tortious
conduct test for "good faith" actually encourages settlement of litiga-
tion. While allowing to be in "good faith" (and, therefore, encourag-
ing) a settlement with one tortfeasor that is in an amount far less than
his proportional share of fault, an argument can be made that this will
actually force the remaining tortfeasor into trial, thus frustrating the
policy of the complete settlement of litigation. 86
A third but more basic argument against the tortious conduct test
is that it effectuates results that are unfair. It gives an inordinate
amount of power to the plaintiff to pick his target and decide how the
loss will be allocated. This is a tremendous weapon and can be used to
284. See supra notes 184-85, 187-92 and accompanying text.
285. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1984). See supra text accompanying
notes 193-95.
286. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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coerce disproportionant settlements or obtain other advantage. The
appellate courts that have applied the tortious conduct test have them-
selves found it to be unsatisfactory. In Cardio the court said, "The
result is fundamentally unfair, and cannot be what the Legislature in-
tended." '287 The Burlington court said, "The fairness of such a result
seems highly debatable ... "2
Finally, no statutory or case law requires the continued use of this
test. The appellate courts in their more recent opinions have bemoaned
the fact that they were compelled by precedent to follow the tortious
conduct test. However, no binding precedent to this effect actually ex-
ists. Neither the statutes nor the California Supreme Court have de-
fined a "good faith" settlement, and as has been demonstrated, an
analysis of these authorities reveals that they suggest a different result.
Also, the appellate cases first setting forth this test did so in dicta which
is no more binding than the dicta in River Garden Farms which estab-
lished a more reasonable test. Therefore, the appellate courts could, if
they desired, return to the River Garden Farms formulation. Of course,
the supreme court may adopt whichever test it thinks is most
appropriate.
In conclusion, the tortious conduct test does not necessarily
achieve the settlement goal it is meant to foster, provides inequitable
results, and flies in the face of the comparative fault scheme. It should
be abandoned in favor of a different test for a "good faith" settlement.
B. The Test of Strict Proportionality
Another possible test of a "good faith" settlement would be to re-
quire that a settlement be absolutely proportional to the settling de-
fendant's liability in order to be in "good faith." Although no case has
specifically adopted such a rule, several have rejected it.
289
This test is mentioned briefly to show that it is not a viable alterna-
tive. Such a test definitely would promote the public policy of equita-
ble apportionment of loss among joint tortfeasors. However, it would
completely frustrate the policies of encouragement of settlements and
efficiency of the "good faith" settlement hearing. First of all, it is rare
that a tortfeasor will be encouraged to settle for an amount which is the
same as he would be required to pay if he completed a trial. Secondly,
a tortfeasor would not even save trial expenses through such a settle-
287. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
288. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
289. Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44; River Garden Farms, 26
Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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ment because, in order for that settlement to be determined to be in
"good faith," all of the issues involved in the trial such as the exact
amount of the plaintiff's damage and the relative liability of the joint
tortfeasors would need to be determined. The "good faith" hearing
would become the trial itself.29°
Also, this test would negate the provision of Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 877291 and the supreme court's statement inAmerican Mo-
torcycle that the plaintiffs judgment against other tortfeasors will not
be reduced by the settlor's pro rata share of the judgment, but rather
only by the amount of the settlement.292 If a settlement must be strictly
proportional to be in "good faith," the reduction will, in fact, be pro
rata.
293
290. This is inconsistent with the notion of a pretrial hearing on the issue of "good faith."
See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
291. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980).
292. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
Absent from § 877.6 is a clause comparable to § 877(a) providing the extent to which a
settlement with one tortfeasor reduces the plaintiff's judgment. Section 877(a) specifically
provides that the plaintiffs claims against the other tortfeasors will be reduced "in the
amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it whichever is the greater." Section 877.6 is silent as to this issue.
Nothing in the legislative history indicates an intention on behalf of the legislature to pro-
vide a different result with respect to settlements obtained in the partial or comparative
indemnity context. Therefore, no argument can be made that, by omitting a reference to a
pro tanto reduction, the legislature left the door open for a pro rata reduction. Presumably,
the American Motorcycle language (albeit dicta) that the amount of the settlement shall re-
duce the plaintifi's judgment pro tanto and not pro rata is still controlling after Code of Civil
Procedure § 877.6. For a discussion of pro rata and pro tanto reduction, see supra note 102.
293. The pro rata reduction rule, i.e., the rule that a nonsettling defendant's share of a
judgment should be reduced not by the dollar amount of the judgment, but rather by the
settling defendant's proportionate share of fault, would reach the same result as requiring
strict proportionality. This rule would completely eliminate the "good faith" requirement
because the "good faith" of the settlement would be irrelevant to a nonsettlor's liability.
Under this approach, a plaintiff would be penalized for making a cheap settlement and
would also benefit from making a good settlement. This would give the plaintiff the incen-
tive to drive the hardest bargain he could with the settling defendant and not prejudice
remaining tortfeasors with a settlement that is either collusive, deliberately discriminatory,
or unintentionally inadequate.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has adopted this
approach of pro rata reduction as part of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. UNIF. COM-
PARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1983).
This rule has also been urged by numerous commentators. See C. GREGORY, LEGISLA-
TIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 78 (1936); G. WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 416 (1951); Fleming, Forward- Comparative Negligence
at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 257-58 (1976); Goldenberg & Nicholas,
supra note 29, at 53; Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multoile Parties, and Settlements,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 1264 (1977); Fleming, supra note 6, at 1495. The California Legislature,
however, rejected this approach on several occasions. Bills introduced on March 28, 1978
(S. 1959 (1978-79 Reg. Sess.)), April 9, 1979 (A.B. 1783 (1979-80 Reg. Sess.)), March 13,
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C The Tactical Maneuver Test
Some judges have suggested a test that would define a "good
faith" settlement as one that does not result from tactical maneuvering
by the plaintiff but rather results from some consideration by the set-
tling parties of the merits of their case. In Commercial Union v. Ford
Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit found that a "good faith" settlement had
not occurred because the dismissal of defendant Ford was motivated by
the plaintiffs attorney's desire to remove a deep-pocket defendant from
the case because of the experts it could produce and the skilled trial
attorneys it could retain.294 This was not a true settlement, but was
rather a "tactical maneuver" by the plaintiff,2 95 and in such a case the
other defendants should not be prevented from seeking partial indem-
nity from the dismissed party.296 After discussing Commercial Union
with approval, the dissenting judge in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-
Clyde & Associates suggested a similar test whereby a settlement would
be in "good faith" if it reflected "at least in some degree a judgment by
the settling parties of the relative merits and values of their cases
against each other" but not if it was motivated by "a reason unrelated
to the potential merits of the plaintiff's claim," such as a decision by
1980 (A.B. 3344 (1979-80 Reg. Sess.)), and December 3, 1980 (A.B. 85 (1981-82 Reg. Sess.))
provided that a plaintiff's claim be discharged as against the other nonsettling defendants by
the amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable share based on his fault. None of the bills
was passed.
Division 2 of the Fourth District, California Court of Appeal, agreed with the rule of
pro rata reduction and held that the plaintiff's recovery against a nonsettling defendant was
reduced not by the dollar amount received from the released tortfeasor, but rather by the
released tortfeasor's proportionate share of the loss. Baget v. Shepard, 128 Cal. App. 3d 433,
180 Cal. Rptr. 396, hearing denied, April 1, 1982 (opinion ordered not to be officially pub-
lished). The majority argued that this approach was not precluded by Code of Civil Proce-
dure § 877, or by the language to the contrary in American Motorcycle, because that
language was dicta. Apparently, the California Supreme Court disagreed by ordering the
opinion not be officially published.
The proposal for a pro rata reduction is not considered in this article because the article
deals with defining "good faith" within the parameters of the existing statutes and the guide-
lines of the California Supreme Court. Both §§ 877 and 877.6 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure contain the concept that a settling tortfeasor is released upon a "good faith" settlement,
and eliminating that requirement (as the pro rata reduction rule would do) would need
legislative approval. Also, both the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle and
Code of Civil Procedure § 877 have provided that the amount of plaintiff's judgment against
the nonsettling tortfeasors will be reduced not by the plaintiff's pro rata share, but rather by
the amount of the settlement. Thus, while the pro rata reduction rule is a good proposal, it
cannot be achieved within the present confines of the requirement of a "good faith" settle-
ment as established by the California Supreme Court and the current statutes.
294. 640 F.2d at 213. See supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 214. See also Owen, 713 F.2d at 1464.
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plaintiff to simplify his case. 21 7
What the courts mean by the tactical advantage test is unclear. If
the plan is for the court to examine the relative liability of the parties in
order to determine whether a settlement was a true settlement as op-
posed to a tactical maneuver, then this test is nothing more than a
measure of proportionality of the settlement. That being the case, the
reasonable range test described below is a better approach.
If, however, the focus is to be on the intent of the settling parties
and whether they gave "some consideration"29 to the merits of their
case, then the test is impossible to administer. The difference between
attempting to achieve a tactical advantage and giving some considera-
tion to the relative merits of the case is a difficult line to draw. For
example, suppose the plaintiff thinks that the case against one defend-
ant is very close on the issue of liability and is further complicated
because that defendant is sympathetic, while the case against another
less sympathetic defendant is clear cut. Is a settlement with the sympa-
thetic defendant a tactical maneuver or an evaluation of liability?
This test will enable a court to find a lack of "good faith" in the
obvious situations as were present in Cardio and Commercial Union
where the plaintiffs' attorneys admitted that their decision to dismiss
one of the defendants was made for a tactical purpose. However, if a
rule was established that a tactical settlement would not be found to be
in "good faith," there is no doubt that clever lawyers would construct a
settlement in which they gave at least some consideration to the merits
of their case. In an article offering hints for practicing attorneys it was
stated: "For defendants contemplating settlements, the message of
Commercial Union is clear: let there be plenty of arm's-length bargain-
ing between the defendant and the plaintiff. Leave a well-marked trail
of letters and memoranda documenting the give-and-take of the negoti-
ations culminating in settlement. 299
Also, at some price even a settlement made as a tactical maneuver
297. Tech-Bilt, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 1159, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (Lewis, J., dissenting),
hearing granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A. 31826).
Similarly, the appellate court in Cardo, feeling compelled by precedent to find that a
dismissal of a party by the plaintiff for the purpose of simplifying plaintiffs case against the
other defendant was a "good faith" settlement, criticized the result because it permitted a
plaintiff to insulate a defendant from partial indemnity claims where the dismissal was "mo-
tivated by the plaintifis tactical consideration having little relationship to the potential lia-
bility of [the settling defendant]." 122 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
298. Tech-Bilt, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 1159, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (Lewis, J., dissenting),
hearing granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A. 31826).
299. Lewin, Making Codefendants Pay Their Fair Share, CAL. LAW., July 1983, 13, 14.
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should be found to be in "good faith" because at some point the price
of the settlement will be such that the goal of achieving equitable ap-
portionment of loss between joint tortfeasors is reached. As mentioned
above, once a court begins to examine the relative liability of the par-
ties rather than the settling parties' thought processes, the reasonable
range test described below is the best method to define "good faith."
While there can be no dispute that a dismissal by the plaintiff of
one defendant for virtually no consideration simply as a tactical ma-
neuver should not protect that dismissed defendant from a claim for
partial indemnity, a test of "good faith" focusing on this aspect of the
settlement will be unworkable. The reasonable range test will ade-
quately guard against this occurrence.
D. The Reasonable Range Test
It is the thesis of this article that the "good faith" of a settlement
for the purpose of releasing the settling tortfeasor from future liability
to his joint tortfeasors for partial indemnity should be judged by the
reasonable range test. Under this test, a settlement would be in "good
faith" if the settlor pays an amount that falls within the reasonable
range of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of comparative lia-
bility for the plaintiff's injuries. As will be explained in more detail
below, in determining the reasonable range, the court would need to
make a rough approximation of the plaintiff's potential recovery and
the settlor's proportionate liability and take into account that a settlor
should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable
after a trial. In certain cases the solvency of the settling tortfeasor
would also be relevant.
1. Judicial precedent for this test
A test of "good faith" that measures the reasonable range of the
settlor's proportional share of relative liability is not a stranger to the
law. Several cases have either specifically espoused this test or utilized
it without acknowledging the fact. This test originated in River Garden
Farms, the first case that attempted to define a "good faith" settlement
in the context of Code of Civil Procedure section 877 and the contribu-
tion statutes. There, the court stated: "Applied to strike a balance be-
tween the dual statutory objectives, the good faith clause should not
invalidate a settlement within a reasonable range of the settlor's fair
share."" ° Although not specifically utilizing the test it described, the
300. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506. See supra text accompanying notes 78-
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River Garden Farms court did set forth some guidelines which will be
discussed below. The test recommended in this article is basically the
River Garden Farms test with some elaboration.
Also, the courts in Kohn v. Superior Court3"' and Wysong, Miles &
Co. v. Western Industrial Movers,302 while paying lip service to the tor-
tious conduct test for "good faith," actually engaged in a reasonable
range type of analysis in order to uphold the settlements involved in
those cases as being made in "good faith.
30 3
In a very recent case, Widson v. International Harvester Co. ,3 the
court also used this approach of examining the amount of the settle-
ment in relation to the settlor's potential liability. 305 Even the court in
Dompeling, perhaps the most fervent advocate of the tortious conduct
test, engaged in a reasonable range type of analysis.
30 6
The Ninth Circuit in Owen v. United States alluded to the ap-
proach by holding that the settlement must reflect a "good faith" deter-
80. See also Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 794-98, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 837, 843-46, citing River Garden Farms with approval.
301. 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983).
302. 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983).
303. In Wysong, the appellate court cited Dompeling with approval, concluding that the
purpose of § 877.6 was to encourage settlement by providing finality to the lawsuit for the
settling tortfeasor, and specifically rejected River Garden Farms. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 288-89,
191 Cal. Rptr. at 679. Having said this, the court did not simply point to the Dompeling
language and find that since there was no tortious conduct with respect to the settlement,
there was "good faith." Instead, the court examined the evidence presented at the hearing of
the "good faith" issue. It concluded that the settling party had a viable defense to the action,
and, therefore, the settlor and plaintiffs were justified in entering into a $65,000 settlement
even though the settlement was disproportionate to the claims made by the plaintiffs com-
plaint of $7,000,000. .d. at 290, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 680. What the trial court did in the
Wysong case that was sustained on appeal was to examine the amount of settlement in
relation to the evidence of the degree of liability of the settling party. The court, in essence,
found that a $65,000 settlement was within the reasonable range of the defendant's potential
liability. Thus, the trial court in Wysong reached its decision using the analysis of River
Garden Farms, not the analysis of Dompeling. Yet, in its opinion the appellate court ex-
pressly rejected River Garden Farms in favor of Dompeling. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 289-90, 191
Cal. Rptr. at 679-80. See infra text accompanying notes 350-53.
Similarly, in Kohn, the court concluded that the settlement was in "good faith" because
"the sums paid [in settlement] . . . are not out of proportion to what the trial court might
have considered the probable recovery of plaintiffs should they prove their case." 142 Cal.
App. 3d at 327-28, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82 (footnote omitted). See infra text accompanying
notes 346-49.
304. 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1984).
305. See infra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
306. In Dompeling, the court looked at the amount of the settlement, compared it with
plaintift's total settlement request, made an evaluation of liability, and concluded the settle-
ment was not an "unreasonably cheap settlement." 117 Cal. App. 3d at 807, 173 Cal. Rptr.
at 43. See infra text accompanying notes 339-40.
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mination of the relative liabilities between the parties. 07 Although
what is meant by the term "relative" is unclear, the Ninth Circuit in
Owen stated it was following the test originally laid down by the Ninth
Circuit in Commercial Union which cited River Garden Farms with
approval.30 8
Finally, an argument can be made that some of the California ap-
pellate decisions that adopted the tortious conduct test while specifi-
cally disavowing any requirement that the settlement be proportionally
related to the liability of the settlor, in actuality, would not have been
troubled by the reasonable range type of analysis discussed here.
Rather, they were rejecting a strict proportionality approach or an
analysis that did not reduce the settlor's share by some amount reflect-
ing his decision to settle rather than litigate. For example, the court in
Dompeling stated that "[b]ad faith is not established by a showing that
a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair
share of the value of the plaintiff's case. '3 9 Also, the courts in Kohn
and Wysong in arguing against a proportionate approach stated that it
did not matter that the amount of the settlement was disproportionate
to the sumsprayedfor in the complaint.310 They did not say that it was
irrelevant that the sums were disproportionate to the reasonable range
of the settlor's proportional share and, in fact, actually did analyze the
amounts of the settlements in question to see if they did fall within the
range of the amount the plaintiff could recover from the settling
defendants.
31 1
2. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonable range
In order to determine whether the settlement is within the reason-
able range of the settlor's proportionate share of plaintiff's damage, the
court will need to consider certain factors. The problem of how the
court can make the necessary evaluations will be dealt with in the next
section.
First among the factors that should be examined by the court is the
amount of damages the plaintiff will likely recover after a trial. The
determinative factor is not the amount of the plaintiffs prayer312 be-
307. 713 F.2d at 1464.
308. 640 F.2d at 213.
309. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
310. Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 328, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 82; Wysong, 143 Cal. App. 3d at
290, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
311. See supra note 303.
312. See Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 81; Wysong, 143 Cal. App. 3d at
290, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
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cause the amount of the prayer usually has little relationship to the
ultimate amount of the award.313
Secondly, the court should estimate the proportional liability of
the settling defendant for the plaintiffs harm to allparties. Thus, the
court should not look merely to the settlor's liability to the plaintiff, but
also to the settlor's liability to his fellow joint tortfeasors under a partial
indemnity theory had there been no settlement. This rule is necessary
to promote the goals of fairness and equitable distribution of loss
among the parties at fault. For example, in Tech-Bilt,3"4 the plaintiff
sued a subcontractor against whom the statute of limitations had run as
well as a general contractor against whom the statute had not run.
Even though the plaintiff had no claim against the subcontractor, the
subcontractor was liable to the general contractor for partial indemnity.
The plaintiff settled with the subcontractor for $55. 31 -5 If the only deter-
minative factor would be the amount of the settlor's potential liability
to the plaintiff, then this settlement would be in "good faith" because
the subcontractor's liability to the plaintiff was zero.3 1 6 However, such
a settlement does not reflect the settlor's potential liability to other
tortfeasors for partial indemnity, a factor that must be considered in
order for the test of "good faith" to have meaning.
After estimating what would be the settling tortfeasor's propor-
tional share of liability to all parties for the plaintiff's damage, the court
should then reduce this figure by some amount to take into account the
fact that it represents a settlement. By settling in advance of trial, a
party expects to pay less than he would be required to pay if after trial
the verdict were not in his favor. 7 This factor is dealt with in more
313. C. BADWAY & N. SHAYNE, EVALUATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY
CASES 75 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EVALUATION].
314. 146 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 194 Cal. Rptr. 729, hearing granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A.
31826).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 140-45.
316. Similarly, in the case of People ex rel Dept. of Transp. v. Superior Court, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that even though the plaintiff could not join the State of California
as a defendant in the action, the named defendants were not prevented from cross-com-
plaining against the state to seek partial indemnity. Taking the facts of this case a bit fur-
ther, the state should not be able to cut off these partial indemnity claims by a low settlement
with plaintiff. While such a settlement would be within the reasonable range of the state's
liability to plaintiff because the plaintiff could recover nothing from the state because a
timely claim had not been filed, it would not reflect the reasonable range of the state's liabil-
ity on the partial indemnity claims.
317. Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44. This factor encourages
settlements, thereby providing both "peace and quiet" to defendant and needed relief with-
out delay to an injured plaintiff. Id.
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detail in the next section.3" 8 In certain situations, the court may con-
sider the financial status of the settling defendant. This special prob-
lem is dealt with in Part V-D-6.319
3. Evaluating the various factors
This section provides guidelines a court can use to evaluate the
factors listed above in order to determine whether a settlement falls
within the reasonable range of the settlor's proportional share of liabil-
ity. Guidance on how the court can make this determination can be
obtained from the cases, commentators and common sense.
The first two factors involved in the reasonable range analysis are
the amount of damage plaintiff is likely to recover after a trial and the
proportional liability of the settling defendant to all parties for plain-
tiff's harm. In evaluating these two factors, the major consideration
must be that the "good faith" hearing is a pretrial proceeding that is not
meant to, and should not, take the place of a trial. In a pretrial pro-
ceeding the court cannot be expected to make a precise determination
of the amount of the plaintiffs recovery after trial and the proportion-
ate amount of the settling tortfeasor's fault. As was pointed out in the
discussion of a strict proportionality test,320 such an exact determina-
tion could occur only after a full trial on the merits of the action, and
this would defeat the purpose of section 877.6 which is to have an early
determination of "good faith" in a pretrial proceeding.
The evaluation of these factors must, therefore, necessarily be a
rough and imprecise one. Because this definition of a "good faith" set-
tlement speaks to the reasonable range of the settlor's share, the test
asks not for precise numbers, but for an approximation. In describing
the reasonable range analysis, the court in River Garden Farms ex-
plained that before a verdict, only a rough assessment of value would be
possible.32'
Making the rough evaluation of factors such as the probable
amount of the plaintiffs recovery and the percentage of the settling
tortfeasor's fault for purposes of the reasonable range test is a manage-
able task. As stated by the court in River Garden Farms, "The price
levels are not as unpredictable as one might suppose. 322 The reason-
able range of the settlor's fair share is not unpredictable, although it
318. See infra text accompanying note 330-33.
319. See infra text accompanying notes 370-78.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 289-93.
321. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
322. Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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does involve uncertainties.323 Generalized evaluation criteria are rec-
ognized by the personal injury bar, insurance claims departments, and
pretrial settlements courts. The River Garden Farms court gave exam-
ples of publications that could be looked to to value potential claims by
plaintiffs.324 When testing the "good faith" of a settlement figure, the
judge should use his own personal experience and expertise and should
also look to experts in the field.325 In this way, knowledgeable counsel
and settlement negotiators can predict with some assurance whether a
settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of
"good faith. ' 326 The danger that a low settlement violates the "good
faith" clause will not impart uncertainty so long as the parties behave
fairly and the courts maintain a realistic awareness of settlement im-
ponderables. 327 Thus, the directive of River Garden Farms is for judges
to use their experience and expertise to make a rough assessment of
whether the settlement falls within the reasonable range of the settlor's
proportionate liability.
Specific factors bearing on the potential amount of the plaintiff's
recovery can be identified. For example, relevant to this inquiry are
the strengths of the plaintiffs liability claim and defendant's defenses,
the seriousness of the injury (be it a personal injury action or an action
in a commercial context), the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
plaintiff as a result of the injury, whether the case will be tried by a
judge or a jury and if by a jury, whether juries from that location are
more apt to render high or low verdicts, and a subjective evaluation of
the parties, their witnesses and their attorneys.328 This list is by no
means exclusive.
Through their experience, judges can make rough estimates of
these factors and estimate the plaintiffs probable recovery and the per-
centage of fault among the parties. Both the plaintiffs' bar and the de-
fendants' bar have been making informed guesses as to the percentage
of responsibility and the probable amount of plaintiffs' damages for
years.329
323. Id.
324. The River Garden Farms court pointed to the PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HAND-
BOOKS (Jury Verdict Research, Inc. Cal. ed.); JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY (E.N. Raymond &
Assocs.); AID (Accident/Injury/Damages) (Lawyers Co-op Publishing Co.). 26 Cal. App.
3d at 998, n.9, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506 n.9.
325. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
326. Id., 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
327. Id., 103 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
328. H. BAER & A. BRODER, How TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CASES FOR SETTLE-
MENT, 63-73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as How TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CASES].
329. Adams, Settlements After Li: But is it "Fair"?, 10 PAC. L.J. 729, 747 (1979).
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Another factor listed above that the judge should evaluate in de-
termining what is the reasonable range for a settlement in a given case
is the fact that an amount paid in settlement should be less than an
amount paid after an adverse judgment. A discount for a settlement
makes sense for two reasons. First of all, a settlement can be looked
upon as a compromise,330 or alternatively, as a means to avoid a poten-
tially higher adverse judgment. As stated by a spokesman for an insur-
ance company, a settlement is "that amount of money which we are
willing to pay . . . in order to avoid a potential runaway verdict in
astronomical numbers . . . . Depending upon our expectations [of
winning], we may choose to offer in settlement anywhere between 5%
and 30% of what would be our estimated full value of the case should
we go to a verdict and lose it."'33I A second reason that a settlement
would be less than an amount received after a verdict is that money is
being given to the plaintiff at an earlier time.3 In examining the
amount of the settlement, the judge and the parties should be cognizant
of when, in the course of the proceedings, the settlement is being made.
The plaintiff will be willing to accept less in settlement in order to have
the use of the money sooner. A given sum offered in settlement four
years before an anticipated trial date will be worth more than the same
sum offered two weeks prior to the trial. No precise amount of "dis-
count" for a settlement should be computed.333 Rather, this is another
variable the judge should consider in making a rough assessment as to
whether the settlement falls within the reasonable range.
Judges will not be making these rough evaluations of the various
factors by themselves. The settling defendant, wishing his proposed
settlement with the plaintiff to be determined by the court to be in
"good faith," will present whatever evidence he has that the proposed
settlement is within the reasonable range of his share of liability. Con-
versely, the nonsettling defendants who do not wish to have the settle-
ment found to be in "good faith" will provide the judge with whatever
evidence they have to the contrary.
As the dissenting judge in the Tech-Bilt case stated, "It may be
that the existence of a settlement in good faith is one of those things
330. Even assuming the parties can agree on the optimum value of the case, that is, the
sustainable limits of plaintiffs award, the amount agreed to should not be the settlement
figure. That amount must be discounted to allow for various factors, such as the early pay-
ment of the money and the uncertainty of trial. How TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CASES,
supra note 328, at 110-11.
331. EVALUATION, supra note 313, at 66.
332. How TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CASES, supra note 328, at 110-11.
333. Id. at I 1l.
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easier to recognize than describe, and it may be easier to describe those
things that are not settlements in good faith. 334 Thus, perhaps it is
simpler to think of the judge's role at the "good faith" hearing in the
reverse. His focus will be not on whether the settlement falls within the
reasonable range but whether it does not. Remembering that the bur-
den of proof is on the party asserting the lack of good faith,335 the judge
will find the settlement to be a "good faith" settlement unless the ob-
jecting party proves that the settlement does not fall within the reason-
able range of the settler's potential liability, or as stated by the court in
River Garden Farms, that the amount in settlement is "so poorly related
to the value of the case as to impose a potentially disproportionate cost
on the defendant ultimately selected for suit. ' 336 If the decision is a
close one, then the court should find the amount of the settlement to be
within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional
amount of liability. This analysis will give the trial judge leeway to
find that a disproportionately low settlement is not within the definition
of a "good faith" settlement.
4. The test in operation
The reasonable range test is meant to allow a flexible analysis. An
argument might be made that the guidelines are too vague to be put
into practice.337 However, the reported appellate decisions reveal that
several courts, both at the trial and appellate levels, have actually per-
formed this reasonable range type of analysis based on evidence
presented in a pretrial setting to determine whether a settlement is a
"good faith" settlement.338 The results reached by the courts seem to
be correct. Therefore, it will be helpful to examine these cases to see
the test in operation and to explore the types of evidence looked to by
these courts in performing the reasonable range analysis.
334. 146 Cal. App. 3d at 1163, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Lewis, J., dissenting), hearing
granted, Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A. 31826).
335. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(d) (West Supp. 1984).
336. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506. See also Tech-
Bit, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 1163, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 740 (Lewis, J., dissenting), hearing granted,
Nov. 10, 1983 (L.A. 31826).
337. No court has made this argument. The courts that adopted the tortious conduct test
did so for the stated purpose of encouraging settlement, not because the reasonable range
analysis of River Garden Farms was unworkable.
338. Widson, 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1984); Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323,
191 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (1983); Wysong, 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983);
Cardio, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981); Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798,
173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981). These decisions were reached by the appellate courts supposedly
applying the tortious conduct test.
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In Dompeling,339 the appellate court did a very simple analysis. It
looked at the amount of the settlement, the amount of a total settlement
request made by the plaintiff to all parties, and the evidence in the
record as to the liability of the parties. The court found that a $100,000
settlement was not an "unreasonably cheap settlement" as that term
was used by the River Garden Farms court because the plaintiff's total
settlement request was $325,000 and the evidence indicated that the
liability was not attributable solely to the settling party.340
The trial court in Cardio34 1 also utilized this type of test. To
briefly recap the facts, the heirs of the decedent sued a hospital for
negligent operation of a heart/lung machine and Cardio, the distribu-
tor of the defective machine that caused the death. The plaintiff settled
with Cardio for nothing more than a waiver of costs in order not to
complicate the simple case against the hospital.342 As a first step in
determining the issue of "good faith," the trial court considered evi-
dence as to the liability of the parties. For example, it heard testimony
of a hospital technician who operated the heart/lung machine during
the surgery who admitted incorrectly attaching the tubing which caused
the patient's death. The hospital's expert testified to the contrary
claiming that the machine was defective, and the hospital's counsel
made an offer of proof as to what other experts would testify to if called
as witnesses at the trial.343 Also considered by the trial court was testi-
mony from plaintiffs former counsel as to his evaluation of the case
who stated that the case against Cardio was substantial.3" After evalu-
ating these factors, the trial court concluded that "[t]here being some
potential liability on the part of [Cardio], the dismissal for a waiver of
costs could not have been reasonably proportionate to the potential lia-
bility [of Cardio] to plaintiffs."
345
The case of Kohn v. Superior Court346 was an appellate review of a
trial court's determination at a pretrial hearing pursuant to section
877.6 that two settlements had been made in "good faith." The Kohn
case involved a suit for fraud by purchasers of a residence against the
sellers, the real estate brokers, the construction company that had re-
339. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981).
340. Id. at 807, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 43. For a more detailed discussion of Dompeling, see
supra text accompanying notes 108-14.
341. 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
343. Id. at 883-84, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
344. Id. at 884, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
345. Id. at 886, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
346. 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983).
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paired fire damage, and a pest control company. The construction
company and the pest control company each settled with plaintiff for
$6,000. The complaint sought $500,000 against all defendants. The
trial court analyzed the "good faith" of the settlements by considering
affidavits submitted by the parties at the "good faith" hearing as to
their estimates of the value of the case and their liability. The declara-
tion by the attorney for the pest control company stated that the com-
pany paid the $6,000 only to avoid the cost of trial and that it was his
position that there was no evidence of any negligence on its part or any
conspiracy to defraud the plaintiffs. Counsel for the construction com-
pany submitted a similar, although less detailed, declaration. The non-
settling defendants, namely the real estate brokers, who had the burden
of proof on estabishing lack of "good faith," submitted a declaration by
counsel stating his opinion that a trial would result in a judgment
against the settling defendants at least equal to that against his clients.
They also submitted a declaration by the seller that at the time of the
sale he thought all of the damage about which the plaintiff was com-
plaining had been repaired by the settling defendants. The plaintiffs
submitted no evidence regarding their reasons for settling.
347
The appellate court concurred in the trial court's finding of "good
faith" based on this evidence. In its opinion it adopted the trial court's
approach and reviewed the evidence, the legal theories pursued, and
the damages claimed.348 Thus, both the trial judge and the appellate
judges used their experience in valuing lawsuits and decided that a to-
tal settlement of $12,000 for these particular defendants for damage to
a $60,500 residence was reasonable.
34 9
Discovery devices were used by the attorneys at the section 877.6
"good faith" hearing in Wysong-Miles & Co. v. Western Industrial Mov-
ers.3 10 In that action, the plaintiff was injured in an industrial accident
347. Id. at 327-28, 191 Cal. Rptr. 81-82.
348. It noted that the plaintiffs had sued for emotional distress and other claimed conse-
quences of the physical deficiencies of the residence. Only in unusual circumstances would
they be able to recover on these grounds. Id. at 328, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 82. Also, the court
noted that the punitive damages claimed could be recovered only against the nonsettling
parties and not against the settling defendants. Id. at 328 & n.2, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 82 & n.2.
349. The appellate court commented that the trial court was not required to ignore its
own experience in valuing lawsuits and accept a prayer by plaintiffs as the comparison point
for evaluating the settlement. Id. at 328, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
A similar analysis was conducted at the "good faith" settlement hearing at the trial level
in Owen, 713 F.2d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1983). Counsel for the plaintiff and the settling
defendant submitted affidavits stating on what bases they reached the settlement and point-
ing out why they thought the settling defendant's state court exposure was minimal.
350. 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983).
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while working on a machine that had been manufactured by defendant
Wysong and moved to the plaintiff's employer's shop by defendant
Movers. The plaintiff settled with Movers for $65,000. The plaintiffs
total claims against all defendants were over $7,000,000. At the hear-
ing on the "good faith" of the settlement, the trial judge took evidence
in the form of declarations. Counsel for the settling defendant, Mov-
ers, submitted a detailed declaration setting forth the allegations of the
complaint against Movers and summarizing deposition testimony from
one of the plaintiffs co-workers which cast doubt on Movers' liabil-
ity.35' In a later hearing on the same issue, Movers' counsel attached a
portion of this deposition transcript to his declaration in which the co-
worker gave evidence tending to reduce the potential for liability on the
part of Movers. Wysong's counsel, who opposed the finding of "good
faith," also referred to other deposition testimony and utilized the
plaintiffs responses to a certain interrogatory to illustrate to the court
the plaintiffs legal theories for liability." 2 At one point during the
"good faith" proceedings, the appellate court in a writ proceeding
stated that if the lower court needed additional evidence to rule on the
issue of "good faith" the court could continue the hearing for a reason-
able period of time.353 This presumably would have allowed the par-
ties to conduct any necessary additional discovery that would be
needed to bear on the "good faith" issue. Thus, in Wysong, the trial
court made its "good faith" determination by referring to declarations
of counsel, excerpts from discovery, and its own judgment. It evalu-
ated the potential liability of the settling defendant and concluded that
Movers had a viable defense to the action. On this basis, the court
decided that the settlement was in "good faith." The appellate court
upheld this determination and conducted the same type of analysis.
In the case of Widson v. International Harvester Co. ," both the
trial court and appellate court seemed to perform the exact type of
analysis recommended by this article. 55 In so doing, these courts
looked to the attorneys' evaluation of the range of the settlor's potential
liability (zero to 10%) and the plaintiffs probable recovery ($200,000 to
$750,000). In light of these figures, both courts concluded the amount
of the settlement ($30,000) was not unreasonable.356
351. Id. at 281-82, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74.
352. Id. at 282-83, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
353. Id. at 283, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
354. 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1984).
355. The case involved various issues and the appellate court's discussion of the "good
faith" analysis comprised only one short paragraph of the opinion.
356. Specifically, the court stated:
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These reported cases illustrate that the reasonable range analysis,
because it requires only a rough approximation of value, is a workable
approach. The reasonable range of a settlement is a question of fact in
each case357 to be determined by the judge based on evidence presented
to him by the parties at the hearing and his own experience. Unless the
party opposing the finding of "good faith" carries the burden of prov-
ing the amount is outside the reasonable range of the settlor's fair
share, the settlement will be approved.
5. Policy considerations and the "reasonable range" definition of
"good faith"
a. the policy of encouragement of settlement of litigation
The reasonable range test does encourage both partial and com-
plete settlement of litigation, although not in the same way as does the
tortious conduct test. It has been shown that a test of a "good faith"
settlement such as the tortious conduct test that requires no relationship
whatsoever between the settlement amount and the settling defendant's
proportional liability will provide tremendous encouragement for an
initial, cheap settlement.35 The effect that this first, cheap settlement
will have on settlement by other defendants is unclear.
3 59
The reasonable range definition of "good faith," requiring that the
settlement must at least approximate the settlor's proportional liability,
will not provide the same incentive for defendants to attempt to enter
into a quick, cheap, disproportionate settlement. Because a dispropor-
tionate settlement will not be found to be in "good faith" under this test
and will not shield the settlor from liability for partial indemnity, the
incentive to settle for an amount not within the reasonable range will
disappear.
Nevertheless, the reasonable range test of "good faith" will pro-
vide an incentive to settlement because the settlor may still extricate
himself from the litigation for a reduced amount. This is because this
test does not require exact proportionality of the settlement to the
tortfeasor's fair share, but rather looks to see if the settlement is within
Evaluation of [the settlor's] potential liability ranged from zero to 10 per cent
of plaintifFs recovery. Counsel for [the settlor] expressed the view that in the worst
case [the settlor's] exposure would tally 25 per cent. Evaluations of plaintifis total
recovery ranged from $200,000 to $750,000. In such a factual context, it cannot be
said the $30,000 paid by [the settlor] was unreasonable.
158 Cal. App. 3d at 58, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
357. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
358. See supra text following note 265.
359. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
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a range of proportionality. Also, it takes into account the fact that a
settlement by definition is a lesser amount than the parties feel would
be awarded by a jury. Therefore, under this test a settling defendant
can settle in "good faith" for an amount less than what he expects will
be his ultimate proportionate share of liability to the other parties. He
still may buy his peace from both the plaintiff and his joint tortfeasors
for a reduced sum, thereby providing a strong incentive to settle.
Also, there will be an incentive for defendants to settle early.
Under the reasonable range test as proposed, the earlier the settlement,
the smaller it need be because in determining the reasonable range, the
trial court will consider when the plaintiff obtained the use of the
money.360 Another incentive to early settlement is provided because
this test gives the advantage to the first defendant to settle. Since the
amount of settlement can be below a settlor's strict proportional share
and still be in "good faith," the nonsettling defendants will have to
account for any shortfall. This is the same result as under the tortious
conduct test, but the shortfall will not be so extreme because the first
settlement must at least be within the reasonable range of the settlor's
proportionate share.
In addition to encouraging an early settlement with one tortfeasor,
the reasonable range test will probably also promote the policy of set-
tlement of the entire litigation. Because the first settling defendant set-
tled within his reasonable range of liability, the second defendant will
not be facing a huge disproportionate judgment as could be the case
under the tortious conduct test of "good faith."'361 The potential judg-
ment against the remaining defendant and the plaintiff's monetary de-
mands upon him will be reasonably related to his amount of fault, and,
therefore, it is more likely that the second defendant will be willing to
enter into a realistic settlement. Again, whether this will occur will de-
pend on the various parties, their evaluation of the plaintiffs potential
for recovery, and other factors peculiar to each case.
By way of example, a comparison between the tortious conduct
test and the reasonable range test for "good faith" as far as the encour-
agement of the settlement of the entire litigation is concerned can be
made as follows. Assume the plaintiff has been damaged in the
amount of $100,000 and sues A who is 80% at fault and B who is 20% at
fault. If the plaintiff settles with A for $5,000, under the tortious con-
duct test this settlement would be found to be in "good faith" absent
360. See supra text accompanying notes 300-02.
361. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
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any proof of tortious conduct, and defendant B would face potential
liability of $95,000 even though he was only 20% at fault. As was
shown in Part V-A,362 it is unclear whether this potential verdict com-
pletely unrelated to the amount of fault would force B into a settlement
in excess of his percentage of fault or whether it would compel B to
take his chances at the trial. However, under the reasonable range test,
such a settlement would not be found to be in "good faith" so defend-
antA would not want to enter into it because he would still be liable on
the cross-complaints. If the court utilized the reasonable range test,
A's settlement would have to be more in line with his anticipated pro-
portionate share. Because he cannot buy an unreasonably cheap settle-
ment, assume A decides to settle for $60,000 (still, a bargain) and the
court finds that this amount is within the reasonable range of A's po-
tential liability to all parties. B is still facing more than his proportion-
ate share of liability, but the amount is not nearly so disproportionate
as before. The plaintiff need not seek as much in settlement from B in
order to be compensated for his injuries because he received more from
A. Because the plaintiff can be satisfied with a lesser amount from B,
and because Bs potential liability is more in keeping with his percent-
age of fault, it is probably more likely that the plaintiff and defendant
B will be able to reach a settlement and end the entire litigation.
In summary, because a settling defendant may settle for less than
his strict proportional share and still have his settlement found to be
made in "good faith," the reasonable range analysis promotes early set-
tlement of litigation and gives the advantage to the first defendant to
settle. Furthermore, this definition of "good faith" will promote settle-
ment of the entire litigation because the remainder of the plaintiffs
damages should not be so grossly disproportionate to the remaining
defendant's proportionate share of liability as to discourage settlement
with that party. Also, the very fact that Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 877.6 puts the burden of proof at the hearing on the party claiming
lack of "good faith," in and of itself, will always tip the balance in
favor of the approval of a settlement no matter which interpretation of
"good faith" is adopted.
b. thepolicy of equitable apportionment of loss among joint
tortfeasors
The main benefit of the reasonable range test over the tortious




of loss among the tortfeasors. To be in "good faith" and discharge the
settlor from claims for partial indemnity a settlement must be within
the reasonable range of the settlor's fair share. Thus, the settlor will
pay an amount commensurate with his comparative fault, although
probably somewhat less.363 Correspondingly, the offset a nonsettling
tortfeasor will obtain against an eventual judgment will be within the
reasonable range of the settlor's fair share, leaving the nonsettlor an
amount to pay within the reasonable range of his proportional share,
although probably somewhat more.3 4 Also, if the second defendant
chooses to settle, he will probably be able to settle for an amount ap-
proximating the reasonable range of his proportionate share.365
Therefore, the reasonable range test for determining the "good
faith" of a settlement will further the policy of equitable apportionment
of loss according to fault to a large extent but not totally. While the
only test of "good faith" settlement that will render precise equitable
apportionment of loss among tortfeasors is one releasing the settlor
from partial indemnity only if his settlement is strictly proportional to
his ultimately determined liability, the reasonable range test provides
much greater equitable apportionment of loss than does the tortious
conduct test whereby a settlement can be in "good faith" regardless of
its amount.
c. the policy of maximization of the plaintifs recovery
The effect of the reasonable range test on the public policy of max-
imization of the plaintiff's recovery cannot be quantified. However, it
has been shown that under this test an initial and early settlement with
a defendant is encouraged. 366 It has also been hypothesized that under
this test the settlements with the remaining defendants and the eventual
settlement of the entire litigation are encouraged more than they would
be under the tortious conduct test.367 Therefore, perhaps if courts uti-
lized the reasonable range test to determine the "good faith" of a settle-
ment, plaintiffs would end up being compensated for their injuries by
receiving at least one early, roughly proportionate settlement followed
by other realistic settlements. However, as has been demonstrated
above, if the plaintiff proceeds to trial and is successful against at least
one solvent defendant, it does not matter which definition of "good
363. See supra text accompanying notes 359-62.
364. Id.
365. See supra text accompanying and following notes 361-62.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 359-60.
367. See supra text accompanying and following notes 361-62.
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faith" is adopted as far as the plaintiffs total recovery is concerned.368
The definition of "good faith" only makes a difference as to the alloca-
tion of the judgment between the joint tortfeasors.
d practical considerations relating to the "goodfaith" hearing
There is no doubt that the utilization of a reasonable range test
will complicate the "good faith" settlement hearing. However, as was
shown, the reasonable range analysis is workable. The appellate deci-
sions reveal that several trial courts have considered the necessary cri-
teria to conduct the analysis and have done so successfully. 369 True,
this type of "good faith" hearing takes longer to hear, takes more prep-
aration by counsel, and is more complex than a hearing solely into the
tortious conduct of the parties. However, the policies of equitable ap-
portionment of loss among tortfeasors and fairness should not be sacri-
ficed merely for judicial expediency. Judges are accustomed to
considering complicated pretrial motions, such as motions for summary
judgment, when necessary. Because of the importance of the "good
faith" determination to the settling parties and to the nonsettling
tortfeasors, the definition of "good faith" adopted by the courts should
not be determined according to the ease with which it can be adminis-
tered if other policy considerations are sacrificed.
6. The special problem of the relatively insolvent tortfeasor
The preceding discussion of the reasonable range test for "good
faith" has assumed that the settling tortfeasor is financially able to pay
his proportionate share of the plaintiffs judgment. However, a
tortfeasor who is not able to pay this amount may wish to settle if that
settlement will be found to be in "good faith" so as to discharge him
from claims for partial indemnity. Thus, a court may be called upon to
decide whether a settlement that would otherwise not fall within the
reasonable range of a settlor's proportional responsibility should never-
theless be found to be in "good faith" because the settlor is financially
unable to pay more.
The cases suggest the relevancy of a settling party's financial status
to the determination of "good faith." For instance, the court in River
Garden Farms defined the "good faith" clause as a demand for settle-
ments which have a reasonable relation to the value of the plaintiffs
case, to the strengths and weaknesses of the parties, and the financial
368. See supra text preceding note 235.
369. See supra notes 337-56 and accompanying text.
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ability of the settlor 7 ° In Stambaugh it was stated that "even where
the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability therefore
certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable
in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured or underinsured,
joint tortfeasor."37 Similarly, the court in Fisher specifically men-
tioned the wealth of a settling defendant as evidence that may be ad-
missible on the trial of the "good faith" issue.372
A rule allowing a relatively insolvent373 tortfeasor's financial status
to reduce the amount required for his settlement to be "good faith"
makes sense if the proposed settlement is for basically the full amount
he would be able to contribute to plaintiff's recovery, i.e., the amount
that could actually be collected from him after a judgment. If the set-
tlement is in this amount, a finding that this lower settlement is in
"good faith" will not result in any additional detriment to the other
tortfeasors. Under the present law the inability of one joint tortfeasor
to pay his share of a judgment does not alter the plaintiffs recovery; the
plaintiff can collect the entire amount of the judgment from the other
joint tortfeasors. 374 However, the insolvency of one tortfeasor will in-
crease the payments by the other tortfeasors because the relatively in-
solvent tortfeasor's shortfall must then be shared proportionately by the
solvent tortfeasors as though the insolvent person had not participated
in the action. 375  This is the same result that occurs where one
tortfeasor's shortfall is caused not by financial inability to pay, but
370. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
371. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
372. 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47.
373. For purposes of this discussion, the term "relatively insolvent" tortfeasor will be
used to describe a tortfeasor with insufficient assets (including insurance) to pay the full
amount of his proportionate share of plaintiffs judgment.
374. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
375. Paradise Valley Hosp. v. Schlossman, 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 93, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531,
536 (1983). In that case, there was no negligence found on the part of the plaintiff. Presum-
ably, under the rules of joint and several liability, if the plaintiff were also at fault, he would
not share in the shortfall occasioned by one tortfeasor's insolvency, but rather could collect
the difference from the other joint tortfeasors. This result has been criticized. See Zavos,
supra note 214, at 817; Fleming, Foreword- Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial
Choice, 64 CAL. L. REV. 239, 251-52 (1976).
The appellate court in Lyly & Sons Trucking Co. v. State, 147 Cal. App. 3d 353, 358,
195 Cal. Rptr. 116, 119 (1983), expressly rejected an argument that a comparatively negli-
gent plaintiff share in the allocation of that portion of the judgment attributable to a
tortfeasor settling in "good faith." The court held that the amount of the settling tortfeasor's
share should be allocated among the nonsettling defendants according to their percentage of
fault, and no portion of it should be allocated back to a comparatively negligent plaintiff.
The court analogized this to the situation of an insolvent defendant.
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rather because his settlement has been found to be in "good faith."376
Therefore, given that a relatively insolvent tortfeasor only has so much
money to contribute either to the plaintiff or to the other tortfeasors, it
does not matter to the other tortfeasors whether his payment of this
amount to the plaintiff is found to be a "good faith" settlement because
the remaining tortfeasors will end up paying the shortfall.
Under these facts, the policy of equitable apportionment of loss
according to fault will be frustrated in any event. Accordingly, in this
situation it seems logical to take the financial condition of the relatively
insolvent tortfeasor into account in determining the reasonable range
of his settlement. By finding his settlement to be in "good faith," he
will be encouraged to settle, the plaintiff will get this amount of money
at an earlier time, and no additional detriment will result to the nonset-
tling tortfeasors.377
However, a tortfeasor's desire to settle for something less than the
collectable amount of his assets so that he will have other assets re-
maining does not justify an exception allowing his settlement to be in a
lower amount. A contrary result would be unfair to the nonsettling
tortfeasors and would not promote equitable apportionment of loss. It
would encourage the settlement with that relatively insolvent
tortfeasor, but that does not outweigh the inequities of depriving non-
settling tortfeasors of their claims for partial indemnity as discussed
previously in this article.
The rules set forth above with respect to the applicability of the
solvency of the settling defendant to a reasonable range analysis would
further the policy of protecting a defendant from discovery into his fi-
nancial affairs expressed by the Dompeling court.378 As long as a set-
tling defendant comes forward with a settlement that he claims is
within the reasonable range of his fair share, his financial condition is
irrelevant to the "good faith" issue and cannot be discovered. How-
ever, once he claims that his acceptable settlement amount should be
lowered because he is relatively insolvent, then his financial status will
become relevant. Since he is the one who put the matter in issue, it is
376. Lyly, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 355, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
377. If the courts ultimately determine that a plaintiff who is comparatively negligent
must share in the shortfall of an insolvent defendant, the rule of Ly/y & Sons, supra note 375,
should also be changed to the extent that a finding of "good faith" has been based on the
relative insolvency of a tortfeasor. Otherwise, a plaintiff could shift his portion of the bur-
den for the insolvent defendant's shortfall to the nonsettling tortfeasors by settling with this
defendant for a small amount and having that settlement found to be in "good faith" be-
cause the defendant is relatively insolvent.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
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not unreasonable to require him to allow the other party to discover
whether his assertions regarding his financial condition are true. Of
course, the "good faith" hearing will be further complicated to the ex-
tent the court must examine the solvency of the settling defendant.
E Recommendation." The Reasonable Range Test Should Be Adopted
The reasonable range test of whether a settlement is in "good
faith" recognizes the role of the "good faith" requirement as an accom-
modating factor among competing policy considerations. This defini-
tion fosters both the policies of encouragement of settlement and
equitable apportionment of loss as mandated by the comparative negli-
gence cases. By providing a settling defendant with a release from par-
tial indemnity claims if the amount of his settlement falls within the
reasonable range of the settlor's proportionate liability to the other par-
ties, settlements will still be encouraged. The initial settlement will re-
main attractive because it can be for less than an exact proportionate
share.379 Settlements by remaining tortfeasors will also be encouraged,
leading to settlement of the entire case.38 ° The goal of equitable appor-
tionment of loss is also achieved by this test, although not perfectly.
Because the settlor's share must fall within the reasonable range of his
proportionate liability, the shares left to be paid by the remaining
tortfeasors by definition will be within the reasonable range of their
proportionate shares.38  The goal of compensating injured plaintiffs
will not be jeopardized by this test, and an argument can be made that
plaintiffs may actually benefit from such a rule. 38" Also, it has been
shown that the test is workable and can be administered in the context
of a pretrial hearing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
877.6.383
The "good faith" requirement is the mechanism by which impor-
tant but competing policy considerations can be balanced. The reason-
able range test allows it to serve this function.
VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has directed that the comparative
negligence rationale should be applied to unsettled questions in a prac-
379. See supra text following notes 359-60.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 361-62.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 359-64.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 366-68.
383. See supra notes 337-56 and accompanying text.
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tical manner.384 Development of the law in the multi-party tort area
should proceed in a flexible fashion to reach a just and equitable result
for all parties.311 One area of tort law ripe for further development is
that of "good faith" settlements. The tortious conduct test being ap-
plied now by the California appellate courts is at odds with the overall
comparative negligence scheme and should be but "a temporary stop
on the path of California law. ' 386 A definition of a "good faith" settle-
ment requiring that the amount of the settlement be within the reason-
able range of the settlor's proportionate liability will serve to further
the evolution of comparative fault concepts without sacrificing other
important policy considerations.
384. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 823-27, 532 P.2d at 1240-42, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-74.
385. Daly v. General Motors, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380, 386 (1978).
386. Owen, 713 F.2d at 1465.
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